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ABSTRACT 
       Toleration has been a topic that was widely considered as an intra-state matter 
rather than an international issue among the contemporary scholars. By arguing 
against the possible reasons for this neglect on the international aspect of toleration, 
this thesis claims that there is a place for toleration in our thinking on the 
international realm. Moreover, it is argued that various dimensions of international 
toleration can be conceptualized such as the characteristics of and reasons for 
international toleration. In line with this, the theories of John Rawls and Jurgen 
Habermas are analyzed as two theoretical sources for investigating the way one might 
think of toleration as an international issue. In this respect, a comparative and 
interpretive analysis is made by focusing on the grounds and characteristics of 
toleration in their outlooks for addressing their strong and weak points on the issue.        
        To argue for the possibility of international toleration, first, a conceptual map is 
developed which outlines the characteristics (structure) of the concept. I noted agents 
and objects, diversity coupled with disapproval, power, scope, demands and limits of 
toleration as characteristics of toleration that make toleration possible. Possible 
reasons that might be given for the justification of toleration are also listed: non-
moral prudential reasons, moral consequentialist reasons, principled moral reasons 
and skepticism. Then, theories of Rawls and Habermas are analyzed in the light of 
this conceptual map as two supportive cases for international toleration. 
         It is stated that both Rawls and Habermas provide strong cases for the 
possibility of international toleration. They take pluralism seriously as a global 
condition in which the question of toleration arises, and for both of them, toleration is 
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a requirement of international political justice. In line with this, they provide a moral 
principled justification for international toleration in bringing the idea of respect to 
the fore as a reason for toleration in the international realm. Thus, I contend that there 
is a commonality concerning the grounds of toleration as an international issue 
between the theories of Rawls and Habermas. 
        I state that the differences between the outlooks of Rawls and Habermas on 
international toleration stems from Habermas‟s cosmopolitanism as opposed to 
Rawls‟s internationalism. I claim that the fact that Habermas leaves room for a 
variety of agents allows him to incorporate plural and diverse agents into his theory 
of toleration as compared to Rawls.  I also mention that Habermas‟s insistence on 
both positive actions and dispositions as requirements of international toleration leads 
to a demanding notion of international toleration but not less realistic. 
        I also analyze the differences between the outlooks of Rawls and Habermas on 
human rights as limits of toleration. I argue that they differ in principle regarding the 
content and role of human rights. Nevertheless, I concede, beside their differences in 
principle, they not differ much in practice: Habermas is not necessarily supportive of 
any international intervention in the name of human rights. 
         Lastly, I focus on which features a theory of international toleration should have 
in the 21
st
 century by way of reflecting on the strong and weak points of the outlooks 
of Rawls and Habermas on international toleration. In this vein, I state my concluding 
remarks on dimensions of international toleration for a pluralistic multicultural world-
society. 
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INTRODUCTION 
        In the period of the Reformation, toleration emerged as both an intra-state and 
inter-state phenomenon. During the 16
th
  and 17
th
 centuries, toleration arose not only 
as an issue for rulers in relation to their subjects, but also in relation to one another: 
Catholic and Protestant rulers had to face the question of whether they should tolerate 
one another. Cuius regio eius religio came onto the agenda as a principle of toleration 
even though it was largely pragmatic in its basis. 
        We might claim that in our contemporary multicultural world, toleration still 
retains its significance as an international issue as well as an intra-state one. Contrary 
to what is envisioned by the modernization thesis, religion continues to have its 
impact on the political and ethical life of citizens both at the international and 
national level.
1
 Not only the rise of religious fundamentalism but also the ongoing 
presence of religion in political and social life has proved that secularization is not a 
smooth path that has resulted in the weakening of the religion in the lives of 
individuals and communities of different sort. In contemporary societies, we have to 
live together in the same territory as people having different faiths and value systems.  
Moreover, issues of different faith and values, give rise to questions of 
tolerance/intolerance at the global level too regardless of whether we buy into the so 
called „clash of civilizations‟ thesis.  It might be claimed that “there is a sense now 
                                                          
1
 See Jurgen Habermas. “The Resurgence of Religion- A Challenge for a secular Self- interpretation of 
Modernity?”, Paper for the conference „Religione e Politica nella Societa Post-secolare‟ (Rome, 
13/9/2007) and “Post-Secular Society? What does that mean?”, paper presented at the Conference 
“Istanbul Seminars, East and West” ( June 2-8 2008) 
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that we share a world where the question of toleration is posited not just as an issue 
for states, for their local laws and constitutions, but for humanity as a whole.”2 
          With the development of globalization, conflicts have gained a more cross- 
boundary character given the high level of interconnectedness regarding the political, 
economic and social structures and the movement of people across boundaries. 
Globalization puts injustice on stage by dividing the world into winners, beneficiaries 
and losers.
3
 Conflicts based on economic and social inequality as well as differences 
of values, beliefs, traditions and world-views have developed increasingly into global 
issues regardless of the nature of the causes of those conflicts. Thus, toleration and 
intolerance, as responses to disapproved/ disliked difference, are in need of 
consideration in international/global terms rather than simply as issues within state 
boundaries.  
         In focusing on toleration as an international issue, this dissertation has two 
justifications: one empirical, the other theoretical. As was mentioned above, the 
empirical justification is that conflicts that call for tolerance have emerged as global 
issues in contemporary times. Perhaps the most remembered and significant case was 
the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers. It was perhaps the first world historical event, 
                                                          
2
 Williams Melissa S. and Waldron Jeremy. Toleration and Its Limits, Nomos XLVIII. New York: 
New York University Press, 2008, 24. 
3
 Giovanna Borradori, Philosophy in a Time of Terror- Dialogue With Jurgen Habermas and Jacques 
Derrida (The University of Chicago Press, 2004), 64 
 
 
11 
 
as Habermas mentioned, that occurred in front of the eyes of a global audience.
4
  
What we observed was an act of intolerance which had global effects both in its own 
consequences and in the reactions undertaken by the US government afterwards. 
Thus, we witnessed that terror as an act of intolerance that led to more intolerance 
with the actions undertaken by USA afterwards (i.e. the war against terror). These 
events confirmed  that the questions of toleration and intolerance are indeed global 
issues, not only intra-state matters. 
         In line with the empirical motivation mentioned above, there is also a normative 
motive behind this dissertation in focusing on toleration as an international issue: 
toleration is needed as a moral attitude if we have to share the same world in peace 
and stability as people coming from different cultures, civilizations and societies. 
This means, responding with toleration to each other‟s differences at the global level 
(be they religious differences or not) seems to be significant for peace and stability. 
Yet, this does not mean that toleration is considered without limits. It is important to 
note that toleration is not addressed in absolute terms in this work. It is only to 
address the motivation that toleration as a moral principle is a requirement of peace 
and stability. 
        The second justification is theoretical: this dissertation aims to contribute to the 
contemporary literature on toleration by focusing on a rather disregarded topic; the 
international aspect of toleration. Toleration has been widely studied as an intra-state 
                                                          
4
 Jurgen Habermas, “Fundamentalism and Terror- A dialogue with Jurgen Habermas”, Philosophy in a 
Time of Terror- Dialogue with Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, ed. Giovanna Borradori (The 
University of Chicago Press, 2003), 24 
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matter rather than an international issue. Of course there are a few exceptions such as 
Michael Walzer, John Rawls, Kok Chor Tan and Peter Jones. Nevertheless, toleration 
has received attention mainly within the context of democratic societies (as an intra-
state issue). There might be reasons that explain the lack of consideration that 
international toleration has received and these will be addressed in this work. 
Nevertheless, it is claimed that these reasons for the neglect of international 
dimension of toleration do not justify the neglect. Based on this diagnosis, this 
dissertation intends to contribute to the theoretical literature on toleration by focusing 
on its international dimension. 
       I aim to answer the question of whether there is a place for toleration in our 
thinking on the international realm and if so, what it is. It is argued that we can think 
of toleration as an international issue and that we might address its dimensions by 
outlining its characteristics and the possible reasons that might be offered for its 
justification. The whole research concerns the way in which we might think of 
different dimensions of toleration in the international realm. Specifically, we will 
focus on the theories of John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas as two exemplary cases. 
Their theories are supportive of the argument that there is a place for toleration in our 
thinking on the international realm and indicate how we might outline its possible 
grounds and characteristics. 
        In arguing for the possibility of toleration as an international matter, I draw on 
specific theoretical sources. First of all, I start with the analysis of the concept in 
general and  set out the characteristics of and reasons for toleration. Thus, I refer to 
the contemporary literature on the concept of toleration, such as the articles and texts 
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of Susan Mendus, Catriona MacKinnon, John Horton and Rainer Forst. This will help 
to develop a conceptual map that outlines the possible dimensions and grounds of 
toleration. Secondly, I address the relevant contributions in contemporary political 
theory which argue for toleration as an international issue, even though these are few, 
such as M. Walzer and P. Jones to demonstrate the significance of toleration in the 
international realm. Finally, I focus on John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas as two 
theoretical sources that claim  the possibility of toleration as an international issue 
and that analyze the way one might think of its dimensions. The outlooks of Rawls 
and Habermas will be analyzed and interpreted in the light of the conceptual map that 
will be developed concerning the characteristics of and reasons for toleration as an 
international issue.  
        The theories of John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas provide the main focus of the 
dissertation because they provide strong cases for the possibility and significance of 
international toleration. First, their theories provide a detailed  account of toleration 
and its international aspect both in their description of the concept and the reasons 
they give for toleration. In this respect, their account of toleration is in line with the 
conceptual map that is developed regarding the characteristics (conditions of 
possibility) of and reasons for toleration in this dissertation. 
         Secondly, their theories also provide a solid moral basis for toleration and its 
international aspect as we think of the realities of our times due to their recognition of 
the fact of pluralism and reciprocal democratic dimension of toleration. In the outlook 
of Rawls and Habermas, toleration comes to the fore as part of a democratic ideal 
based on the reciprocal respect of free and equal citizens in conditions of pluralism. 
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This gives us the chance to reflect on the meaning and dimensions of toleration for a 
multicultural world divided by various differences. In line with this, their emphasis 
on pluralism as a global condition is significant for us to think of the different 
dimensions of toleration such as possible reasons for toleration at the international 
level. 
        So far, I have stated the motivation and argument of the dissertation. From now 
on, I will mention how I will focus on the question of the research by outlining what 
exactly  I will be doing in each chapter of the dissertation. This dissertation consists 
of six principal chapters. Chapter 1 will be concerned with the concept of toleration 
and its international aspect in order to develop a conceptual map that will be used 
when interpreting the theories of Rawls and Habermas. In the subsequent chapters, 
we will focus specifically on the outlooks of Rawls and Habermas as far as toleration 
and its international aspect is concerned. And, finally, in the conclusion, a summary 
of the analysis and conclusions that will be derived from the analysis will be outlined. 
        Chapter 1 consists of two parts. In the first part, I will develop a conceptual map 
by outlining the characteristics of and reasons for toleration. In the second part, I will 
pose the main question of the dissertation: Is there a place for toleration in our 
thinking on the international realm and if so, what is it? This part of the chapter will 
be concerned with developing an argument for toleration as an international issue. 
Hence, first, we will outline the possible reasons for the neglect of toleration as an 
international issue. After demonstrating the implausibility of those reasons that 
disregard toleration as an international issue, I will cite certain examples from 
contemporary international discourse to demonstrate that there is a place for 
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toleration in our thinking of international realm. Then, using the conceptual map that 
is developed in the first part of the chapter, I will consider the possible characteristics 
of and reasons for toleration in the international realm in order to show the way we 
might think of toleration as an international issue. 
        Chapter 2 deals with the theory of John Rawls as far as his domestic conception 
of toleration is concerned. I will focus on Political Liberalism to outline the main 
features of toleration in the theory of Rawls. This is significant because Rawls‟s 
conception of toleration in the context of domestic democratic societies is highly 
relevant to understanding and interpreting his outlook on international toleration.  In 
this chapter, I will make conceptual references to the first part of the Chapter 1 to 
examine the grounds (reasons for) and structure (characteristics) of toleration in the 
theory of Rawls. Then in Chapter 3, I will examine his account of international 
toleration in The Law of Peoples. In this chapter, I will also refer to Political 
Liberalism to examine the parallels and differences between Rawls‟s thinking on 
domestic and international toleration. It is also significant to note that throughout the 
two chapters on Rawls, particular references to Habermas‟s outlook on toleration will 
be made to anticipate certain parallels and differences between the two theories. 
        Chapter 4 concerns the theory of Jurgen Habermas regarding his conception of 
toleration as an intra-state matter. I will address the features of his conception of 
toleration within the context of democratic societies in light of the conceptual map 
that is developed in the first chapter. This will give us the chance to see the parallels 
and discontinuities between his understanding of toleration as an intra-state matter 
and as an international matter. In Chapter 5, I will analyze the grounds and 
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characteristics of international toleration in the theory of Habermas. In addressing the 
way Habermas understands toleration, I will also refer back to Rawls to make a 
comparison between the two theories.  
        Chapter 6 is devoted to further reflections on the strong and weak points of the 
theories of Rawls and Habermas on the issue of international toleration. With the help 
of the critical assessment of their outlooks on the characteristics of toleration, further 
thought will be initiated for conceptualizing different dimensions of international 
toleration. This will help us to reflect more on which features a theory of international 
toleration should have in the 21
st
 century. 
        My concluding remarks will be devoted to a brief summary of the analysis that 
is made in the dissertation regarding toleration and its international aspect and, the 
outlooks of Rawls and Habermas on toleration. I will outline the results that are 
reached concerning the way we could think of toleration as an international issue. I 
will also address the results of the interpretation of the theories of Rawls and 
Habermas concerning the characteristics and grounds of toleration as an international 
issue. The results of the comparative analysis of the theories of Rawls and Habermas 
will be briefly recalled because this will provide an example of the way that one 
could think of toleration as an international issue. In addition, addressing the strong 
and weak points of both theories with respect to toleration and its international aspect 
will give us a chance to reflect on what dimensions a theory of toleration should have 
in the conditions of a multicultural world society of the 21
st
 century.  
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CHAPTER 1 
MAPPING TOLERATION AND ITS INTERNATIONAL ASPECT 
1.1. THE CONCEPT OF TOLERATION 
     Chapter 1 aims to point out the characteristics of toleration that will allow us to 
think of it as an international issue. Basically, this chapter will establish the ground 
concerning if there is a place for toleration in our thinking of international realm and 
if so, how we can think of toleration as an international issue. However, before 
engaging in investigating the dimensions of toleration as an international issue, it is 
significant to have a grasp of what the concept of toleration amounts to as the way it 
has been pictured in the contemporary literature so far. In this sense, first part of 
Chapter 1 intends to outline how toleration has been portrayed and conceived in the 
theoretical sources which directly address the issue. One might rightly think that this 
is a huge task to tackle with since there is a vast literature that point out toleration in 
domestic context. Nevertheless, one can still try to give a glance at the relevant 
undertakings for the purpose of drawing a conceptual map. In this manner, this part of 
the chapter is particularly significant because it will provide us the foundations 
regarding the concept of toleration and thus, will give us the chance to look through 
where the conceptual tools come from when building the argument in the second part 
of this chapter. 
      First, I intend to look at the theoretical sources to identify the basic features of the 
outlook on toleration. Thus, we will start with indulging in what I call the 
characteristics of the concept of toleration. This is the part in which I aim to draw the 
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boundaries of the concept (to the extent that it is possible of course). Therefore, I aim 
to make an analysis of the concept and its different characteristics. 
     The very attempt to draw a map of a concept necessarily involves the attempt to 
understand its meaning as well.  Toleration as a term, which originates from Latin 
tolerare, means “to put up with”, “countenance” or “suffer”- “generally refer to the 
conditional acceptance of or non-interference with beliefs, actions or practices that 
one considers to be wrong but still “tolerable”, such that they should not be 
prohibited or constrained.”5 This basic definition already gives some clue to start to 
consider what is at stake when we talk about toleration. 
       As we have to get into the conceptual analysis to set up the stage for the second 
part of Chapter 1, the analysis will be based on two levels: Conditions of possibility 
of toleration (characteristics of toleration) and reasons for toleration. By conditions of 
possibility, I mean the conceptual tools that are helpful in indicating the 
characteristics of toleration. In this sense, they help to reflect on the boundaries of the 
concept by pointing out what makes toleration possible. On the other hand, reasons 
for toleration indicate why we tolerate the thing that we dislike/ disagree. A reason 
for toleration provides a justification for putting up with the thing that we dislike / 
disagree. These two levels will constitute the ground on which we move in the 
following pages of the first part. 
                                                          
5
 Rainer Forst, "Toleration", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/toleration/, (accessed February 9, 
2009) 
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1.1. 1. Characteristics of Toleration 
      Perhaps the first circumstance that one must refer is the presence of a „tolerator‟ 
and a „tolerated‟. It might be claimed that we can talk about a diversity of agents as 
well as objects depending on the context of toleration. In this way, one might think of 
„individuals‟, „groups‟ (in various forms such as associations), „societies‟, „states‟ and 
„governments‟ as potential agents of toleration. As for the objects, we can mention 
„beliefs‟, „actions‟, „identities‟ etc. Preston King makes a very helpful categorization 
regarding the objects of toleration: The first category consists of any human activity 
such as public petting, divorce, gambling, late hours, drinking, strikes, currency 
speculation, fast driving, and noisy parties and so on.
6
 Since there is no end to the 
diversity of human activity, there is no end for potential tolerance of activities. The 
second category consists of expression of various kinds of ideas such as religious, 
scientific, ethical or political. This might be labeled as ideational tolerance. Third 
category refers to the tolerance of various kinds of organizational groups such as 
ethical, political, educational, and religious. This he calls organizational tolerance. 
Here we can talk of various types of organizational tolerance such as of political 
clubs and parties, religious groups, trade unions etc. And lastly, we might talk about 
the tolerance of certain involuntary and natural or semi-natural differences such as 
nationality, class, sex, race, tribe, religion and culture. This categorization of King 
can, at least, give us the opportunity to imagine a relation of tolerance in concrete 
basis in terms of thinking of possible agents and objects. 
                                                          
6
 Preston King, Toleration (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), 63-64. 
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         When we refer to circumstances of toleration, it is commonly accepted in the 
contemporary literature that we make reference to certain principle characteristics of 
toleration such as diversity, dislike/disapproval and power.
7
 First of all, we need 
circumstances of diversity coupled with dislike, disapproval or disgust to be able to 
refer to toleration. Thus, for toleration to be possible what is needed is not sheer 
diversity or any diversity, it is diversity that is the source of dislike, disapproval or 
disgust. Otherwise, if we are happy with the plurality and nothing is bothering us, we 
cannot talk about toleration. This also means that if we are indifferent regarding a 
specific behavior/ opinion or action, then we cannot argue we tolerate it. Both 
indifference and approval are the conditions that eliminate the possibility of 
toleration. 
                                                          
7
 See Susan Mendus and John Horton, eds., Aspects of Toleration (London, New York: Methuen, 
1985), Susan Mendus, Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism (London:MacMillan,1989), Susan 
Mendus and David Edwards eds., On Toleration (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), Susan Mendus, ed., 
Justifying Toleration- Conceptual and Historical Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), John Horton, ed., Liberalism, Multiculturalism and Toleration (London: MacMillan 
Press, 1993), John Horton and Peter Nicholson, Toleration: Philosophy and Practice (Aldershot: 
Averbury, 1992),  Peter Jones, “Making Sense of Political Toleration”, British Journal of Political 
Science, 37.3 (July 2007),”Toleration, Recognition and Identity”, The Journal of Political Philosophy, 
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     Secondly, to be able to talk about toleration, we also need the characteristic of 
power. In order for me to be in a relation of toleration to someone or something, I 
have to be in the position of having the power to act or not to act on my objection. 
Regarding this point, it is significant to point out one specific aspect concerning the 
characteristic of power: Is it enough for one to feel that she is in a position to act on 
the basis of her objection or do we need further objective evidence that there is a 
power dimension demonstrating that the tolerator is objectively having the capacity to 
act but refraining from acting on her objection for toleration reasons? 
8
 My contention 
is that one could go for both way of approaching the issue since in most cases, what 
we might think as being in a powerful or powerless position from an objective point 
of view might not match with the subjective understanding of the tolerator. To give 
an example, imagine that I am a person who is against the rights of gays. In my 
country, the Parliament is planning to issue a law that legalizes the right to marriage 
of gays. As an individual, I consider being gay as something against the word of god. 
Nevertheless, I remain without action. Prima facie one might think that the reason for 
me to refrain from action is the fact that I do not have any power to affect the 
situation as an individual because I lack the objective means to act on the basis of my 
objection. So the conclusion would be there is no relation of toleration between me as 
an individual and the Government. Nevertheless this is not the case. Certainly I 
believe that I have an option to decide if I should engage myself in a political 
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movement which is acting against the rights of gays. However, I decide not to 
because I have a gay boss at work and I am afraid that if he finds out about my 
political engagement, he will fire me. In this example, I certainly consider myself 
tolerating the action of the Government since I refrain from acting on the basis of my 
objection (even if it is out of prudential reasons). This demonstrates that in most 
cases, the perception of the tolerator concerning her situation seems to be significant 
as far as the characteristic of power is concerned. It might also be suggested that it 
can be helpful if we distinguish between tolerant conduct and tolerant disposition or 
attitude. For the tolerant conduct, I definitely need the dimension of power since I 
behave tolerantly if only if I could prevent X but don‟t (think of gay rights example 
above). But tolerant disposition does not require actual power because I have a 
tolerant disposition if I disapprove of X but would not prevent it even if I could.  
       We can also analyze the scope, demands and limits of toleration. However, it is 
intended to examine these as criteria that are related to the concept of toleration in the 
sense that what we could tolerate or not, rather than the substance of toleration in 
terms of what we ought to tolerate. First I will start with what Susan Mendus calls the 
scope of toleration. This is a debate regarding the question if toleration needs to be 
defined on the basis of a morally grounded disapproval or simple dislike, or disgust.
9
 
It seems we might imagine sources of disagreement which are not necessarily moral 
such as aesthetic, artistic etc.  Imagine that I do not like my boyfriend‟s choice of 
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music at all but I tolerate him listening to it because I do not want to bother him and I 
want him to be comfortable at home. In this case, the nature of my disagreement is 
aesthetic, not really moral but I do tolerate him and do not want him to change his 
taste of music or stop listening to it at home. Regarding this point, Mary Warnock 
also claims that toleration is not necessarily moral and we can have nonmoral beliefs 
about the thing that we tolerate.
10
 From an opposite standpoint, Peter Nicholson 
thinks that toleration is a moral concept in the sense that it is both applicable to moral 
action and in the narrower sense, it is a virtue.
11
 With respect to the debate on the 
scope of the concept, it might be the case that drawing the boundary depends on what 
counts moral and what counts nonmoral as well. For instance, if sentiments and 
judgments of different kind count as moral or not is a curious issue to think over. 
Nevertheless, regardless of the moral standing of judgments, it seems to me that there 
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might be a plurality of sources that might trigger dislike, disgust and disagreement. In 
addition to this, it is also significant to mention that here the issue is not whether 
„putting up with‟ counts as toleration only if the reason for toleration is moral. Rather, 
the point is whether the disapproval is a moral one or not.   
     Another characteristic that I would like to discuss here is what I call the demands 
of toleration. Demands refer to the limits of the action that can be taken with 
reference to toleration. Mendus calls these limits as requirements of toleration. It is 
significant to consider if toleration means leaving alone or refraining from 
persecuting or it can require more than that such as assisting, aiding and fostering.
12
 
This question makes even more sense when we consider the divided nature of 
societies which contain various types of cultural and ethnic groups and practices: 
Shall the state leave each group on its own and be neutral towards all the cultural 
differences or shall it try to foster and facilitate their way of being different with 
specific policies? In addition to this, demands of toleration might also be relevant 
when reflecting on toleration as an international issue. States and international 
organizations enter into relations of toleration most of the time: the issue of 
nonintervention, aiding and assisting comes to the fore as relevant attitudes and 
actions that one might imagine in the international realm. However, I will deal with 
this aspect in the second part of the Chapter where I will focus on specifically 
toleration as an international issue. 
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     The last conceptual reflection regarding the conditions of possibility of toleration 
(characteristics of toleration) might be considered as the limits of toleration. 
Toleration is possible only with certain limits. Whenever we talk about toleration, we 
talk about its limits indeed. By limits, we refer to what could be tolerated and what 
could not; what could be the object of toleration and what could not. For instance, it 
is sometimes mentioned that we can only tolerate what could be changed. In this 
sense, we cannot tolerate race because race cannot be changed. We might think of 
ethnicity and other characteristics of a person that are not changeable within that 
range as well. 
      When we think of the substance of toleration, rather than the concept of 
toleration, we need to think of its limits in terms of what we ought to tolerate. In a 
way, we might say that toleration must have its own domain.
13
 However to define the 
content of this domain is always context- dependent and changeable due to the nature 
of the relation of toleration between the parties. This debate itself will be brought to 
the agenda in the second part of the Chapter since the limits of toleration seems to be 
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 Concerning the domain of toleration, Peter Jones makes a categorization as follows: “When we think 
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a significant and dominant component of our imagination of toleration in the 
international realm. 
1.1.2. Reasons for Toleration 
     After covering up the conditions of possibility of toleration (characteristics of 
toleration), I would like to turn to reasons for toleration (justifications of toleration). 
In the contemporary literature, we come across couple of possible justifications that 
have been mentioned as for reasons to tolerate such as skepticism and certain versions 
of it, autonomy, respect and reasonableness. Below, I will try to outline the basic 
possibilities as far as reasons for toleration are concerned though I prefer to 
categorize them as principled moral reasons, non-principled moral reasons 
(consequentialist reasons) and nonmoral prudential reasons. From a principled moral 
reason, we tolerate as a matter of principle, without the guidance of ulterior motives 
that might treat toleration as an instrument. On the other hand, nonprincipled moral 
reasons come to the scene when „one ought to tolerate‟ cannot be argued in a 
straightforward way but it depends on different motives; i.e. consequentialism. 
      Firstly, one can mention non-moral (prudential) reasons for toleration. These are 
the reasons that are motivated by self-interest and its benefits we consider that would 
come with toleration. They do not provide any justification from a moral point of 
view; be it in the sense of a principle or consequence. I think imaging this type of 
reasoning is not so uncommon in daily life as well as in politics. We can either find 
ourselves as single individuals or political parties and associations putting up with the 
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things that we disliked or disapproved due to the benefit that we expect out of the 
non-conduct. 
       As for the consequentialist moral reasons, one might imagine reasons that are 
based on a broad range such as utilitarian considerations aiming to maximize the 
happiness of the greatest number and the reasons that are related to the establishment 
of peace and stability. Let‟s imagine that there is a scientist in our country who is 
extremely talented and even a genius. He is running a project about cloning of organs 
in human body which will benefit the whole population and even human race if he 
manages to conduct his research properly and if he is given the adequate support. In 
this situation, even though we do not agree with what he is doing due to our religious 
beliefs, we might think that we should tolerate his action because his project will 
serve the benefit of the sick fellow countrymen. Here, the reason for us to tolerate the 
scientist is from a consequentialist justification. It does not seem principled (however 
it is moral) because toleration is seen as an instrument to achieve the common good. 
Nevertheless, it still can give effective and real reasons for us to tolerate an action 
that we disagree from a strong point of view. Thus, one might say that we can find 
some place for consequentialist reasons in our consideration of toleration as well as 
nonconsequentialist reasons. 
     Another possible justification for toleration can be a principled moral way of 
giving reasons to why we should tolerate. In this approach, we might say that 
toleration is viewed as a concept which has a moral value on its own. The most 
commonly accepted position on this basis is what we could call „respect for persons”.  
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This is widely supported by contemporary philosophers as a ground which we should 
appeal if we want toleration to have a principled justification. According to this view 
which justifies toleration on the basis of respect, intolerance is morally wrong (not 
only imprudent) and this moral wrongness is a consequence of its failure to treat 
persons as worthy of respect.
14
 
      Generally speaking, we might argue that if we want toleration to have 
significance on its own, we should be able to justify it by referring to reasons that are 
themselves morally grounded. „Respect for persons‟ might be considered as an 
attempt to do this with its appeal to see persons as self legislating beings that are 
capable to choose and follow the life they wanted for themselves. Different version of 
this approach might be found in contemporary theoretical sources.
15
 We might say 
John Rawls, both in Political Liberalism and The Law of Peoples subscribes to this 
idea of „respect for persons‟ (in Law of Peoples, „respect for peoples‟) concerning 
toleration because he pictures persons as free and equal (as having a sense of justice 
and a capacity to follow their own conception of good). In this sense they are both 
rational and reasonable and for this reason, imposition of any comprehensive doctrine 
on the other is wrong because that would mean to treat persons without respect. This 
might sound a too simple and caricaturized way to explain Rawls‟s position however 
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I will not go into the details of his conception of toleration here since there will be a 
whole Chapter which will be dealing with this issue separately.  
       For Susan Mendus, a prudential way of toleration is not enough to give 
principled reasons for toleration. We need a justification that considers  toleration as a 
moral value: “if we wish to count toleration as a genuine virtue, then its justification 
must make reference to the value of persons as essentially autonomous, self-
legislating beings who are worthy of respect.”16 She says: “A belief in persons as 
essentially autonomous agents, entitled to direct the course of their own lives, 
generates an argument for toleration as distinct from indifference or licence, since 
what is required by such an ethics is precisely that I act morally well in allowing 
others to dictate their own actions, even though I morally disapprove of such 
actions.” 17 
      Peter Jones mentions respect as a possible way for a justification to toleration too. 
I will not go in the details of his argument here since I will take up the issue of 
international toleration in the following chapter. However, it is significant to see why 
he endorses respect for persons as a reason for toleration. He says; “Any approach to 
toleration or intolerance that pays no attention to consequences should not be taken 
seriously…. However, while we should not disregard consequences, we may be 
reluctant to place the case for toleration entirely at their mercy.”18 In this way, we 
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might claim that, Jones also thinks that respect for persons helps us not to consider 
toleration in purely prudential and consequentialist terms. Therefore, he continues: 
“Respect, as used in „respect for persons‟, invokes an idea of status rather than merit. 
Thus we may think that a person‟s beliefs and form of life are without merit, but our 
respect for her status as a person can provide reason why we should tolerate her 
beliefs and form of life in spite of our negative appraisal of them and even though our 
negative appraisal is soundly based.” 19 We will see how this notion of personhood 
and status will be significant in the second part of the Chapter when we reflect on 
possible justifications of toleration as an international issue. We will also explicate 
how „respect for persons‟ approach can translate to the international realm. 
      Rainer Forst might also be considered as subscribing to the „respect for persons‟ 
view as a justification to toleration. He says that toleration as respect can be justified 
in different ways. 
20
 According to an ethical liberal neo-Lockean justification, respect 
is owed to individuals as personally and ethically autonomous beings with capacity to 
choose, revise and realize an individual conception of the good. However, we could 
also talk about an alternative neo- Baylean justification of the respect conception 
which is based on discourse principle of justification: “Every norm that is to be 
binding for a plurality of persons, esp. norms that are the basis of legal coercion, must 
be justifiable with reasons that are reciprocally acceptable to all affected as free and 
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31 
 
equal persons.”21 In line with this, “persons are tolerant to the extent that, even 
though they disagree with others about the nature of the good and true life, they 
tolerate all other views within the bounds of reciprocity and generality.”22 We could 
possibly claim that Forst‟s conception of respect does not exclude what he calls the 
neo-Lockean conception of respect but adds another dimension such as discourse 
principle to the very idea of persons as autonomous beings to whom respect is owed. 
      We can claim that one might put McKinnon‟s reasonableness approach under the 
category of „respect for persons‟ as well. Toleration from reasonableness is basically 
a Rawlsian account which is inspired by the argument in Political Liberalism. Since 
the first part of Chapter 3 will be devoted to Rawlsian notion of reasonableness and 
toleration in Political Liberalism, here I will not indulge in how McKinnon reads 
Rawls. For now, it is enough if we just state what the characteristic of McKinnon‟s 
account of justification for toleration is. McKinnon says: “Toleration is justified by 
the requirement that each person ought to accept that it is unreasonable for her to 
attempt to impose her responsibly held commitments on another person or group 
which generates their opposition is a reasonable one.”23 In this sense, one might say 
each person reasons that she should respect others as persons since she recognizes 
them as having a sense of justice and aware of burdens of judgment. However, 
McKinnon still thinks that reasonableness account also needs an account of political 
harm to be more acceptable as far as dealing with the hard cases we face in life 
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concerning toleration.
24
 This is specifically significant when it comes to the point that 
state has to protect the side which was harmed by means of legislation. 
      Lastly, let‟s mention skepticism as a controversial candidate for constituting a 
reason for toleration. At first we might claim that skepticism tends to justify 
toleration in a nonprincipled way. This means it does not offer a straightforward 
reason for tolerating when we ask the question „why we ought to tolerate?‟ However, 
it gives a reason that stems from the epistemological uncertainty of the beliefs and the 
nature of the plurality of values. We might mention different versions of skepticism 
and their ways to justify toleration. Catriona McKinnon distinguishes between 
different skepticisms as reasons for toleration such as metaphysical skepticism, 
pragmatism and epistemological skepticism. Metaphysical skepticism is divided into 
two: subjectivism and relativism.
25
 Subjectivism claims that “when we make moral 
judgments we do no more than express an opinion on the matter of the judgment, or 
emote with respect to the issue addressed by the judgment.” 26 Argument for 
toleration from subjectivism would be following the logic that if my opinion of 
opposition is only one among all others regardless of how strong and how evaluated it 
is, then toleration should follow. This means I cannot act on the basis of my opinion 
intolerantly in a legitimate way. Although subjectivism offers a reason for toleration 
as a form of skepticism, as McKinnon puts it rightly, relativism has been more 
influential in philosophical circles. As for relativism, McKinnon mentions that the 
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form of relativism that is relevant in the discourse of toleration is: It has to reject both 
that there is one single morality and when two moral statements conflict as 
recommendations to action, only one statement can be true.
27
 For McKinnon, both 
arguments (subjectivism and relativism) are invalid as far as toleration is concerned. 
She says: “If subjectivism is true then the judgment „people ought to practice 
toleration‟ is nothing but an opinion or an emotion which is on the same footing in 
terms of its authority in practical reasoning as all the judgments of opposition it is 
supposed to rein in.”28 As for relativism, she points out that relativism as meta- 
ethical position could not provide any normative action guiding principles for 
toleration or against toleration. It lacks the normative action guiding component to 
give reasons for why we ought to tolerate. 
     Pragmatism and epistemological ethical skepticism are the other two versions of 
skepticism McKinnon mentions. Pragmatism is “the view that social values and 
political principles are judged to be the right principles for any given society 
according to how well these values and principles enable the society in question to 
achieve its collective goals and realize its shared ends: crudely, for pragmatics, 
morality is what works.”29 On the other hand, epistemological skepticism is the view 
when J. S. Mill says “because we cannot be sure that we always form and hold true 
beliefs, we ought not to take our genuine conviction that our opinions are justified as 
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evidence that they are true.”30 McKinnon claims that pragmatism brings a 
justification to toleration with a very high cost for it rules out the possibility of 
democratic transparency and access to the real sources of justification for the political 
principles enacted in policy. On the other hand, she criticizes epistemological 
skepticism as well because it is based on an untenable distinction between evaluative 
and factual beliefs.
31
   
     Like McKinnon, Mendus is also critical of skepticism because for her, skepticism 
provides a pragmatic defense of toleration; it is not offering a principled reason.
32
 In 
this sense, for skepticism, toleration has an instrumental value because toleration is 
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viewed as the child of doubt “and those who doubt whether we can know moral and 
religious truth will tend to favor a laissez faire attitude towards diverse and disparate 
beliefs.”33 I tend to agree with Mendus and McKinnon regarding their criticisms of 
skepticism when they say it is not enough and valid reason for toleration on its own. 
It might be true that it does not provide a straightforward moral principle in favor of 
toleration even though I think it can still contain a certain force of justification 
(though limited).  
       In regard to the point mentioned above, one might claim that skepticism can 
provide some justification as long as it faces persons who hold their beliefs in 
moderate way in the sense that they maintain a certain level of doubt towards what 
they believe. Nevertheless, it might face difficulty when dealing with persons who 
dogmatically hold to their beliefs. For instance, let‟s imagine a person who thinks that 
her ideology is the absolute truth and for this reason, she has to convert everyone in 
the world either by force or by persuasion to her belief system. An argument from 
skepticism can tell her; “What you believe is just one set of beliefs among many in 
the world and there is a plurality of opinions and ideas, how come you could be that 
sure of what you believe is hundred percent true?” If the person is reasonable enough, 
she would not reply that all other people in the world who do not think like me are 
either deceived or ignorant. The problem starts if she replies insisting “I do not care if 
my truth is just one among many. Even this is the case, this does not tell me anything 
wrong about my belief and I do not see any reason why I should not try to convert all 
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other people to my belief system”. Then, in this case, skepticism seems to lack further 
arguments to appeal to convince the dogmatic person about the necessity of 
toleration. 
     So far, possible ways to justify toleration (moral and prudential) have been 
outlined. The goal was not to make an argument in favor of one way over the other; 
rather I aimed to show how one can approach the issue from different angles and how 
has the debate been evolving in contemporary undertakings. Overall, in this part of 
the Chapter, we have made a brief analysis of what the concept of toleration is and 
what boundaries it has through reflecting on certain contemporary theories. This has 
been a survey of how the concept has been described so far. In the following part of 
the dissertation, I would like reflect on toleration as an international issue. Basically I 
aim to consider how toleration as an international issue can be conceived by looking 
through the conceptual tools that we addressed in the first part of Chapter 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
1.2. TOLERATION AS AN INTERNATIONAL ISSUE 
     In this part of the chapter, the goal is to examine if there is a place for toleration in 
our thinking of international realm and if so, how. In the previous part, we analyzed 
the concept of toleration by focusing on its characteristics concerning conditions of 
possibility of toleration and also justification of toleration. Now, we will reflect on 
how toleration might be imagined as an international issue.  First, we will focus on 
what might be the reasons for the lack of concern on toleration as an international 
matter. In line with this, it will be demonstrated that there is a place for toleration in 
the international realm. Secondly, by referring to the conceptual analysis that was 
made in the first part of the chapter, we will focus on what have been called the 
conditions of possibility of toleration and reasons for toleration with respect to its 
international dimension.  
1.2.1. Is There a Place for Toleration in the International Realm? 
       As it was mentioned in the introductory chapter, toleration has always been an 
issue that was considered within domestic societies as far as the contemporary 
literature is concerned. Although various matters in international politics such as 
debate on humanitarian intervention and the role of human rights in international 
relations are related to toleration as an international issue, it is difficult to find direct 
reference to the concept in contemporary literature. One might identify only couple of 
theorists who addressed toleration directly as an international issue: Peter Jones, 
Michael Walzer, John Rawls and Kok Chor Tan.
34
 In this chapter I will refer to Peter 
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Jones and Michael Walzer to support my argument that toleration might indeed be 
seen as an international issue. I will leave the discussion of Rawls and Kok Chor Tan 
to the following chapter in which I will specifically concentrate on the theory of 
Rawls despite of the fact that their theories obviously are helpful for one to 
understand how toleration can be an international issue. 
        To begin, I would like to state the argument that inspires this chapter and 
obviously the whole dissertation by claiming that there is a place for toleration in our 
thinking of international realm. We can think of toleration as an international issue. In 
the following parts of the chapter, we will demonstrate how toleration is an 
international issue by pointing out certain illustrations in global political discourse as 
well as conceptual references. However, first, it is significant to reflect on what might 
be the possible reasons for the lack of concern on toleration in the international realm. 
Below, I will refer to two thinkers (M. Walzer and P. Jones) who found it significant 
to think of toleration as an international matter. This will give us the opportunity to 
reflect on the possible reasons for disregarding toleration as an international matter as 
well as demonstrating how toleration has a place in contemporary international 
society in spite of this lack of interest.   
       Perhaps the first evident reason for disregarding toleration as an international 
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matter is the affect and dominance of realist paradigm which claims that international 
realm is anarchic and states follow their own self-interests. According to the realist 
paradigm, toleration does not have a place in international realm as a moral reason 
because states tolerate each other only when their self –interest is at the agenda.  
Thus, toleration is viewed only on prudential terms since what matters for a state is to 
act on the basis of its self-interest for its own security. In this sense, the assumption 
that states tolerate only when it serves their self-interest might have pre-empted the 
consideration of toleration as something important in the international realm. 
       M. Walzer, who is one of the few thinkers who explicitly addressed toleration as 
an international issue challenges this realist argument by stating that toleration is an 
essential feature of international society:   
“International society is an anomaly here because it is obviously not a domestic regime; 
some would say that it is not a regime at all but rather an anarchic and lawless condition. 
If that were true, the condition would be one of absolute toleration: anything goes, 
nothing is forbidden, for no one is authorized to forbid (or permit), even if many of the 
participants are eager to do so. In fact, international society is not anarchic; it is a very 
weak regime but it is tolerant as a regime despite the intolerance of some of the states 
that make it up. All the groups that achieve statehood and all the practices that they 
permit (within limits that I will come in a moment) are tolerated by the society of states. 
Toleration is an essential feature of sovereignty and an important reason for its 
desirability.” 35     
   
Thus, for Walzer, toleration has a place in international society. States respecting the 
freedom of one another to be self-determining is not a mere anarchic fact; it 
constitutes a norm of right conduct in international society. Here one might say for 
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Walzer, Westphalian model is itself a tolerant society. This is to say that, 
international society is not anarchic in the sense of not having common norms; rather 
there is a shared normative realm of conduct that states respect. It is not the only fact 
about international society that states do not respect any norms except for their self-
interest. They do respect certain norms such as self-determination of each other which 
might be considered as a principle of toleration. 
       Peter Jones argues for the possibility of international toleration as well. In his 
article International Toleration and the „War on Terror‟, he mentions the possible 
reasons for why toleration has received less attention as an international than an intra-
national issue. According to him, one of the explanations might be the lack of other-
centered international toleration.
36
 Since toleration is generally regarded as a good 
thing, many people might think that in the international realm, there is too much 
toleration rather than too little. So there may not be the same motivation for pressing 
the case for toleration internationally as there is intra-nationally. In addition to this, 
Jones also mentions the government‟s reluctance to take risks and to incur costs other 
than for the benefit of their own country as one other possible reason. State‟s 
reluctance to incur the costs of intervention might induce them to tolerate more than 
they should. Furthermore, like Walzer, he also points out the claim of realist tradition 
which argues states either will not or should not be concerned with other centered 
toleration, as a possible reason for disregarding toleration as an international matter.
37
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        Moreover, for Jones, viewing the world from a simple Westphalian model in 
which each sovereign state is interested in its own affairs might lead one to think 
toleration is not necessary. Following Jones on this matter, we might say that there 
can be two ways to disregard the relevance of toleration at the international level: 
Firstly, on a Westphalian view, it might be argued that a state may lack the power to 
intervene in the affairs of other states so that it is incapable of tolerating or not 
tolerating the conduct of the other state. To answer this claim, we can simply say that 
states indeed do have the power to interfere in the affairs of other states. Some states 
have more power than others but no state is fully incapable of exerting or wholly 
immune from, external influence. 
        Secondly, on Westphalian view, it might be claimed that a state lacks the right 
(moral entitlement) to intervene in the affairs of other states and that pre-empts 
toleration. Here to counter this argument, we might say that state A‟s right to self-
determination can be the reason for the state B‟s toleration, rather than something 
displaces toleration. The argument of Jones in Toleration, Supererogation and Rights 
is relevant to support us here. For him, it is appropriate to regard moral rights as 
moral reasons for toleration. He says: “If someone should ask why I tolerate A‟s 
dissolute or misguided form of life, there is nothing odd in my replying that I do so 
because A has a (moral and natural) right to lead that sort of life if she so chooses. 
My acknowledgement of A‟s right is consistent with my “tolerating” her conduct and 
with my conceiving that right as the reason for my toleration.” 38 From a Westphalian 
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view, people might think given that each state has a right to sovereignty, we cannot 
talk about state B tolerating state A in not intervening state A‟s affairs because state B 
already has a duty to not to intervene. In this way, B does not have the freedom and 
power to intervene. Nevertheless, we might still say that state A has a moral right to 
conduct its own affairs as the way she wants and state B tolerates her conduct even if 
she disagrees. State A‟s right to self-determination can be the reason for state B‟s 
toleration. In this manner, it seems to me, as Jones mentioned it rightly, we might still 
find a place for toleration within the realm of rights and obligations at the 
international level. Moreover, as we have touched upon elsewhere before, Walzer 
shares the same intuition that rights of the states as sovereign entities do not preclude 
toleration but it is the very basis of a tolerant regime. 
        For Jones, the possible interpretations concerning the impossibility of 
international toleration mentioned above are not sound. Furthermore, simple 
Westphalian view does not describe the world in which we live in any more.
39
 He 
says that states and their governments intervene in each other‟s affairs all the time 
and they are not the only actors who do so. In this sense, he rightly acknowledges the 
interdependent nature of societies over each other‟s affairs in a globalizing world. 
Thus, for Jones, one might even say contemporary nature of the international society 
(post- Westphalian if I may call) makes toleration more significant as an international 
matter.        
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      As Walzer and Jones, from different angles, showed us, reasons for the disregard 
of toleration as an international matter are not plausible. Toleration might be 
imagined as an international issue. Now I would like to carry on with the argument 
that toleration is an international issue by giving some examples from actual 
discourses that have been shaping global politics. This will give us the opportunity to 
see how one might think of toleration as an international matter in contemporary 
international society. 
       First, it seems significant to think of the history of toleration to understand that it 
has emerged as an inter-national as well as intra-national matter.
40
 Toleration came to 
the agenda as a concern after Christianity became the official religion of the Roman 
Empire because that raised the question of whether state power should be used to 
curb „heretics‟ and „infidels‟. But it is only with the Reformation that the discourse 
about toleration gained a significant character because thinkers such as Luther and 
Calvin came along with their own interpretation of Christianity which was quite 
different than the old doctrine. In this way, Catholicism had to face with a new 
challenge: Catholics, Protestants and Calvinists had to live together. It was not only a 
matter of religious struggle, it was political as well because rulers were involved 
deeply in either being supportive of or against the new challenge and in the need of 
making maneuvers for their interest. In this sense, in 16
th
  and 17
th
  centuries, 
toleration did not only arise as an issue for the rulers in relation to their subjects, but 
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also in relation to one another: Catholic and Protestant rulers had to face the question 
of whether they should tolerate one another. This political dimension was a 
significant part of the phenomenon at the time because it contained an international 
aspect. Cuius regio eius religio came to the agenda as a principle of toleration even 
though it was largely pragmatic in its basis. 
      In contemporary world, with the affect of globalization, it has become common to 
imagine issues that arise across and beyond boundaries. This might be due to the 
increasing level of interdependence and communication between national, 
international and transnational agents as well as the globalizing nature of economic, 
political and cultural aspects of our daily lives. Since problems of disagreement and 
conflict contain a global nature, toleration as a response to these disagreements might 
likely to have a global and international nature as well. Below, I will refer to four 
possible cases within contemporary global horizon that raise questions of toleration at 
the international level. 
     (1) First, one might mention the debate on intervention in international realm as 
one of the examples of how the issue of toleration contains an international global 
dimension. The conflicts between states and between groups of people with its 
various dimensions (ethnic, religious, political) in different parts of the world made it 
essential for international society to consider tackling with the unrest and establishing 
peace. The missions of peace keeping and debate regarding conflict prevention 
became the central agenda for UN and other international NGOs. In all these debates, 
it seems that toleration and intolerance is at stake because international society is 
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faced with whether putting up with the wrong conduct in certain states and societies. 
Therefore, it is always needed to define what is intolerable and acting with 
consideration of the limits of tolerance. 
       (2) Human rights and its role in international affairs is an example for how 
toleration has a place in our thinking of international realm. Possibly there are three 
ways in which human rights as international norms raise questions of toleration. First 
of all, human rights, in some respects prescribe a right to toleration, i.e. in including 
rights to freedom of expression and freedom of religion. Secondly, human rights set 
limits to what is tolerable, i.e. human rights violations ought not to be tolerated. And 
lastly, universalism of human rights confronts the reality of cultural diversity. This 
last point will be illustrated below by referring to Asian values debate in order to 
show how human rights raise questions of toleration. 
        The debate regarding the universalism of human rights has gained a new 
character lately: Different communities started to challenge the universality of human 
rights because they think that human rights do not express the peculiar nature of their 
value set. Asian values debate can be seen as one of those challenges since it was 
claimed that Asian societies have different values which are incompatible with 
„western‟ human rights. In the 1990s, the notion of „Asian values‟ was devised by 
several Asian officials and their supporters for the purpose of challenging Western-
style civil and political freedoms. “Asians, they claim, place special emphasis upon 
family and social harmony, with the implication that those in the chaotic and 
crumbling societies of the West should think twice about intervening in Asia for the 
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sake of promoting human rights and democracy.”41 In this sense, we might say that 
communities who disagree with the universality of „western human rights‟ are in a 
relation of toleration to the societies who think that human rights, regardless of the 
origin, are relevant for their societies. Here I do not mean to say anything concerning 
the foundations of human rights or if the claim of Asian values approach is right or 
wrong. It seems human rights discourse itself has created relations of toleration 
between different parties who disapprove of each other‟s culture and values, yet do 
not act on their objections. No country sends troops or intervenes in the affairs of 
another country because it questions the foundations of human rights. The reasons of 
toleration might be several of course such as prudential and consequentialist. 
Nevertheless, one can still talk about a relation of toleration with an international 
dimension here. 
       (3) Gender with its relation to cultural difference also seems to be one of the 
issues of toleration in the international realm. Consider the case of female genital 
mutilation. Should we tolerate it or not and if we should, to what extent? These are 
questions which are concerns of international entities such as states and international 
NGOs as well as domestic ones because the practice of genital mutilation might be an 
object of tolerance or intolerance both in a domestic society and the international 
society. As long as we ask the question what stand we should take towards the 
practice of genital mutilation in the country of its origin, it is an international 
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problem. Here it is not to say we should tolerate it or not. I do not aim to give any 
substantive answer to the issue in terms of what we should tolerate. The point here is 
that the problems such as female genital mutilation which might be thought of a 
solely domestic matter might be an international issue and object of international 
toleration or intolerance. 
       (4) Environmental problems can be considered within the domain of toleration as 
an international issue as well. Imagine a government which carries out energy 
policies that are dangerous for the environment. It must be easy to gain information 
regarding what has been happening in that particular country for other people living 
in different parts of the world due to the speed of dissemination of information by 
internet and other channels. International organizations that are sensitive about 
environment can protest the oppressive practices and show their intolerance in several 
ways from running a campaign on internet to doing actual demonstrations against that 
particular government. Nevertheless, some organizations and governments can 
tolerate the practices due to some prudential reasons such as political and economic 
interests of their country.   
1.2. 2.Characteristics of International Toleration 
      After stating that we can indeed think of toleration as an international issue with 
reference to actual discourses in the international realm, now, I would like to consider 
in which way one can imagine international toleration as a concept through focusing 
on its possible characteristics. To reflect on this issue, I will follow the schema that 
was put forward regarding the concept of toleration in the previous (first) part of the 
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chapter. Thus it will be the aim to concentrate on the characteristics of toleration by 
focusing on its international aspect. 
       In the previous part of the chapter, we started our analysis with the objects 
(tolerated) and subjects (tolerator) of toleration as essential components to talk about 
the concept itself. Here for considering toleration as an international matter, we need 
to reflect on this issue as too. One might say national governments, international 
organizations, NGOs as well as powerful groups and individuals can be considered as 
subjects of toleration in the international realm. It might be claimed that any agent 
that is capable of influencing conduct beyond national boundaries might be engaged 
in international toleration or intolerance. For instance, the most obvious example for 
an agent of toleration might be UN as an international organization which engages in 
relations of toleration to individual states concerning esp. matters of intervention. In 
this sense, when to intervene and when to tolerate is a matter that is debated among 
the society of states which compose UN (at least Security Council).    
       One might think of specific acts, practices and affairs that occurred in individual 
states as possible objects of toleration. However there can be cases that it might not 
be so easy to identify the subjects and objects clearly. As Peter Jones claims, it is 
easier to look at the nature of the tolerated than the tolerator.
42
 Take the example of 
one country that made an intervention to another country by sending troops. In this 
case, who are the agents that tolerate or show intolerance? The government of the 
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country? The people? The leader of the country? In addition to this, given the 
complexity of contemporary international realm which contains entities crosscutting 
the boundaries of nation-states and domestic institutions, it seems likely to have 
puzzlement concerning agents of toleration. 
      In the previous section, we had examined three characteristics concerning the 
conditions of possibility of toleration: Circumstances, demands and scope. Just to 
recall, by conditions of possibility, we mean the characteristics that makes the 
concept possible. As for the circumstances, we mentioned that there are three 
commonly accepted dimensions in contemporary literature: Diversity, 
dislike/disapproval and power. We saw that, first of all, diversity coupled with 
disapproval or dislike is crucial to be able to talk about toleration (not sheer diversity 
or approval). In the international realm too, the significance of the dimension of 
diversity is quite obvious given the pluralistic nature of our world cross cut by 
societies and civilizations. Furthermore, one might claim that this global diversity 
contains the sources of disapproval and dislike as well given the conflicts that arise in 
different parts of the world which has a global nature, i.e. conflicts between states as 
well as individual groups and associations. Thus we might state that pluralism and 
diversity world-wide coupled with disapproval and dislike is also the characteristics 
of toleration in the international realm. 
      In the first part of this Chapter, we mentioned the characteristic of power among 
the conditions of possibility for toleration and made a distinction between tolerant 
conduct and tolerant disposition. We said: in order for me to act tolerantly, I should 
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have the power to act on my objection but refrain to do so. This is significant to talk 
about a tolerant conduct. If we consider a tolerant disposition or attitude, then we do 
not need the actual power but it is enough if we say we are tolerant and we would not 
interfere on the basis of our objection even if we had to power to do so.  
        I think it would not be wrong to claim we can refer to tolerant conduct and 
tolerant dispositions at the international level too. States and governments tolerate 
each other‟s affairs even though they have the actual power not to do so. As for the 
tolerant disposition, we can mention agents such as individuals and groups of people 
that consider themselves as tolerant of a specific action or affair which is across or 
beyond borders with the condition that they would refrain from acting even if they 
had the power. Also, we might mention those who determine the foreign policy of a 
state as exhibiting a commitment to toleration or not. Furthermore, we might think of 
a state committed to an ideology or an ambition that is consistent or inconsistent with 
toleration. For instance, state A might have an ideology of domination. Due to the 
lack of power, it might not behave intolerantly but we say it still exhibits an intolerant 
stance. 
        Perhaps we might admit that different actors have different degrees of 
international power and therefore they are placed differently regarding international 
toleration. However, it also seems to be the case that no actor is wholly immune from 
the power of others. For instance, US is considered to be a super power of the world 
but it is not the only state that acts tolerantly or intolerantly and in this sense, there 
are occasions that its conduct is the object of intolerance as well.   
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      In the previous section, we also mentioned the demands, scope and limits of 
toleration in terms the conditions of possibility of toleration. These characteristics 
were mentioned with respect to what could be tolerated and what could not or what 
toleration could mean and what could not rather than what ought to be tolerated and 
what toleration should mean. Here in this section, I will try to see how one might 
think of toleration as an international issue regarding these characteristics. 
       As for the scope of toleration, one might claim that we can encounter both moral 
and nonmoral sources of disapproval in the international realm. We can imagine 
different sources of disapproval such as aesthetic, cultural, religious etc. It seems very 
likely that one group of people living in this part of the world might disapprove of a 
specific cultural ritual which is considered aesthetic and significant in another part of 
the world. In this case, the source of disapproval might be aesthetic rather than moral. 
Nevertheless, this cannot mean moral disapproval does not have a place at the global 
level. Certainly it does. In most cases, our disapproval of a certain practice or ritual 
that is essential for groups of people who are different than us might stem from a 
moral objection in the sense that we find the practice morally wrong. 
        In the first part of this chapter, it was mentioned that demands of toleration refer 
to the limits of action that can be taken with reference to toleration: whether 
toleration requires leaving alone and refraining from persecuting or more than that 
such as assisting, aiding and fostering. This discussion seems to be significant as far 
as international domain is concerned esp. if we think of the issues around 
humanitarian intervention and assistance. For instance, consider the example of the 
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UN Report called “Responsibility to protect” which was declared in 2001. As it is 
stated in the Report, in September 2000, the government of Canada, together with a 
group of major foundations announced the establishment of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.
43
 It was a response to Secretary 
General Kofi Annan‟s call for a consensus on the issue of intervention at the 
international level. The goal of the report was to establish a new conception of 
sovereignty and intervention for the time in which we are living since the conditions 
of Westphalian system has changed. The usage of the concept intervention is 
significant since it covers a broad range of conceptions such as the responsibility to 
prevent, the responsibility to react and responsibility to rebuilt.
44
 This shows that 
intervention is not restricted to military intervention as such but it covers a rather 
broad range of possibilities for protecting the populations in need. This report might 
be regarded as an example for how the demands of tolerance/ intolerance might be 
considered at the global level. By trying to define intervention in a broader sense, UN 
seems to broaden the requirements of intolerance. 
       As far as limits of toleration are concerned, we mentioned two dimensions in the 
previous part of the chapter: limits of the concept (what could be tolerated and what 
could not) and limits in the sense of substance (what ought to be tolerated and what 
not). The first characteristic was analyzed in relation to the possibility of the concept 
of toleration whereas the second dimension was related to the substance of toleration. 
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Considering limits is also an important characteristic of international toleration. In 
this sense, the issue of intervention and other issues such as the role of human rights 
in international realm necessitate the deliberation of what ought to be tolerated and 
what not.  
      In Thick and Thin, M. Walzer‟s approach might be conceived as an illustration of 
the significance and relevance of the limits of toleration in the sense of what ought to 
be tolerated in international domain. When discussing when to intervene in another 
state‟s affairs, he says:       
“Now let‟s consider one possible occasion very much in today‟s news: when the 
solidarity we feel with people in trouble, confronting murder and oppression, seems to 
require not only marching but also fighting- military intervention on their behalf. No 
doubt, we should never be in a hurry to fight; I have argued elsewhere for a strong 
presumption against intervening in other people‟s countries. Nor can every moral rule 
that we are able to describe in minimalist terms serve to justify the use of force. We are 
more likely to be called upon to speak up for “truth” than to fight for it. “Justice”, too, is 
better defended with the moral support of outsiders than with their coercive intervention. 
We might even say that this preference is a feature of the moral minimum. Nonetheless, 
there are times when it is morally justified to send armed men and women across a 
border- and minimalism alone (ultra minimalism?) defines the time and fixes its 
limits.”45 
Here he refers to minimal morality in terms of when to intervene and it is an attempt 
to draw the limits of toleration in the international realm.
46
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1.2.3. Reasons for International Toleration 
      So far we reflected on toleration as an international issue with reference to the 
characteristics (conditions of possibility) of the concept. We will examine the 
arguments for international toleration given by John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas in 
detail in the subsequent chapters. Now, the concern is to identify and distinguish a 
number of different kinds of reasons that might be offered in defense of international 
toleration. 
      As mentioned in the first part of the chapter, what we mean by reasons for 
toleration is how we justify toleration. In line with this, we saw that there can be 
diverse reasons such as (non-moral) prudential, consequentialist moral, principled 
moral and skeptic. One might say that we can observe these diverse reasons for 
toleration in the international realm too.  
       Let‟s begin with prudential non-moral reasons. In prudential non-moral reasons, 
the self-interest of the tolerator is the only reason for toleration. We might argue that 
this type of reason for toleration is perhaps the most common in international realm 
as we observe contemporary international politics. It might be the reason that, given 
the nature of international society, the costs of intolerance (interference) are likely to 
be too high: they may involve raising an army, crossing a border, killing and being 
killed.
47
  Even if a society is hostile to the politics of a neighbor state, it might refrain 
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from acting on the basis of its objection due to the fact that it is either unprepared or 
unwilling to pay the costs of interference.  Imagine a state, which oppresses a group 
of minority within its territory due their ethnic origins. A neighbor state thinks that 
what that particular state does is a morally wrong action towards the minority group. 
However, it does not criticize its neighbor because they are involved in an economic 
alliance and if the alliance is broken due to the intolerance, the economic costs would 
be very high for the community of its fellow citizens.  
       The second reason for toleration might be moral consequentialist reasons. We 
tolerate for the sake of the consequence that we expect to achieve out of the conduct 
of tolerance but the consequence is not calculated on the basis of merely the self-
interest of the tolerator. In this sense, unlike non-moral prudential reasons, in moral 
consequentialism, the reason for toleration is more other-regarding: the relevant 
consideration is how toleration or intolerance will affect the interests of others. One 
might think of diverse reasons out of consequentialism. For instance, the most evident 
reason can be peace and stability. It seems very likely that states or international 
organizations tolerate each other‟s conduct because they do not want to risk the 
stability and they do not want to create a hostile environment that can risk peace. In 
this case, peace as a moral idea motivates the toleration.  
      We might also think of other consequentialist reasons. As Peter Jones mentions, 
one can appeal to the adverse consequences of intolerance such as human suffering it 
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may cause when considering the reasons to tolerate.
48
 In addition to this, another 
appeal might be the idea of human good: It might be suggested that human well-being 
may be enhanced by allowing people follow their own conception of good even if we 
do not agree with their conception of good.
49
 It might be claimed that different 
societies, groups of people etc. in the international realm should be able to pursue 
their own life path in terms of culture, tradition and politics because this will help 
promote and contribute to the human well-being in general.  
       In the first part of the chapter, we saw that there can be principled moral reasons 
for toleration too. In this manner, we examined „respect for persons‟ which is a 
common appeal among contemporary thinkers. Basically, „respect for persons‟ is 
founded on the idea which considers individuals as self-legislating beings that are 
capable of pursuing a way of life which they think is good for them. We saw that this 
way of reasoning gives principled moral reasons for toleration because toleration is 
not treated as a means to achieve an end. 
       How can we think of „respect for persons‟ as a reason for toleration in the 
international realm? Respect for persons “points to the status and respect we should 
accord people as persons, which provides reason why we should allow them to take 
their own path even when we think it the wrong path”50 Thus, we might assume that 
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in the international realm, „respect for persons‟ would treat international entities such 
as peoples as persons and would tolerate them in the sense of putting up with the 
conduct and way of life that these entities posses. Here, like Rawls, one might think 
of peoples as subjects - and their conduct as objects - of toleration. Nevertheless, 
different traditions, civilizations and cultures might be regarded as subjects of 
toleration too. As we saw in the first part of the chapter, „respect for persons‟ is 
accepted as a normative reason for toleration among liberal contemporary thinkers 
such as Peter Jones, Rainer Forst, Susan Mendus and Catriona McKinnon. As we will 
see in the following chapters of the dissertation, both Rawls and Habermas can be 
considered as thinkers who also subscribe to „respect for persons‟ approach so far as 
the reasons for toleration are concerned.  
       We also mentioned skepticism as a controversial candidate to be one of the 
possible justifications of toleration in the previous part of the chapter. It was stated 
that skepticism does not offer straightforward reasons for toleration but it can erase 
the ground for intolerance by referring to the epistemological uncertainty and doubt 
regarding beliefs. In this sense, one might claim skepticism can still play a role in the 
international realm due to its potentiality to challenge the ground of intolerance. From 
skepticism, one might argue that given the diverse and plural nature of beliefs, 
traditions, cultures and civilizations in the world, we cannot know if our own set of 
beliefs are hundred percent certain and true. Since we cannot be certain that what we 
hold is true, there is no point in imposing our own values on other people. In this 
manner, although skepticism is far from offering a direct moral reason for toleration, 
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it can still give some justification for why intolerance is wrong, and this seems to be 
significant in a world which is cross cut by pluralism and diversity if we need to live 
in peace.  
        Beside the skepticism about the truth of our own moral norms as a possible 
justification for the wrongness of intolerance, we might also mention the risk that one 
society will possess less than full information and understanding of another society as 
another way of skepticism concerning the wrongness of intolerance. One might say 
that there is a risk that intolerant interventions may be based on mistakes and 
misjudgments. M. Walzer seems to support some sort of skepticism on that basis as 
well. He distinguishes between two types of legitimacy for a state: A state could be 
presumptively legitimate in the international realm and actually illegitimate at 
home.
51
 In the case of an actually illegitimate state, the addressee is only the members 
of the state. It is only them who should decide to rebel against government or not 
because the foreigners can not have a full understanding of the particular culture and 
the fit between government and the community in that particular state. In other words, 
the intervention made by foreigners into the affairs of a presumptively legitimate state 
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(but actually illegitimate) would be based on false or inaccurate beliefs concerning 
the community at question. Here the incapacity of the outsiders to have a full 
knowledge about the specific conditions of community seems to be a reason based on 
skepticism which Walzer gives for the wrongness of intolerance.  
       Above, we focused on if we can think of toleration as an international issue and if 
so how. It was claimed that certainly there is a place for toleration in our thinking of 
international realm and we can examine its possible characteristics. For focusing on 
toleration as an international issue, we followed the line of analysis that was 
established in the first part of the chapter concerning the concept of toleration. Thus, 
we analyzed conditions of possibility (characteristics) of toleration and reasons for 
toleration concerning international realm. In the following chapters, we will reflect on 
the theories of John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas for examining and interpreting their 
outlooks on toleration through referring to the conceptual map that was drawn in this 
Chapter. We will try to consider how one might evaluate their theories regarding 
toleration as an international issue.  
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CHAPTER 2 
TOLERATION IN RAWLS’S POLITICAL LIBERALISM 
      In the last two chapters, we have outlined the main framework and question of the 
dissertation. First, we had focused on the concept of toleration and its characteristics 
and then, we claimed that toleration has a place in the international realm as well. In 
line with this, we have focused on the characteristics of toleration as an international 
issue. From now on, we aim to concentrate on the theories of two thinkers, John 
Rawls and Jurgen Habermas, with the intention of seeing to what extent one might 
draw conclusions regarding toleration and its international aspect from their theories. 
We shall reflect on their primary texts in undertaking analysis using the conceptual 
tools that have been outlined in the last chapter. Thus, we will analyze and interpret 
their outlook on toleration by referring to parallels and differences between their 
theories. In this chapter and the next one, the focus will be particularly on John 
Rawls; we will focus upon Habermas in chapters 4 and 5. 
2.1. The Centrality of Toleration in Political Liberalism 
       In this chapter, first we will examine Political Liberalism, published in 1993, 
which has an utmost relevance for the issue of toleration. In this text, Rawls deals 
mainly with toleration in domestic democratic societies, not the law of peoples as he 
calls it.
52
 Nevertheless, Political Liberalism provides the most important statement of 
Rawls‟s general thought on toleration and we shall see, that, in many ways, Rawls‟s 
thinking on international toleration consists in applying to the international world the 
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ideas and principles that he develops in Political Liberalism. Thus, considering 
Political Liberalism will help us understand the connection between Rawls‟s 
domestic and international theories of toleration. In analyzing Political Liberalism, I 
will stick to the conceptual schema of characteristics of toleration that had been laid 
out in the previous chapter. Here the goal is not to give a full account of what Rawls 
discussed in the text. What is intended is to make cross references between what was 
mentioned in the previous chapter concerning toleration and Political Liberalism. In 
this way, the fundamental structure and concepts will be assumed as known by the 
reader as constituting the background of what we will say, though it is not possible to 
explain every idea in Political Liberalism. 
      First of all, it is significant to understand the centrality of toleration in Political 
Liberalism. It might be said that toleration is the subject of Political Liberalism as an 
important component of the project of establishing the fundamentals of „justice as 
fairness‟ as a political conception. The fundamental question that is addressed in 
Political Liberalism is: “How is it possible for there to exist over time a just and 
stable society of free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided by 
reasonable religious, philosophical and moral doctrines?”53 As the background to the 
question, Rawls takes the diversity among reasonable comprehensive doctrines in a 
constitutional democratic regime as a starting point and toleration comes as an answer 
which is also conceived as a foundational conception for political justice. We might 
say, according to Rawls, given the fact that democratic societies are divided by 
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various reasonable religious, moral and philosophical comprehensive doctrines which 
have opposing and irreconcilable views, one has to start from toleration and its 
possible role in imagining a well-ordered stable democratic society. The fact of 
pluralism and diversity makes toleration central to the fundamentals of a political 
conception of justice. 
       For Rawls, the whole attempt to formulate a political conception of justice entails 
applying the principle of toleration to philosophy itself. Thus he says:  
“The aim of justice as fairness then, is practical: it presents itself as a conception of 
justice that may be shared by citizens as a basis of a reasoned, informed and willing 
political agreement. It expresses their shared and public political reason. But to attain 
such a shared reason the conception of justice should be, as far as possible, independent 
of the opposing and conflicting philosophical and religious doctrines that citizens affirm. 
In formulating such a conception, political liberalism applies the principle of toleration 
to philosophy itself.”54  
 
 For Rawls, political liberalism by affirming a political conception of justice is at the 
same time affirming toleration because the political conception of justice refers not to 
any comprehensive doctrine but to the shared public reason of citizens in a 
democratic society. Toleration means not imposing the values of any comprehensive 
doctrine on citizens as the source of the legitimacy for the conception of justice, since 
the legitimacy comes from their shared agreement which is the reflection and practice 
of public reason. Rawls put this in a clear way when he mentions the liberal principle 
of legitimacy: “our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is 
exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free 
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and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals 
acceptable to their common human reason.”55 Thus political liberalism, by being 
independent of reasonable comprehensive doctrines and by acknowledging the liberal 
principle of legitimacy, is applying the principle of toleration to philosophy.   
        A political conception of justice in being political is also freestanding. This 
means “it offers no specific metaphysical or epistemological doctrine beyond what is 
implied by the political conception itself.”56 This point of being free standing might 
be considered in relation to toleration as well because, if political liberalism affirms 
some metaphysical or epistemological assumptions, then it would impose a certain 
world-view which is partially or fully comprehensive on citizens who held the other 
comprehensive doctrines. For instance, imagine that a political conception of justice 
is based on an assumption that human beings are morally autonomous which is a 
central claim of the liberal doctrine of Kant and Mill. This would mean that the 
conception of justice affirmed a liberal comprehensive doctrine and it would impose 
this liberal assumption on citizens having the comprehensive doctrines that do not 
share this view of autonomy. Thus, one might say that both by being independent (as 
mentioned in the previous paragraph) and free standing of reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines, a political conception of justice is a significant principle of toleration. 
2.2. Characteristics of Toleration in Political Liberalism 
       Above, we aimed to demonstrate how toleration is a central idea in Political 
Liberalism and how it is connected to the idea of a political conception of justice. 
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Now we should look more into the characteristics of toleration to the extent that these 
may be drawn out of Political Liberalism. In doing this, I will refer back to the 
conceptual map that had been drawn in the previous chapter regarding the conditions 
of possibility and reasons for toleration. This will give us the opportunity to see to 
what extent and how Rawls‟s theory of toleration in Political Liberalism could match 
with the conceptual scheme that we had drawn. It will also help us to reflect on the 
international dimension of the concept of toleration in Rawls‟s theory in the second 
part of the chapter. Furthermore, it will give us the background to compare Rawls‟s 
thinking on toleration with Habermas‟s. 
       In Chapter 1, we distinguished two dimensions of toleration: characteristics 
(conditions of possibility) of and reasons for toleration. By conditions of possibility 
we mean the conceptual dimensions that make toleration possible. As for reasons for 
toleration, we mean the justification of toleration. We also analyzed these 
characteristics with respect to the international aspect of the concept in the second 
part of Chapter 1. Now we shall expose Political Liberalism to a similar analysis.  
2.2.1. Agents and Object of Toleration in Political Liberalism 
        The first characteristic of the conditions of possibility of toleration is the objects 
and subjects of toleration. Put another way, one has to talk about the „tolerator‟ and 
the „tolerated‟ to be able to refer to toleration. In Political Liberalism, citizens of a 
constitutional democratic society are the agents of toleration. Also a variety of 
reasonable religious, philosophical and moral comprehensive doctrines; in virtue of 
being the beliefs, attitudes and values of citizens; could be viewed as objects of 
toleration. In a well ordered democratic society, citizens are regarded as free and 
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equal persons. “The basic idea is that in virtue of their two moral powers (capacity for 
a sense of justice and for a conception of good) and the powers of reason (of 
judgment, thought, and inference connected with these powers), persons are free. 
Their having these powers to the requisite minimum degree to be fully cooperating 
members of society makes persons equal.”57 Thus, persons as free and equal agents 
engage in a relation of toleration to each other in acting through these two moral 
powers and powers of reason in public forum. 
        As stated in the last paragraph, reasonable comprehensive doctrines, as 
constituting belief sets, values, attitudes and the sources of action, come to the scene 
as objects of toleration. It is significant to understand what Rawls means by a 
reasonable comprehensive doctrine. Here I will refer to „reasonable‟ with respect to 
the character of comprehensive doctrines. I will focus on reasonableness as an 
attitude of persons in the following parts of the chapter, when talking about the limits 
and reasons of toleration. This is not to say that Rawls has two conceptions of 
reasonable; certainly reasonable comprehensive doctrines are viewed as doctrines that 
are held by reasonable persons as we will observe later and in this sense there is one 
common definition. First we will focus on what he means by „comprehensive‟. In 
explaining the distinction between a political conception of justice and other moral 
conceptions, Rawls mentions scope in terms of generality and comprehensiveness. In 
this sense, he continues:  
“A moral conception is general if it applies to a wide range of subjects, and in the 
limit to all subjects universally. It is comprehensive when it includes conceptions of 
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what is of value in human life, and ideals of personal character, as well as the ideals 
of friendship and of familial and associational relationships, and much else that is to 
inform our conduct, in the limit to inform our life as a whole. A conception is fully 
comprehensive if it covers all recognized values and virtues within one rather 
precisely articulated system; whereas a conception is only partially comprehensive 
when it comprises a number of, but by no means all, nonpolitical values and virtues 
and is rather loosely articulated. Many religious and philosophical doctrines aspire to 
be both general and comprehensive.”58 
 
Concerning the nature of comprehensive doctrines, as Rawls himself puts it very 
clearly, we might talk about a diversity cross- cut by opposing and irreconcilable 
world-views that inform the life style and value set of citizens in a constitutional 
modern democracy. 
        As mentioned, Rawls specifically talks about reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines in terms of the character of pluralism in democratic societies. That is why 
we need to understand the meaning of reasonable with respect to comprehensive 
doctrines. As he puts it, first, we have to assume that reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines are the comprehensive doctrines that are affirmed by reasonable persons.
59
 
Concerning the features of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, he says they have 
three main features. One is that a reasonable doctrine is an exercise of theoretical 
reason in the sense that “it covers the moral, religious and philosophical aspects of 
human life in a more or less consistent and coherent manner”.60 Secondly, “in 
singling out which values to count as especially significant and how to balance them 
when they conflict, a reasonable comprehensive doctrine is an exercise of practical 
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reason”.61 And third, although stable over time, it tends to evolve slowly in time in 
the light of what it sees as sufficient and good reasons. Here Rawls puts it that his 
definition of „reasonable comprehensive doctrine‟ is „deliberately loose‟62. As Samuel 
Freeman, rightly mentions, many philosophers would call unreasonable what Rawls 
calls reasonable: “For example most philosophers would contend that most any 
religious doctrine is unreasonable in so far as it believes in miracles, an afterlife, 
spiritual beings and so on”.63 However for Freeman, the loose and flexible character 
of the definition is in line with Rawls‟s limited purpose: He needs to avoid 
controversial epistemological claims in order to achieve agreement on the political 
principles of justice among holders of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. We might 
relate what Samuel Freeman suggests here to Rawls‟s empirical observation about the 
characteristic of pluralism in democratic societies. As mentioned before, since 
democratic societies are divided by reasonable religious, moral and philosophical 
comprehensive doctrines, one should begin with acknowledging this diversity in 
working out the possibility of stability in democratic societies. In this way, as 
mentioned before, citizens as holders of reasonable comprehensive doctrines 
constitute the subjects and their beliefs, attitudes etc. constitute the objects as far as 
toleration is concerned in Political Liberalism. 
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2.2.2. Reasonable Pluralism as Condition of Diversity in Political Liberalism 
        In chapter 1, we have seen one of the conditions of possibility of toleration is 
circumstances of diversity coupled with disapproval or dislike. We said that it is not 
mere diversity or a circumstance in which everyone approves of each other‟s 
differences. It is diversity with specific qualification. In this way, as we examined 
Political Liberalism, we could obviously talk about the existence of this condition. 
Indeed the very starting point of Rawls in this text is the fact that modern democratic 
societies are divided by various comprehensive doctrines. In this sense, pluralism is a 
fact. Here Rawls mentions reasonable pluralism as a condition of diversity in the text. 
Nevertheless he also addresses the fact that there could also be unreasonable 
comprehensive doctrines as they always might occur but it seems that what is 
characteristic of constitutional modern democracies is the fact that they contain a 
pluralism which is reasonable because in a sense Rawls considers the fact of 
reasonable pluralism as something that modern democracy achieved as the history 
evolved.  
        Catriona McKinnon makes a significant remark regarding the character of the 
pluralism that Rawls endorses. For her, Rawls conceives of the ideal character of 
pluralism as non-hostile due to the requirement of public reason in the form of 
engagement on the part of citizens separated by differences.
64
 She says, hostility 
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involves a rejection of another person and citizens who are hostile towards each other 
cannot engage in public reason. Thus, she means that the expectation from reasonable 
citizens, such as a willingness to understand and interpret each other‟s differences in 
their political discourse, is at the root of a Rawlsian political justification and these 
specific attitudes that citizens are expected to adopt underlie the non-hostile character 
of pluralism in Rawls‟ theory. In the following parts of the chapter, we will examine 
this relation between the expectations from citizens and toleration better as we carry 
on analyzing Political Liberalism in Rawls‟s theory. Here one might interpret this 
non-hostile character of pluralism in Rawls‟s theory not as a dimension that removes 
the basis for disapproval or dislike. Quite the contrary: since we have the diversity, it 
is likely that people will disapprove of each other‟s values, attitudes etc even though 
they are reasonable. We will observe that better when we talk about „burdens of 
judgment‟ which marks that disagreement is possible between reasonable people in 
the following parts of the chapter.   
2.2.3. Power as a Characteristic of Toleration in Political Liberalism 
       We have mentioned about the characteristic of power as one of the conditions of 
possibility of toleration in Chapter 1. In order for me to be in a relation of toleration, I 
should have the power to act on my objection. Thus, toleration needs the agent to be 
in a position to be able to interfere with the situation that is the object of disapproval 
or dislike. Here, we made a distinction between tolerant conduct and attitude. To be 
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able to talk about a tolerant attitude, it is enough to say that the tolerant agent, 
regardless of having the actual power to act, would not act on behalf of her objection 
even if she had the power to do so. In line with this, we could say that in the 
democratic society of Rawls, citizens would exhibit both tolerant conduct and a 
tolerant disposition. They would refrain from using political power either to promote 
their own conception of good or to impede others‟ pursuit of their conceptions of 
good. They would do this as a matter of justice. In this manner, what Rawls calls the 
„burdens of judgment‟ also demonstrates that reasonable persons could disagree and 
in these situations they certainly should tolerate each other even though they have the 
power not to do so. I will get into what “burdens of judgment‟ refer to and its place in 
the toleration argument in Political Liberalism in the following parts of the chapter. 
2.2.4. Scope, Demands and Limits of Toleration in Political Liberalism 
       We have also seen in chapter 1 that we could analyze the scope, limits and 
demands of toleration concerning the conditions of possibility of toleration. By scope, 
we mean the sources of disapproval or dislike. Just to recall, the debate here concerns 
whether the sources of disapproval are moral or not. We said that we could refer to 
diverse sources such as aesthetic objections and mere dislike as well as moral 
disapproval. Here, concerning Political Liberalism, one might claim the same since 
we have religious, philosophical and moral reasonable comprehensive doctrines; it 
seems very likely that Rawls‟s citizens would show disapproval or dislike that falls 
under the category of nonmoral as well as moral. Citizens might find certain values 
and practices of other citizens which are informed by their particular comprehensive 
doctrine morally wrong as well as aesthetically ugly, or they just might not like them 
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for many different reasons. Here we also need to recall the meaning of 
„comprehensive‟ in Rawls. We have seen that comprehensive doctrines could cover a 
broad range of aspects such as values, traditions, beliefs which could be connected to 
a religion, philosophical or moral doctrine. Therefore, the range of differences that 
might cause disapproval is broad as well. Due to the nature of this diversity, one 
might claim that we could have different sources of disapproval or dislike such as 
religious, aesthetic, cultural as well as moral. 
       As for the limits of toleration, I will refer to substantive limits in terms of what 
we should tolerate and what we should not. In this sense, in Political liberalism, 
reasonableness, which is central to the idea of toleration in Rawls‟s theory, seems to 
be significant in the sense of drawing the limits of what is tolerable and what is not in 
the public forum.  In addition to this aspect, reasonableness also gives reasons for 
toleration in the theory of Rawls but I will take up this issue later. First let‟s see what 
Rawls mean by reasonableness: “Persons are reasonable in one basic aspect when, 
among equals say, they are ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of 
cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance others likewise do 
so. Those norms they view as reasonable for everyone to accept and therefore as 
justifiable to them; and they are ready to discuss the fair terms that others propose.”65 
Thus, reasonableness refers to a particular public disposition which is based on an 
other- regarding principle of proposing principles that others would accept and being 
ready to abide by the principles that other people would propose in the same manner. 
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Here it is also significant to note that reasonable is distinct from rational. Rawls says 
justice as fairness “does not try to derive the reasonable from the rational. …Rather 
within the idea of fair cooperation, the reasonable and the rational are complementary 
ideas. Each is an element in this fundamental idea and each connects with its 
distinctive moral power, respectively with the capacity for a sense of justice and 
capacity for a conception of the good.” 66 Thus citizens as persons in a well-ordered 
democratic society behave as reasonable when they appeal to their moral capacity for 
a sense of justice. 
       How is reasonable significant in determining the limits of toleration? Here Rawls 
seems to propose that comprehensive doctrines that gain the status of reasonable in 
public realm are tolerated because by being reasonable, they already demonstrate that 
they move within the boundaries of the appropriate principles of justice. Citizens 
practice toleration when they engage in proposing principles as fair terms of 
cooperation given that others would do the same. We might say that, even if they do 
disapprove of certain aspects of a particular reasonable comprehensive doctrine, they 
tolerate these aspects due to the fact that this comprehensive doctrine is reasonable as 
well. In this sense, citizens know that disagreement or disapproval should not lead 
them to act intolerantly. In this manner, reasonableness comes onto the scene as a 
substantive limit to the toleration that citizens practice in Rawls‟s theory. 
       What about the unreasonable comprehensive doctrines? Here Rawls says:  
“There is not one account of toleration for reasonable doctrines and another for 
unreasonable ones. Both cases are settled by the appropriate political principles of justice 
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and the conduct these principles permit. Unreasonable doctrines are a threat to 
democratic institutions since it is impossible for them to abide by a constitutional regime 
except as a modus vivendi. Their existence sets a limit to the aim of fully realizing 
reasonable democratic society with its ideal of public reason and the idea of legitimate 
law.”67  
 
Here by not complying with the appropriate set of principles for a constitutional 
democracy, unreasonable doctrines already exclude themselves from the reciprocal 
toleration of democratic citizenship. Even if they could benefit from the outcomes of 
a modus vivendi, they would not be willing to participate as a member of a stability 
that is the outcome of an overlapping consensus. However this does not mean, for 
Rawls, to actively suppress unreasonable comprehensive doctrines and their 
members. As he states in A Theory of Justice, intolerance towards the intolerant is 
acceptable only in specific circumstances; when it is vital to preserve equal liberty 
itself.
68
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       As for the demands of toleration, we had seen that the debate is about what could 
be the appropriate limits of action that could be taken for tolerating: whether 
toleration means leaving alone and refraining from persecuting or it could require 
more than that (assisting, aiding and fostering etc). I think one has strong reasons to 
believe that Rawls‟s understanding of toleration goes beyond refraining from 
persecuting or leaving alone. In this way, the requirements set by public reason and 
reasonableness provides toleration to maintain dimensions that are related to the ideal 
of democratic citizenship. Rawls expresses this very explicitly when referring to the 
ideal of public reason and it limits:  
“I stress the limits of public reason are not, clearly the limits of law or statute but the 
limits we honor when we honor an ideal: the ideal of democratic citizens trying to 
conduct their political affairs in terms supported by public values that we might 
reasonably expect others to endorse. The ideal also expresses a willingness to listen 
to what others have to say and being ready to accept reasonable accommodations or 
alterations in one‟s own view. Public reason further asks of us that the balance of 
those values we hold to be reasonable in a particular case is a balance we sincerely 
think can be seen to be reasonable by others. Or failing this, we think the balance can 
be seen as at least not unreasonable in this sense: that those who oppose it can 
nevertheless understand how reasonable persons can affirm it. This preserves the ties 
of civic friendship and is consistent with the duty of civility.” 69 
 
Here one might say that demands of toleration and the ideal of citizenship are 
connected to each other: Demands of toleration go far enough to cover civic duty and 
friendship in a democratic constitutional society. In this sense, demands could be seen 
as part of the requirements of public reason and acting reasonable as citizens who 
share the same institutional framework. We will have the chance to observe the same 
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aspect regarding the demands of toleration when we analyze the theory of Jurgen 
Habermas as well in chapter 4. Also in Habermas‟s theory, the requirements of public 
discourse and public reason in respect of toleration go beyond merely refraining from 
persecuting or leaving alone. 
2.3. Reasons for Toleration in Political Liberalism 
        We shall now aim to focus on what we call the reasons for toleration with 
reference to Political Liberalism. In the first chapter, we identified nonmoral 
prudential, moral (nonprincipled) consequentialist and moral principled reasons and 
skepticism (though not giving straightforward reasons but erasing the ground of 
intolerance) as possible justifications for toleration. Here it is claimed that Rawls 
subscribes to moral principled reasons as justification for toleration. With this in 
mind, below, Rawls‟s concept of toleration in Political Liberalism will be examined 
with respect to reasons for toleration. 
         As mentioned in the previous chapter briefly, it might be claimed that Rawls 
subscribes to the idea of „respect for persons‟ as a principled moral justification for 
toleration. Before concentrating on Rawls‟s understanding of „respect for persons‟ 
and how it fits into the argument for toleration, we will focus on what is meant by 
„respect for persons‟ in general and what the idea of personhood implies in Political 
Liberalism to the extent that it is related to the analysis of toleration. Personhood is 
usually associated with being recognized as a human being who is capable of 
reflecting, judging and choosing for herself. As Peter Jones mentions, here it is not 
the merit of the choice which is respected, but it is the status of the person who is 
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making the choice.
70
 The idea has Kantian roots in the sense of treating human beings 
as ends in themselves and it is shared among philosophers who have deontological 
theories.
71
 For instance, Charles Larmore connects the idea of person to the idea of 
democratic legitimacy in a way echoing Kant with regard to „respect for persons‟:  
“…an essential feature of persons is that they are beings capable of thinking and acting 
on the basis of reasons. If we try to bring about conformity to a rule of conduct solely by 
the threat of force, we will be treating persons merely as means, as objects of coercion, 
and not also as ends, engaging directly their distinctive capacity as persons…. Thus, to 
respect others as persons in their own right when coercion is at stake is to require that 
political principles be as justifiable to them as they presumably are to us.”72  
 
Also, in the contemporary literature on toleration, it has become common to refer to 
„respect for persons‟ as a reason for toleration (as we observed in Part 1 of Chapter 
1).  
       As far as Political Liberalism is concerned, Rawls says that he refers to a 
political conception of person. In this sense, persons are regarded as free and equal. 
He says, “The basic idea is that in virtue of their two moral powers (a capacity for a 
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Kant and Mill but he talks about artificial and political autonomy (see Lecture 2, Parts 5 and 6 in 
Political Liberalism). 
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sense of justice and for a conception of the good) and the powers of reason (of 
judgment, thought, and inference connected with these powers), persons are free. 
Their having these powers to the requisite minimum degree to be fully cooperating 
members of society makes persons equal.”73 We might say that this idea of person is 
political in two aspects: First, viewing persons in this way is considered as one of the 
political values of a democratic political culture. That citizens are free and equal is 
already a political value that we find in a constitutional democratic society. Secondly, 
the idea of the person is connected to the idea of social cooperation. Citizens as 
persons are members of a society as a fair system of cooperation in which they appeal 
to the political principles of justice as well as follow their conceptions of good. “For 
purposes of social cooperation as members of a democratic society the ideal 
conception of free and equal moral persons captures (Rawls conjectures) how we 
think of ourselves and one another in our capacity as democratic citizens.”74 In our 
capacity as citizens, we view ourselves as well as each other as free and equal and 
respect this status both in our own capacity and in the capacity of other fellow 
citizens. Thus, we might say that Rawlsian personhood is also about the status of 
persons and respect owed to this status as part of the justification of toleration.  
Below, we will focus on how „respect for persons‟ constitutes a justification for 
toleration in Political Liberalism. 
       To begin with, it might be argued that  the idea of „respect for persons‟ as a 
reason for toleration is embedded in the idea  of „reasonableness‟ together with the 
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idea of „burdens of judgment‟ in Rawls‟s understanding of toleration. Indeed 
„burdens of judgment‟ as Rawls says constitutes the second aspect of the reasonable: 
The first basic aspect of the reasonable is the willingness to propose fair terms of 
cooperation and to abide by them provided others do. The second basic aspect is “the 
willingness to recognize the burdens of judgment and to accept their consequences 
for the use of public reason concerning the legitimate exercise of political power in a 
constitutional regime.”75 Here, both concerning the first and second aspect of the 
reasonable, toleration comes as a response to difference and disagreement, and it is 
related to our judgment and comprehension of others‟ status as persons.  
       As for the first aspect of the reasonable, citizens know the fact that they have 
different viewpoints and values does not necessarily mean that others‟ values are 
unreasonable. This is an outlook which allows citizens to see their fellow citizens as 
respectable and on an equal footing in the use of public reason for the exercise of 
shared political power. In this sense, seeing others as free and equal persons (just like 
us) who are willing to propose reasonable arguments constitutes a principled moral 
ground for our toleration. And in addition to this, citizens by seeing other 
comprehensive doctrines as reasonable would find it unreasonable to use political 
power to promote their own comprehensive doctrine over others.
76
  
       In relation to the idea of „reasonableness‟, the „burdens of judgment‟ constitute a 
significant ground for toleration. By „burdens of judgment‟, Rawls says he means the 
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causes and sources of disagreement between reasonable persons.
77
  He lists six 
possible sources of disagreement from a to f:  
“a. The evidence- empirical and scientific- bearing on the case is conflicting and 
complex, and thus hard to assess and evaluate. 
b. Even where we agree fully about the kinds of considerations that are relevant, we may 
disagree about their weight, and so arrive at different judgments.  
c. To some extent all our concepts, and not only moral and political concepts, are vague 
and subject to hard cases; and this indeterminacy means that we must rely on judgment 
and interpretation (and on judgments about interpretations) within some range (not 
sharply specifiable) where reasonable persons may differ.  
d. To some extent (how great we cannot tell) the way we assess evidence and weigh 
moral and political values is shaped by our total experience, our whole course of life up 
to now; and our total experiences must always differ. Thus, in a modern society with its 
numerous offices and positions, its various divisions of labor, its many social groups and 
their ethnic variety, citizens‟ total experiences are disparate enough for their judgments 
to diverge, at least to some degree, on many if not most cases of any significant 
complexity. 
e. Often there are different kinds of normative considerations of different force on both 
sides of an issue and it is difficult to make an overall assessment. 
f. Finally, as we note in referring to Berlin‟s view (V: 6.2), any system of social 
institutions is limited in the values it can admit so that some selection must be made 
from the full range of moral and political values that might be realized. This is because 
any system of institutions has, as it were, a limited social space. In being forced to select 
among cherished values, or when we hold to several and must restrict each in view of the 
requirements of the others, we face great difficulties in setting priorities and making 
adjustments. Many hard decisions may seem to have no clear answer.” 78 
 
In recognizing the burdens of judgment, citizens would grant that disagreement is 
possible even among reasonable persons and comprehensive doctrines. Disagreement 
does not mean that other comprehensive doctrines are unreasonable. That is why they 
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would consider using state power or make an alliance with some citizens to impose 
their own view on others as unreasonable since disagreement does not give them any 
grounds for oppression or imposition of their own comprehensive doctrines over 
others. Moreover, they would consider imposition of their own conception of good by 
using political power to be unjust. In this sense, political toleration is a requirement of 
justice as well. 
         Since disagreement does not mean other comprehensive doctrines are 
unreasonable, persons who are holders of these doctrines could not be viewed as 
unreasonable either. In this way, „respect for persons‟ seems to follow as a necessity 
of recognizing the burdens of judgment. We have to respect and grant equal status to 
others as persons in sharing the corporate political power of society even though we 
end up in disagreement. Moreover, if I am equal in status with all other reasonable 
persons with different reasonable comprehensive views, then I cannot justify others 
using power to impose my own view. If I were to do this, I would be in a position of 
not granting respect to other citizens who are also free and equal and this would 
definitely mean that my intolerance was unreasonable. 
        Before moving further with „respect for persons‟ as a reason for toleration in 
Political Liberalism, I would like to touch upon some criticisms of Rawls concerning 
the way he acknowledges „respect for persons‟. The first criticism is based on an 
interpretation of the idea of reasonableness which seems to challenge the argument 
that was laid out above. Our argument was that „respect for persons‟, which is a 
principled moral ground, functions in Rawls‟s theory, as a justification for toleration. 
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Susan Mendus and Matt Matravers interpret the idea of reasonableness in Rawls‟s 
theory in an interesting way. They call the illegitimacy and unreasonableness of 
imposing one conception of good over the others as “injustice of imposition”. 79 They 
claim that Rawls and his followers tend to take it for granted that reasonableness of 
pluralism will be followed smoothly by “injustice of imposition” as far as they refer 
to epistemological restraint. They continue claiming, nevertheless, for this to happen, 
we need a moral ground that will tell us why it is wrong to impose our own 
conception of good on others. In this sense, for them, as an epistemological claim, 
reasonableness of pluralism does not provide us with a sufficient reason for acting 
tolerantly. That is why we need a moral component to claim for the injustice of 
imposition in Rawls‟s theory. Although Mendus says in couple of words that Rawls‟s 
later work might be considered as containing a moral component that is built into the 
idea of reasonableness, still for her, we could distinguish two aspects of the 
reasonable: epistemological and moral. 
         I would like to reply to this argument on three levels: First, we might say that 
there is a moral component in Rawls‟s theory concerning justification of toleration 
and it is already embedded in the idea of reasonableness. In this way, toleration which 
is grounded in the idea of reasonableness should be considered in its connection with 
the idea of citizenship and its requirements. This broad consideration will allow us to 
see the moral component which is „respect for persons‟ in Rawls‟s understanding of 
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toleration. Secondly, it is difficult to comprehend why it is a problem to have two 
aspects (one epistemological and one moral) for the idea of reasonableness in Rawls‟s 
theory. It seems that this does not make Rawls‟s arguments any weaker for the 
justification of toleration. Thirdly, I am not sure if it is correct to describe 
reasonableness as an epistemological idea. This is something Rawls himself denies in 
Political Liberalism together with the idea of skepticism. Regarding this issue he 
says: “Observe that here being reasonable is not an epistemological idea (though it 
has epistemological elements). Rather it is part of a political ideal of democratic 
citizenship that includes the ideal of public reason. The content of this reason 
includes what free and equal citizens as reasonable can require of each other with 
respect to their reasonable comprehensive views. In this case, they cannot require 
anything contrary to what the parties as their representatives in the original position 
could grant.”80 Here, it makes sense for Rawls not to describe reasonableness as an 
epistemological argument because reasonableness is based on a political ideal of 
citizenship which also has moral requirements from citizens as free and equal 
members of a well-ordered democratic society. And as for the skepticism charge, 
Rawls claims that if an overlapping consensus of reasonable doctrines is to be 
possible, skepticism must be avoided and the account of burdens of judgment must 
not proceed as a skeptical argument.
81
 I think it would be more comprehensible why 
Rawls denies skepticism as the ground of „burdens of judgment‟ if we consider the 
stability argument which is based on overlapping consensus as the result of 
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agreement among reasonable comprehensive doctrines. If we reason from skepticism, 
it is very likely that we shall not gain a stability which is different from a modus 
vivendi or a merely constitutional consensus. An overlapping consensus requires a 
moral commitment on the part of citizens as they use their public reason and affirm 
the appropriate conceptions of justice. Below, we will have the chance to observe it 
more how the idea of „overlapping consensus‟ is connected to the idea of 
reasonableness as a ground of toleration. 
        In a similar fashion but for different reasons, Charles Larmore is also not happy 
with the way Rawls proceeds in terms of „respect for persons‟. For Larmore, Rawls 
should have stressed „respect for persons‟ in an appropriate and open way concerning 
political liberalism: putting „respect for persons‟ in the position of a moral basis that 
is prior to the will of reasonable persons.  He claims that, even though Rawls‟s  
liberal principle of legitimacy 
82
 give voice to a certain degree to the abiding moral 
heart of liberal thought, Rawls failed in bringing up the moral content of this 
principle and its proper place in Political Liberalism.
83
  For Larmore, „respect for 
persons‟ should be acknowledged as a moral principle that is binding independently 
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of the democratic will of citizens.
84
 He thinks that this is not to call into question the 
political nature of liberalism, which he claims he shares with Rawls, but to 
acknowledge the need to refer to a moral content over which political liberalism 
should stand. To reply to Larmore, we could say that, as Larmore himself 
acknowledged to a certain extent, „respect for persons‟ is implied by conceptions of 
reasonableness and the idea of democratic citizenship in Rawls‟s later work: Citizens 
act on the basis of mutual respect in viewing each other as reasonable with respect to 
their status as being free and equal. Therefore, it seems sensible why Rawls does not 
give „respect for persons‟ an independent moral status which is prior to all other 
political values and principles. If he would acknowledge that moral status, it would 
be difficult for Rawls to sustain the freestanding and political characteristic of 
liberalism he endorses. It seems that acknowledging „respect for persons‟ as an 
independent moral principle binding for citizens would put Rawls‟s liberalism in the 
same footing with a moral comprehensive doctrine. In Rawls‟s view, „respect for 
persons‟ seems to be a significant political value that is inherently connected to the 
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values of democratic citizenship that we find in our political culture. In this sense, we 
might say that it informs citizens‟ attitude towards each other in exercising their 
public reason and as we argued, it provides reasons for toleration. 
       We have pointed out that the idea of „reasonableness‟ is connected to the idea of 
„respect for persons‟ as a ground for toleration in Rawls‟ theory as far as justification 
is concerned. Furthermore, we could point out the idea of „overlapping consensus‟ 
and „moral psychology of persons‟ as two significant conceptions which are 
supportive of the idea of „respect for persons‟ and „reasonableness‟. First let‟s 
concentrate on the „moral psychology of persons‟. For Rawls, persons as citizens of a 
well-ordered democratic society act out of a certain philosophical disposition which 
we might call a certain moral psychology. This is related to the moral motivation of 
persons in the sense that they have a reasonable disposition. Thus Rawls says, 
“Citizens have a reasonable moral psychology. The features we have attributed to 
citizens- their readiness to propose and to abide by fair terms of cooperation, their 
recognizing burdens of judgment and affirming only reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines and their wanting to be full citizens- provide a basis for ascribing them a 
reasonable moral psychology, several aspects of which are consequences of these 
features.” 85 In this manner, one might claim that persons as citizens acting out of a 
particular disposition might be considered as ascribing to a tolerant attitude towards 
their fellow citizens. Thus, the principle of toleration itself could be seen as 
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embedded in the ideal of democratic citizenship which requires a reasonable moral 
psychology. 
        As for the idea of „overlapping consensus‟ as supportive of „respect for persons‟, 
we might claim that the principle of toleration which is grounded by „respect for 
persons‟ and „reasonableness‟ could be under full guarantee only with the stability 
which is the outcome of an overlapping consensus. In other words, stability achieved 
by the assent of reasonable comprehensive doctrines with respect to the appropriate 
principles of justice could support the principle of toleration and its realization to the 
fullest extent. As Rawls himself puts it, “the kind of stability required of justice as 
fairness is based, then, on its being a liberal political view, one that aims at being 
acceptable to citizens as reasonable and rational, as well as free and equal, and so 
addressed to their public reason.” 86 In this sense, overlapping consensus as the basis 
of stability is different from modus vivendi which is no more than a contingent 
balance of forces in the society. Moreover, a constitutional consensus is also far from 
guaranteeing the principles of toleration to the full extent because it covers basic 
rights to political participation but does not address questions of the distribution of 
goods. However, with the overlapping consensus, the principles of a fully developed 
conception of justice are agreed on. It is only with overlapping consensus, that we 
arrive at stability in which citizen do not consider changing the stability by using 
political power to impose their own comprehensive doctrine over the others. Thus, 
the principle of toleration is secured. As McKinnon puts it, the agreement through an 
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overlapping consensus demands deeper answers concerning the questions of justice 
from citizens who adopt different reasonable comprehensive doctrines because the 
level of opposition is deeper at that level due to the wide range of principles that are 
addressed by the appropriate conception of justice.
87
 In this situation, citizens find a 
way to accommodate their different views in order to accept the same conception of 
justice and this is possible with the reasonable attitudes of the citizens who participate 
in overlapping consensus. Citizens, seeing themselves and others as reasonable in 
affirming the same conception of justice regardless of their differences grant respect 
to others who are as reasonable as themselves and do not consider changing the 
stability by using political power. 
        Above, we tried to outline the fundamental characteristics of toleration in 
Political Liberalism with reference to conditions of possibility and reasons for 
toleration. This outline will provide a basis for examining the characteristics of 
toleration as an international issue in Law of Peoples in the following chapter of the 
dissertation since we will have the opportunity to observe the parallels and 
differences between the two accounts of toleration in Rawls‟s theory.  In addition to 
this, with the help of the outline we had drawn in this chapter, we shall be able to 
compare the theories of Rawls and Habermas with respect to the characteristics of 
toleration which are deployed in their theories in the following chapters of the 
dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TOLERATION IN RAWLS’S THE LAW OF PEOPLES 
 
       In Chapter 2, we have analyzed Political Liberalism to outline the characteristics 
of the toleration Rawls endorses. This had to be an analysis in which the context of 
democratic societies was the addressee. Now, we will turn to the international context 
to examine the characteristics of toleration in Rawls‟s theory, that is, his Law of 
Peoples. In analyzing Law of Peoples, we will try to see how Rawls addresses 
toleration as an international issue by referring to his standpoint in Political 
Liberalism as well as to the conceptual map that has been drawn in the first two 
chapters of this dissertation. Since our goal is limited to making an analysis of 
toleration in Rawls‟s international theory, we will not aim to explain every idea in 
Law of Peoples. This analysis will provide us with the fundamental characteristics of 
Rawls‟ international toleration and enable us to consider what grounds he offers for 
international toleration. Moreover, analyzing Law of Peoples will provide us with the 
parameters that we will refer to when we discuss the theory of Jurgen Habermas in 
Chapters 4 and 5. 
3.1. Toleration as a Requirement of Justice in Law of Peoples 
       As mentioned in previous chapters, Rawls is among the few scholars who 
address toleration directly as an international issue and his interest is laid out 
particularly in his text Law of Peoples published in 1999. In the text, Rawls deals 
with the question of peace and justice at the international level. This is where he 
extends the social contract idea to the level of what he calls „peoples‟. Thus, he works 
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out the principles and regulations of a liberal idea of justice among peoples. In this 
sense, the law of peoples refers to the rules of the society of reasonable peoples. 
Reasonable Peoples comply with and act according to the principles and rights that 
they established among themselves. 
       Rawls states in the Introduction of the book: “The basic idea is to follow Kant‟s 
lead as sketched by him in Perpetual Peace (1975) and his idea of foedus pacificum.” 
88
 He indicates that he interprets this idea of Kant in a particular way: we first have to 
begin with the social contract idea of a political conception of a democratic regime 
and then extend it by introducing a second original position where the representatives 
of liberal peoples make an agreement with other liberal peoples.
89
  
       Rawls distinguishes five types of societies: reasonable liberal peoples, decent 
nonliberal peoples, outlaw states, benevolent absolutisms and societies burdened by 
unfavorable conditions. In line with this, his text is composed of three main parts. 
The first two parts deal with ideal theory: first, he develops arguments concerning the 
first and second original positions and in the second part, he incorporates nonliberal 
decent peoples into the society of reasonable peoples. Part three concentrates on two 
nonideal theories: the first concerns the conditions of noncompliance in which certain 
societies refuse to comply with law of peoples (this is where he deals with outlaw 
states). The second type of nonideal theory is concerned with unfavorable conditions 
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where the historical, social and economic conditions make it impossible for a society 
to become a well-ordered society (either liberal or decent). 
       Toleration, a central theme in Law of Peoples, is regarded as a requirement of 
justice in the international realm. Our goal here is limited to identifying the grounds 
for and limits of toleration in Rawls‟ international theory. That is why we will not be 
addressing each idea in Law of Peoples. Nevertheless it is still significant to point out 
the relation between Rawls‟ understanding of toleration and the project of Law of 
Peoples in general. As we consider Rawls‟s attempt to outline the principles of a 
liberal idea of justice in the international realm, we might say that toleration comes to 
the fore as a requirement of international justice. It might be argued that in 
considering the toleration of decent hierarchical societies, Rawls thinks that this 
toleration is essential to the just regulation among well-ordered societies (liberal and 
decent). In this sense, toleration is not something at the mercy of liberal peoples that 
they could grant whenever they want. For Rawls, rights and obligations of a just 
arrangement among peoples make toleration necessary. Well-ordered (liberal and 
decent) societies act out of the principles that they have worked out and that gives a 
reason to tolerate each other as societies who recognize each other as equal members 
of the society of reasonable peoples. 
     Rawls lists eight principles of law of peoples:  
“1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be 
respected by other peoples. 2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. 3. 
Peoples are equal and parties to the agreements that bind them. 4. Peoples are to observe 
a duty of non-intervention. 5. Peoples have the right of self-defense but not right to 
instigate war for reasons other than self-defense. 6. Peoples are to honor human rights. 7. 
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Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war. 8. Peoples 
have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their 
having a just or decent political and social regime.” 90 
These principles are reached under a veil of ignorance first by liberal peoples.
91 Here, 
the conditions of the second original position are similar to those of the first one that 
provides for domestic case: “the parties are subject to a veil of ignorance properly 
adjusted for the case at hand: they do not know, for example the size of their territory, 
or the population or the relative strength of the people whose fundamental interests 
they represent. Though they do know that reasonably favorable conditions obtain that 
make constitutional democracy possible- since they know they represent liberal 
societies- they do not know the extent of their natural resources, or the level of their 
economic development, or other such information.”92 Secondly, he extends this idea 
of hypothetical contract to decent hierarchical societies who are not liberal. He argues 
that these principles would also be agreed on by decent peoples (even though they are 
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not liberal). Liberal and decent peoples, in acting in line with these principles, tolerate 
each other‟s conduct. Intolerance would be unjust because, as long as peoples comply 
with the rights and obligations stemming from principles of the Law of Peoples, there 
would be no reason to be intolerant. Therefore, we say that toleration is a requirement 
of international justice in Rawls‟s theory. 
3.2. Characteristics of Toleration 
       In line with the above-stated argument, we aim to focus on the characteristics of 
toleration as an international issue in Rawls‟ theory. To do this, we will refer to the 
conditions for the possibility of toleration as stated in the first part of Chapter 1. 
References will also be made to Political Liberalism when necessary to demonstrate 
the parallels and differences between the two texts. This analysis will demonstrate the 
grounds of international toleration in Rawls‟ theory. 
3.2.1. Agents and Objects of Toleration in Law of Peoples 
       In the previous chapters, in considering the conditions for the possibility of 
toleration, we have seen that the first condition for toleration concerns its subjects 
and objects. Regarding this matter, it would be true to say that well-ordered societies 
(liberal and decent peoples) are the agents of toleration in Law of Peoples. The 
conduct, values and beliefs of those societies could be considered as the objects of 
toleration. We need to clarify what Rawls means by a people and what features it has 
to have so that we can gain a better picture of agents and objects of toleration in Law 
of Peoples. 
        As Rawls puts it, the account of the Law of Peoples conceives liberal 
democratic and decent peoples as the actors in the Society of peoples, just as citizens 
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are the actors in domestic society.
93
 In this sense, we can see the parallel between 
Political Liberalism and Law of Peoples in considering the agents of toleration: 
persons in a domestic democratic society and peoples in the international realm. 
Rawls says “liberal peoples have three basic features: a reasonably just constitutional 
democratic government that serves their fundamental interests; citizens united by 
what Mill called “common sympathies; and finally, a moral nature.”94 By reasonably 
just (not necessarily fully just) democratic government, he means that people have 
the political and electoral control of the government and the government protects the 
fundamental interests of the people as stated in a written or unwritten constitution.   
        Rawls‟s conception of „people‟ has often been the object of misunderstanding 
and criticized for its being a homogenous entity which does not fit the reality of the 
world. For instance, Kok Chor Tan, one of the prominent cosmopolitan critics of 
Rawls, thinks that Rawls subscribes to state communitarianism in his understanding 
of people and also in his belief that decent hierarchical societies are entitled to 
sovereign status.
95
 For him, the basic flaw of state communitarianism is that “it takes 
it granted that states are homogenous ethno-cultural units, a mistake commonly 
committed in the normative international relations theory.”96 State communitarianism 
ignores the reality of states and nations in the world: “It presupposes a more neatly 
mapped and delineated world, a world in which each ethno-cultural unit or „people‟ 
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has its own political community. Not only is it not currently (or for much of history) 
the case that each people is represented by a state but it is questionable whether it is 
possible, geographically and physically, for there to be enough states for every 
people. Because of this flawed starting assumption, the state communitarian 
argument does not even get off the ground.”97 Although Tan has a point here in 
associating Rawls with a form of communitarianism, I think calling him nationalist 
does not do justice to Rawls‟s international theory. In addition, labeling his theory as 
statist disregards the fact that Rawls‟s category of „people‟ is an idealization. We will 
see in subsequent pages that Rawls himself denies the claim that „people‟ is identical 
to „state‟. 
        To consider the charge of communitarianism, what Rawls himself says about the 
concept of „people‟ is significant. From his definition of „people‟, though it is not 
entirely clear what he means by „common sympathies‟, we can infer that he does not 
necessarily refer to a „nation‟. He states:  
“As for a liberal people being united by common sympathies and a desire to be under the 
same democratic government, if those sympathies were entirely dependent upon a 
common language, history, and political culture, with a shared historical consciousness, 
this feature would rarely, if ever, be fully satisfied. Historical conquests and immigration 
have caused the intermingling of groups with different cultures and historical memories 
who now reside within the territory of most contemporary democratic governments. 
Notwithstanding, the Law of Peoples starts with the need for common sympathies, no 
matter what their source may be. My hope is that, if we begin in this simplified way, we 
can work out political principles that will, in due course, enable us to deal with more 
difficult cases where all the citizens are not united by a common language and shared 
historical memories.” 98  
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Thus, the criticism that Rawls‟ definition of a „people‟ is unrealistic because there are 
no such homogenous communities in the world as we know it, often ignores the fact 
that Rawls‟s goal is to start with a simplification in order to deal with more difficult 
cases. Samuel Freeman stresses this point: “although Rawls has little to say about 
what constitutes a people, it clearly is an idealization”.99 “A people may constitute 
more than one ethnic group or nation as traditionally understood. Rawls is not then a 
“nationalist”. Certainly not in the sense which says that each nation of people, 
whether ethnically, culturally or linguistically constituted, has a right to political self-
determination.”100 Rawls considers „peoples‟ as communities in an idealized manner 
without ignoring the reality of the world. Nevertheless, it seems true that he considers 
„people as a single moral entity rather than reducing it to the individuals who make 
up the people. At this point, the criticism of Kok Chor Tan seems to be relevant. 
        Once again the parallel Rawls draws between Political Liberalism and Law of 
Peoples becomes evident in his depiction of peoples having a moral character: Like 
citizens in a domestic society, liberal peoples are both reasonable and rational. As 
reasonable citizens in domestic society abide by fair terms of cooperation with other 
citizens, so reasonable liberal or decent peoples offer fair terms of cooperation to 
other peoples.
101
 In this sense, the rational conduct of the peoples is constrained by 
their reasonable disposition in relations with each other. 
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          The feature of peoples as reasonable agents also distinguishes peoples from 
states. States are depicted as having traditional sovereignty, right to war and 
unrestricted internal autonomy. For Rawls, “A difference between liberal peoples and 
states is that just liberal peoples limit their basic interests as required by the 
reasonable. In contrast, the content of the interests of states does not allow them to be 
stable for the right reasons: that is, from firmly accepting and acting upon a just Law 
of Peoples.”102 That is why peoples are the agents of toleration rather than states. We 
could infer that for Rawls, states could not affirm the principle of toleration for the 
right reasons. Possibly they could be tolerant agents participating in a modus vivendi 
but they could not be stable for the right reasons. We will explore the reasons for 
toleration in Rawls‟s theory under a separate title later on but the point has been to 
establish that peoples are counted as genuine agents as far as toleration is concerned 
in Rawls‟s international theory. 
        In addition to liberal peoples, Rawls also considers decent hierarchical societies 
as agents of toleration. As we will see better in the following parts of the chapter, 
Rawls includes nonliberal societies in his scheme of toleration provided that they are 
decent. Peoples who are not liberal but decent might not satisfy the condition of 
being a fully just society but they could be members of the Society of reasonable 
peoples in good standing. There are two criteria for a decent hierarchical society to be 
a member in good standing in the Society of peoples. First, the society should not 
have aggressive aims so that it must gain its ends through peaceful means such as 
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trade and diplomacy.
103
 The other criterion includes three parts: first, the system of 
law in a decent society has to secure human rights for all its members. Second, the 
law has to impose moral duties and obligations on all persons within the territory and 
lastly, there needs to be a belief on the part of judges and officials who administer the 
legal system that the law is guided by a common good idea of justice.
104
 
       Rawls means by securing human rights for all members and by being peaceful is 
readily intelligible, but the notion of a common good idea of justice has to be 
clarified. Rawls explains it first by distinguishing it from the common aim of a 
people and then relating it to decent consultation hierarchy. He says that the common 
aim is what the society tries to achieve for itself and a common good idea of justice 
encourages the pursuit of this aim.
105
 However, the common aim is not to be 
maximized without any restrictions, in and for itself; rather it has to be maximized 
within the boundaries that are defined by a decent consultation hierarchy which 
provides the institutional basis for protecting the rights and duties of the members of 
the people.  
       Although persons in a decent hierarchical society are not considered as free and 
equal citizens, they are viewed as rational and decent. They are treated as responsible 
members of their society who can recognize when their moral duties are in line with 
the common good idea of justice.
106
 “Each person belongs to a group represented by 
a body in the consultation hierarchy and each person engages in distinctive activities 
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and plays a certain role in the overall scheme of cooperation.”107 In political 
decisions, in line with the religious and philosophical values of the society, a decent 
consultation hierarchy allows room for hearing dissent and the opinions of persons 
who are members of different associations and corporations as well. Thus, we might 
say that, for Rawls, a decent consultation hierarchy secures a basis of social 
cooperation in a decent nonliberal society even though it is not democratic.  
        Rawls portrays a decent hierarchical people called Kazanistan who deserves to 
be recognized in good standing in the Society of peoples.
108
 Kazanistan is an 
idealized Islamic society. Since the law in Kazanistan does not recognize the 
separation of church and the state, the higher public offices are not equally open to 
members from all religions, but there is a certain level of toleration towards other 
religions in the sense that they can freely practice their religion. Kazanistan is 
organized in a decent consultation hierarchy: each member belongs to a group and 
each group is consulted.
109
Also these groups are represented by bodies and the rulers 
of Kazanistan must weigh the views and opinions of all bodies when making 
decisions. Moreover, the judges and other officials must explain and justify their 
decisions when called upon. Dissent is respected in this sense. Assemblies of groups 
can raise their objections to government and government officials must reply in 
explaining how they interpret their policies according to the common good 
conception of justice and impose obligations and duties on all members of the 
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society. Giving this imaginary example, Rawls concedes that he does not mean that 
Kazanistan is perfectly just but that it is decent.
110
 For him, a society like Kazanistan 
might exist: it seems to be the best we could realistically hope for.  
        As depicted above, for a people to be included in the Society of Peoples and 
therefore to be an agent of toleration, it has to be peaceful, respect human rights and 
secure them for all its members and its laws have to be guided by a common good 
idea of justice. Here, it is significant to note that Rawls attempts to imagine a society 
which is not liberal but which still might be tolerated with its own understanding of 
justice and way of life. It is enough for Rawls that decent societies assign obligations 
to its members, even though they do not have the liberal democratic conception of the 
person, together with their common good understanding which does not have to be 
similar to a liberal understanding of justice and its principles. It is also significant to 
note that in depicting decent hierarchical societies as having a decent consultation 
hierarchy, he does not say this is the only model we could have that satisfies the 
condition of decency. Decent hierarchical societies are only one model that we can 
imagine; maybe there could be other possible models whose basic structure is not 
based on a consultation hierarchy but which deserve to be included in the Society of 
Peoples.
111
 
        Above, we have considered the agents and objects of international toleration in 
Rawls‟ theory. We have seen that liberal and decent nonliberal peoples are viewed as 
the agents and their conduct and policies as the possible objects of toleration. In this 
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respect, we have observed that there is a parallel between Political Liberalism and 
Law of Peoples: Rawls conceives peoples in the international realm in the same way 
as persons in a domestic society. Here we might add a critical remark and say that 
even though one might interpret the idea of peoples in a broader manner so as to 
incorporate cross cultural entities of international realm, sticking to corporate entities 
of peoples as the sole agents of toleration might contain the risk of disregarding other 
possible agents of international toleration such as individuals. Below, we will touch 
upon the other dimensions of the conditions of possibility of toleration as far as 
international toleration in Rawls‟s theory is concerned. We will have chance to reflect 
on this critique later on when discussing the theory of Habermas. 
3.2.2. Diversity as a Condition for Toleration in Law of Peoples 
        In the last two chapters, we have seen that diversity coupled with disapproval is 
one of the possibility conditions of toleration. In Chapter 2, we also observed that 
reasonable pluralism as a fact of the contemporary democratic societies constitutes 
the diversity condition in Rawls‟ theory. In line with this, we mentioned that given 
the fact that democratic societies are divided by different religious, philosophical and 
moral comprehensive doctrines, that pluralism provides the disapproval/ dislike 
component in Rawls‟s theory as well (since this diversity would be the source of 
different and even opposing worldviews and opinions).  
        As far as Law of Peoples is concerned, one might argue the same: We can see 
that diversity coupled with disapproval/ dislike is a condition for and characteristic of 
Rawls‟s international toleration as well. As we examined before, peoples (liberal or 
decent) constitute the basic agents of toleration in international realm. It seems it is 
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likely that liberal peoples would not approve of all the conduct and beliefs of decent 
nonliberal peoples and vice versa. Moreover, one might also mention disapproval 
both among liberal peoples themselves and among decent nonliberal peoples. 
         We might question whether other societies that are not liberal or decent in 
international realm are seen by Rawls as part of the diversity condition. We have seen 
that there are three more categories of societies that Rawls mentions in Law of 
Peoples: outlaw states, burdened societies and benevolent absolutisms. It seems that 
they fall outside the realm of toleration; at least we could say this confidently for 
outlaw states. Outlaw states are not regarded as reasonable or decent members of the 
Society of Peoples because they are not peace prone and they do not recognize 
human rights as principles of right conduct in international realm. 
         One might also point out a difference between the pluralism as a condition for 
toleration in Political Liberalism and Law of Peoples. In Political Liberalism, we 
have seen that reasonable pluralism is a condition for toleration.  As far as Law of 
Peoples is concerned, we might say that pluralism is also a reasonable one but this 
time is defined by decency. Therefore, when we refer to reasonable pluralism in the 
international realm, we refer to the Society of Peoples which is the society composed 
of liberal and nonliberal decent peoples. A society does not have to be fully 
reasonable in order to be tolerated in the international realm. We will have chance to 
consider this further when we deal with the limits of toleration.  
3.2.3. Power as a Condition for Toleration in Law of Peoples 
        We have seen that Rawls‟ international toleration satisfies the two conditions of 
toleration: agents and objects of toleration and diversity coupled with disapproval. 
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Furthermore, we need to observe in what sense we could refer to the dimension of 
power as a characteristic of international toleration. To recall, it was mentioned that it 
is often accepted that if X tolerates Y, X has to have the power to act on her 
objection. We also mentioned that one might make a distinction between tolerant 
conduct and a tolerant attitude or disposition. In order for X to act tolerantly, we 
might say that she has the actual power. However, in order for X to have a tolerant 
disposition, we do not need to refer to X having an actual power; it is enough to say 
that she would not act on her objection even if she had the power to do so. 
        Upon the above-mentioned reminder, we need to examine Law of Peoples. 
Peoples, as agents of toleration, might very likely have the power to act on their 
disapproval or objection to a certain conduct or type of society but they refrain from 
doing so due to the reasons they consider for toleration. Liberal people or a nonliberal 
decent people can disapprove of the conduct of any other liberal or decent people but 
it can refrain from action and tolerate the conduct. Most peoples are capable of 
interfering in the internal affairs of other peoples- particularly since Rawls would 
include things like offering incentives as interference- so that most peoples meet the 
power condition required for toleration. But since Rawls gives such prominence to 
recognition and respect as features of international toleration even a people that lacks 
real power in relation to others might engage in Rawlsian toleration simply by 
adopting a stance of recognition and respect towards them. Thus, the dimension of 
power constitutes a condition of toleration in Law of Peoples. 
        It is also significant to mention here that Power for Rawls in international realm 
is not limited to military power. Rather, he has a much broader understanding in the 
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sense that he includes all sorts of interference such as economic sanctions and 
offering incentives as well as military power within his definition of power in the 
international domain. This inclusive way of defining power leads him to define any 
kind of intervention as a means for intolerance. That is why he opposes offering 
incentives because for him this is a way of exercising power on another country. 
3.2.4. The Scope, Demands and Limits of Toleration in Law of Peoples 
        We also referred to scope, demands and limits of toleration as part of the 
characteristics of toleration in the previous chapters of the dissertation. We have 
analyzed these dimensions regarding Political Liberalism in Chapter 2. By the scope, 
we mean the nature of the disapproval (whether it is moral or not) as far as the 
sources of disapproval are concerned. In Political Liberalism, we have seen that we 
could refer to both moral and nonmoral sources of disapproval/ dislike: citizens 
holding different reasonable religious, philosophical and moral comprehensive 
doctrines are likely to find themselves faced with various types of disapproval/ 
dislike such as aesthetic, religious or cultural etc. In Law of Peoples, it seems that we 
might argue the same. In the Society of Peoples, liberal and decent nonliberal peoples 
might have varied sources of disapproval/ dislike of one another‟s societies since we 
can assume that both liberal and nonliberal decent peoples may disapprove of each 
other‟s conduct and values etc. Furthermore, we could also say that peoples might 
contain diverse groups, cultures etc. inside their territories and this could also lead to 
disapproval/ dislike of varied sorts as we imagine that peoples have relations with 
each other and they have an influence over each other‟s conduct. Although it seems 
Rawls talks about a homogenous group when he talks about peoples, as we observed 
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elsewhere before, he accepts the fact that in reality, we are faced with a more 
complex and difficult situation. In this manner, we could infer that the Society of 
Peoples contains diverse groups as well as diverse practices and conduct, and this 
character of pluralism might be the basis of various sources of disapproval (be it 
moral or not) as far as the scope of toleration is concerned. 
         The demands of toleration refer to the requirements expected by way of tolerant 
conduct: whether toleration means only refraining from persecuting or whether it 
could also require positive action such as assisting, fostering etc. We have seen that 
in Political Liberalism, the demands of toleration go beyond refrain from persecuting 
or a negative attitude in the sense of refraining from acting on the basis of 
disapproval. In this sense, we observed that the idea of citizenship and its 
requirements together with the notion of reasonableness bring positive dimensions to 
Rawls‟ understanding of toleration such as respect, recognition and engaging in 
dialogue. We also mentioned that we will see the parallels between Rawls and 
Habermas on this point as we analyze Habermas‟s theory of toleration in Chapters 4 
and 5. 
        Concerning Law of Peoples, one could also argue that the demands of toleration 
go beyond refraining from intervening. Toleration demands not only a negative 
attitude but it is also a positive attitude. In this manner, it is significant to note that we 
refer to a positive disposition in terms of demands in Rawls‟s international theory, 
not necessarily positive action. Here it is significant to examine what Rawls says 
about the meaning of toleration in explaining the reasons for the incorporation of 
decent nonliberal peoples the Society of Peoples: “Here to tolerate means not only 
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refrain from exercising political sanctions-military, economic, or diplomatic- to make 
a people change its way. To tolerate also means to recognize these nonliberal 
societies as equal participating members in good standing of the Society of Peoples, 
with certain rights and obligations, including the duty of civility requiring that they 
offer other peoples public reasons appropriate to the Society of Peoples for their 
actions.”112 Below, we will examine what Rawls means by these dimensions of 
toleration. 
        For Rawls, the most significant feature of liberal international toleration is not to 
impose liberal values and institutions on nonliberal peoples. Liberal peoples should 
not force them to change by any means. Here he explicitly refers to an analogy he 
makes between tolerating reasonable comprehensive doctrines and tolerating 
reasonable peoples:  
“We recognize that a liberal society is to respect its citizens‟ comprehensive doctrines – 
religious, philosophical and moral- provided that these doctrines are pursued in ways 
compatible with a reasonable political conception of justice and its public reason. 
Similarly we say that, provided a nonliberal society‟s basic institutions meet certain 
specified conditions of political right and justice and lead its people to honor a 
reasonable and just law for the Society of Peoples, a liberal people is to tolerate and 
accept that society.”113  
 
Here, just as it is not reasonable to impose one comprehensive doctrine on others in a 
domestic society, so liberal peoples should refrain from imposing their liberal values 
on nonliberal decent societies. 
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         At this point, Kok Chor Tan raises an important criticism regarding the analogy 
Rawls makes between the toleration in domestic societies and toleration in 
international realm. Tan claims that Rawls holds that tolerating well ordered 
hierarchical societies (nonliberal decent) is analogous to tolerating nonliberal 
comprehensive doctrines in domestic societies. However this is a problematic analogy 
because there are important differences between domestic comprehensive doctrines 
and states: “In the case of comprehensive doctrines, what are permitted are moral, 
religious or philosophical differences, not political ones.
 114
 In this manner, a state 
cannot enforce a moral, religious or philosophical good but it can criticize 
comprehensive views which are politically unreasonable. According to Tan, Rawls 
tolerates politically unreasonable views at the international level due to this flawed 
analogy but does not give us any principled reason why things should be like that at 
the global level.  
         In reply Tan, we could mention that for Rawls the criterion of what is politically 
reasonable is set by the concept of decency at the international realm and decency is 
not identical with what he used to call reasonable in the case of domestic toleration. 
Peoples who satisfy the conditions of decency are tolerated because they are 
recognized as equal members of the Society of peoples in good standing. If Rawls 
were to advocate applying the concept of reasonableness as he did in the case of 
domestic toleration, then he would not have been able to argue for toleration of 
nonliberal peoples in the full sense. His goal in introducing the requirements of 
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politically reasonable in different ways in domestic and international realm is to work 
out a Society of peoples in which liberal peoples can live together with people who 
are not liberal but still sufficiently decent to be tolerated.  In this sense, Rawls has a 
principled reason for tolerating decent nonliberal peoples: the respect and recognition 
that is owed to those peoples due to their equal status in complying with the Law of 
Peoples. We will observe the reasons for toleration in Rawls‟s international theory in 
more detail in a latter section but for now, we might say that Rawls has a principled 
reason for introducing a more flexible understanding of the politically acceptable in 
the international realm. 
       Samuel Freeman also outlines Rawls‟s position on the duty of non-interference 
clearly by pointing out two reasons why Rawls thinks liberal peoples should refrain 
from imposing liberal values: First, “it is not the role of a liberal society‟s 
government to establish liberal justice non-domestically in decent societies.”115 If a 
decent society wants to change towards a liberal direction, that has to be achieved by 
their own determination. That will secure the establishment of stability and justice 
better because the political culture and institutions of a society would be ready for 
that change if the change comes from within. And second, Freeman says that the duty 
of non-interference is not simply strategic: Rawls also thinks that it is unreasonable 
for a liberal society to coerce and force a well-ordered decent society to liberalize 
itself.
116
 Thus, we might say that the both the need for stability and recognition of the 
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equal status of decent non liberal societies make it necessary for Rawls to claim that 
liberal peoples should refrain from interference. We will take up this point in detail 
when we focus on the reasons for toleration in the following section. 
        As far as the demands of toleration are concerned, in line with the argument that 
liberal peoples should not impose liberal institutions and values on nonliberal 
societies, Rawls puts a restriction on offering incentives as well. He claims that 
liberal peoples should not offer incentives for decent nonliberal peoples to develop 
more liberal democratic constitutions. This point has attracted certain criticisms from 
scholars who are supportive of a more cosmopolitan understanding of international 
justice and toleration. They claim that Rawls‟s theory of toleration “does not show 
why democratic states should not encourage expansion of liberty of conscience, 
speech and other rights in decent nonliberal societies through engagement in 
international fora, use of incentives or other proportionate means.”117  
        Rawls offers two reasons for this prohibition: one pragmatic and one principled. 
The first reason for his opposition to offering incentives is that incentives might 
cause conflict among liberal and decent nonliberal peoples considering the rational 
interests of the peoples.
118
 Of course private persons in civil society can raise funds 
for that purpose but it is not reasonable for a liberal people to offer incentives as a 
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government policy. Instead, liberal peoples should consider assisting burdened 
societies rather than decent ones. Secondly, decent nonliberal peoples should have 
the right to decide upon their own future. This second reason is related to his 
contention that decent nonliberal peoples deserve respect and recognition as long as 
they comply with the convictions of a reasonable Society of Peoples and they should 
be considered as equal members possessing good standing in the Society of Peoples. 
I think some ambiguity still remains here. One might ask why respect and recognition 
have to exclude offering incentives as a way of assisting nonliberal societies. 
However, it seems that for Rawls, trying to affect nonliberal societies so that they 
become liberal by any kind of means, be it offering incentives or assisting would 
mean an imposition of liberal set of values on nonliberal peoples and that would 
mean intolerance and injustice. If decent nonliberal peoples have to change, then that 
change has to occur from within the institutions and political culture of those 
societies. It might be claimed that for Rawls, offering incentives means not 
respecting a people‟s capacity and right to decide its own character. In this manner, it 
could be considered as bribing and manipulating or coercing a people in different 
ways. Rawls possibly would not object to people from different societies engaging in 
argument and discussion about how they ought to organize and run their societies 
since that sort of engagement is consistent with respect. We will examine this aspect 
in more detail when we talk about the reasons for toleration in the following parts of 
the Chapter. 
        As far as the demands of toleration are concerned, we might say that not 
imposing liberal values on decent nonliberal peoples is consistent with demands such 
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as recognition and respect. However, here what we mean by positive aspects of the 
demands of toleration is not fostering or assisting decent nonliberal peoples. Rather, 
the positive demands consist of according recognition to decent nonliberal peoples as 
equal members of the Society of Peoples (and in this sense; it is a disposition, not a 
requirement of positive action). Otherwise, Rawls would object to liberal peoples 
assisting or fostering nonliberal societies to become liberal as we have observed 
above. Recognition and respect requires the prohibition of imposition of liberal 
values on decent nonliberal peoples. 
          Regarding Rawls‟s prohibition of assisting or giving incentives to nonliberal 
peoples, Kok Chor Tan raises a significant worry. According to Tan, it is not clear if 
Rawls‟s theory allows any global liberalizing effect on nonliberal peoples, at least at 
the substantive sense. The only positive effect that can be thinkable for Tan is cultural 
exchange in the sense that films, books, movies and art might have an important role 
in educating people and raising their consciousness.
119
 I think here we could imagine 
more than what Tan anticipates. The whole interaction between liberal and nonliberal 
peoples might have a liberalizing affect: trade, cultural and intellectual exchange, 
technological interaction. In addition to this, private associations and civil society 
could always make criticisms of the conduct and practices of decent hierarchical 
societies. There is no prohibition on criticism in Rawls‟s theory of toleration. What is 
not acceptable for Rawls is one government officially criticizing a decent nonliberal 
people in hostile manner. All these interactions, at the end of the day, would 
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contribute to what Rawls calls „moral learning‟ on the side of decent nonliberal 
peoples.
120
  
3.2.4.1. Decency and Human Rights as Limits of Toleration 
        Having considered the scope and demands of toleration in Rawls‟s international 
theory, we will now focus on the limits of toleration in Rawls‟s international theory. 
By limits we mean what we ought to tolerate and what we ought not. Considering the 
substantive limits will reveal certain characteristics of toleration in Rawls‟s 
international theory. 
        We have observed that in Political Liberalism, reasonableness defines the limits 
of what is tolerable and what is not.  The comprehensive doctrines that can claim to 
be reasonable fall within the boundaries of toleration. In Law of Peoples, we might 
say that decency similarly draws the boundaries of what is tolerable and what is not. 
What is identifiable as decent peoples and their conduct to the extent that they 
comply with the reasonable principles of the Society of Peoples, is considered 
tolerable. Thus, other societies such as outlaw states fall outside the realm of 
toleration because they do not consider the principles of a reasonable regulation of 
the international system as binding for their conduct. By being war prone and not 
respecting human rights, they are not only unreasonable, they also constitute a threat 
for peace and stability of the reasonable Society of Peoples. 
       Rawls‟s conception of decency is defined by the characteristics of what he calls 
decent hierarchical societies.
121
 We have seen the features of these societies before: 
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they are peaceful; they secure human rights for all their members and have a common 
good conception of justice which is believed to be the source of just regulation of the 
institutions of their society. In this sense, as we mentioned before, Rawls tries to 
imagine a tolerable society which is not necessarily liberal.  
        It might be claimed that for Rawls, decency does not have to overlap with liberal 
justice: decent hierarchical societies have an understanding of justice which is 
different from the liberal one. Accordingly, they do not have to affirm the liberal 
conception of the person as well. It seems that what matters here for Rawls is that 
these societies can be seen as legitimate and equal members of the Society of 
Peoples, and in this sense, they are regarded as not unreasonable. Here the notion of 
decency covers less than reasonableness does in the international realm.
122
 Thus, 
decent nonliberal peoples, even though they are not fully just, are tolerated. 
       One of the features of both liberal and decent nonliberal peoples is the fact that 
they recognize and respect human rights as far as their relations in the Society of 
Peoples are concerned. As Peter Jones comments, “Rawls‟s human rights are not part 
of a general moral theory of the rightful treatment of human beings. They figure only 
in his just law of peoples, and accordingly their role is limited to regulating relations 
between peoples.”123 In this sense, human rights are the rights that societies must 
honor if they are to be members in good standing of a reasonable society of peoples. 
Thus, human rights come onto the scene as an important characteristic of toleration 
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as an international issue in Rawls‟s theory: human rights are significant criteria that 
define the limits of international toleration in the sense of what is tolerable and what 
is not. 
        Rawls has a minimalist conception of the content of human rights.
124
 Regarding 
the content of human rights Rawls says: “Among the human rights are the right to life 
(to the means of subsistence and security); to liberty (to freedom from slavery, 
serfdom, and forced occupation, and to a sufficient measure of liberty of conscience 
to ensure freedom of religion and thought); to property (personal property); and to 
formal equality as expressed by the rules of natural justice (that is, that similar cases 
be treated similarly)”.125 In this way, he distinguishes between the rights that a 
democratic government endorses within its territory and human rights: human rights 
are a more urgent specific set of rights.
126
 The violation of these rights is equally 
condemned by both reasonable liberal and decent nonliberal peoples. 
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       Rawls mentions that the class of human rights has three roles in the Society of 
Peoples: 
“1. Their fulfillment is a necessary condition of the decency of a society‟s political 
institutions and of its legal order.  
2. Their fulfillment is sufficient to exclude justified and forceful intervention by other 
peoples, for example, by diplomatic and economic sanctions, or in grave cases by 
military force.  
3. They set a limit to the pluralism among peoples.” 127 
 
Given these roles, we can see that human rights constitute the limits of what is to be 
tolerated and what is not in the Society of Peoples. First, by being part of the political 
institutions of a decent society, human rights put limits on the internal autonomy of 
peoples. Second, in complying with human rights, peoples are exempt from forceful 
intervention and other intolerant sanctions. And thirdly, human rights draw the 
boundaries of acceptable and legitimate conduct in international society by putting 
limits to the pluralism. The conduct of outlaw states in violating these rights can 
legitimately be an object of intolerance. Thus, we can say that this list of human 
rights, by being accepted by liberal and decent nonliberal peoples, ensures the 
toleration of the conduct of those peoples. Thus, it has a practical role in drawing the 
boundaries of toleration. 
       In Law of Peoples, Rawls seems to be silent on the justification or foundations of 
his set of human rights though he mentions this set of rights could not be condemned 
                                                                                                                                                                     
protections that any persons need for the most basic development and exercise of the moral powers 
that enable him or her to engage in social cooperation in any society.” (Freeman, Rawls, 436) 
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as western or liberal by other societies and is not parochial.
128
 We might infer that his 
coming up with a minimalist set is to ensure its acceptability as legitimate both by 
liberal and decent nonliberal peoples. However, interestingly, he seems silent on the 
foundations and justification of his set of human rights. As Peter Jones claimed 
before, this might be related to the limited role that Rawls assigns to human rights; 
regulating the relations between peoples in international realm. 
         Joshua Cohen, who offers a minimalist set of human rights based on Rawlsian 
inspirations, indicates how a Rawlsian account of human rights might be justified. 
Considering Cohen will also help us see further how a Rawlsian account of human 
rights might play a role in defining the boundaries of toleration. We will consider 
Cohen‟s account of human rights as an extension of Rawls‟s conception of human 
rights and its relation to toleration as an international issue. 
         In his article Minimalism about Human Rights: The Most We Can Hope For, 
Cohen addresses the issue of minimalism by making a distinction between what he 
calls substantive and justificatory minimalism. He is critical of substantive 
minimalism
129
, and puts his own theory of human rights in the category of 
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justificatory minimalism. Justificatory minimalism is a Rawlsian account which is 
based on the idea of global public reason and overlapping consensus. The central idea 
is that a conception of human rights should be presented autonomously that it should 
be independent of any particular philosophical or religious theories that might be used 
to explain and justify its content.
130
 In this manner, it is the extension of Rawls‟s 
thinking about political liberalism to the global level. In other words, it is an account 
that considers human rights as the object of a global overlapping consensus. 
      In the article, Cohen makes certain distinctions to characterize better what he 
means by an autonomous account of human rights: He distinguishes between the 
content, role and rationale of a human right. Content refers to a specific set of rights. 
Their role identifies “a set of important standards that all political societies are to be 
held accountable in their treatment of their members”.131 On the other hand their 
rationale aims to explain why the rights have the content that they have and why 
political societies are required to ensure those rights. In the light of these distinctions, 
Cohen mentions that a justificatory conception of human rights claims that each of 
the three aspects of human rights should be autonomous/ independent so that they can 
be affirmed at the same time by people with different ethical outlooks.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
approach to human rights. According to this position, human rights are confined to protections of 
negative liberty and ensure against restrictions on negative liberty that take the form of intrusions on 
bodily security. Cohen thinks that this is a less ambitious set of human rights which is formulated due 
to the belief that being sensitive to toleration means ending up with a very minimal list of human 
rights. 
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       It might be claimed that Cohen‟s conception of human rights follows from 
applying political liberalism at the international level. I think we can understand 
Cohen‟s position better if we think of it together with what Rawls claimed in Law of 
Peoples: Human rights should not be seen as western, liberal or parochial by 
nonliberal decent societies. Cohen‟s way of portraying human rights through 
justificatory minimalism seems to be inspired by this statement as well. In this sense, 
we can find parallels between his standpoint and both Political Liberalism and Law of 
Peoples. 
       Cohen‟s approach might also be inspired by the idea of toleration in Political 
Liberalism and Law of Peoples. Human rights are independent of all comprehensive 
doctrines and they are free standing in the sense of not being derived from a particular 
ethical outlook. This is similar to Rawls‟s understanding of toleration because it is 
based on the idea that the imposition of one comprehensive doctrine on the other is 
intolerant.  We find a similar way of reasoning in his theory of international 
toleration: Liberal peoples should not impose their liberal values on decent nonliberal 
peoples because that would be intolerant. In this way, Cohen seems to take this idea 
in Rawls‟s theory seriously in coming up with an account of human rights which is 
the object of an overlapping consensus at the global level. Possibly Rawls would have 
reasoned in a similar way if he had worked out a justification for his set of human 
rights in Law of Peoples. 
       Cohen‟s approach is also significant for drawing the boundaries of what is 
tolerable and what is not. As in the case of Rawls, the conduct of societies that 
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violates the human rights falls outside toleration. In this sense, human rights play an 
intervention- justifying role as they do for Rawls. In Rawls‟s theory, we have seen 
that outlaw states who do not comply with human rights can be the object of 
intolerance whereas decent nonliberal peoples are to be tolerated due to their 
commitment to human rights and peace. 
        Above, we have examined the limits of toleration in Rawls‟s theory and we 
referred to Cohen as providing a Rawlsian example of how human rights might play a 
role as far as the limits of toleration are concerned. This has been examined within 
the attempt to outline the characteristics of toleration as an international issue in 
Rawls‟s theory by reflecting on the conditions of possibility of toleration.  Below, we 
will focus on the reasons for toleration in Law of Peoples. 
3. 3.Reasons for Toleration and Law of Peoples 
        In chapter 1, we outlined the possible different reasons for toleration both at the 
domestic and international level: non-moral prudential, moral consequentialist, 
respect for persons and scepticism. In Chapter 2, we also observed that Rawls 
subscribed to „respect for persons‟ as a moral principled justification for toleration in 
Political Liberalism. From here on, we will see there is a parallel between Rawls‟s 
view on toleration in Political Liberalism and Law of Peoples as far as the 
justification of toleration is concerned. Rawls subscribes to respect as a justification 
to international toleration as well. However, in the international realm, „peoples‟ 
replaces „persons‟ as the subjects of toleration and he does not treat peoples as 
reducible, morally, to persons.  
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        In Political Liberalism, we have seen that persons, in virtue of being reasonable, 
grant respect to each other as citizens who are free and equal members of a society as 
a fair system of cooperation. By abiding by the fair terms of cooperation and 
recognizing the burdens of judgment, they recognize each other as free and equal. 
They also do not impose their own conception of good, either alone or by using 
political power, on others due to their acceptance that others are reasonable, and free 
and equal like themselves. Therefore, they respect each other‟s status as citizens who 
have different conceptions of good.   
       We might say that this idea of „respect for persons‟ is reflected in Rawls‟s 
understanding of international toleration as well.
132
 Liberal and decent nonliberal 
peoples, as equal members of the Society of Peoples, grant respect to each other by 
abiding by the principles of the Law of peoples. As we have seen before, Rawls 
contends that decent nonliberal peoples are not unreasonable. They are to be 
considered as equal members of the Society of Peoples in good standing. They accept 
human rights and they are peaceful. That is why; liberal peoples do not have any 
reason not to tolerate them.  Not only should they not impose their own liberal view 
on them but also, they should recognize them as equal members of the Society of 
Peoples. In recognizing the equal standing of decent nonliberal peoples in the Society 
of Peoples, liberal peoples grant respect to the status of those peoples as free and 
equal. Here, we do not claim exactly that nonliberal decent peoples are fully 
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reasonable, but in virtue of being decent, they should receive equal recognition and 
respect from liberal peoples.  
         Respect seems to be closely related to the recognition of difference as well as to 
equal standing in Rawls‟s international theory. Rawls depicts peoples as having a 
disposition which maintains self-respect (amour proper) and which recognizes this 
aspect in other peoples as well.
133
 In this sense, we might claim that respect is granted 
when reasonable and decent peoples recognize each other as equal members along 
with their differences in good standing in the Society of Peoples. In this manner, as 
Peter Jones remarks, Rawls “rejects the idea that culture is good in itself and that is 
the reason we tolerate. Rather, he subscribes to respect for persons as bearers of 
cultures.”134 In a sense as long as those differences do not cause the violation of the 
principles of the society of Peoples, they are respected and tolerated. The imposition 
of the set of values of one people on another people would mean not recognizing and 
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peoples as equals.” (Rawls, Law of Peoples, 34-35) 
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respecting the equal status of the people who suffered the imposition. This imposition 
would be not only intolerant; it would also be unjust since it would violate the 
principles of a just Law of Peoples.  
        We mentioned the importance of the idea of „overlapping consensus‟ for 
Rawls‟s conception of toleration in Political Liberalism. We stated that the principle 
of toleration cannot be guaranteed fully under a modus vivendi since a modus vivendi 
is a stability that is achieved merely by a balance of forces. If the balance of forces 
changes, some parties to the consensus would want to impose their conception of 
good on others or the balance of forces itself might be changed by some act of 
intolerance.  That is why we claimed that a modus vivendi is a contingent affirmation 
of toleration. We also mentioned that, in a modus vivendi, there could be reasons for 
toleration deriving from non-moral prudential positions as well as moral 
consequentialist reasons. However, it seems difficult to have moral principled reasons 
for toleration in a modus vivendi. 
        We observed that only an „overlapping consensus‟, could secure a full guarantee 
and experience of toleration. Only with the stability that is achieved by an 
overlapping consensus, one might refer to the affirmation of the principle of 
toleration out of a full principled justification; i.e. respect for persons. The stability is 
achieved because citizens, not only view the principles of a political conception of 
justice as legitimate from within their own comprehensive doctrines but also, they 
view other citizens as free and equal in sharing the political power. They consider 
other citizens as reasonable and respect the status that they posses. 
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        As for Law of Peoples, we could also argue that it is only with the stability 
secured for right reasons that we might talk of the full guarantee of the principle of 
toleration. In The Law of Peoples, Rawls mentions two conceptions of stability: 
stability as a balance of forces and stability for right reasons.
135
 Stability for the right 
reasons is closely connected to peoples as entities that have moral capacities in the 
sense that they can act out of reasonableness, not just rationality or self interest. Here, 
he explicitly states that: “it is these reasonable interests that make democratic peace 
possible and the lack thereof causes peace between states to be at best a modus 
vivendi, a stable balance of forces only for the time being.” 136 In line with this, 
“stability for the right reasons describes a situation in which, over the course of time, 
citizens acquire a sense of justice that inclines them not only to accept but to act upon 
the principles of justice”137  
        We might say that we achieve stability for the right reasons because people are 
reasonable as well as rational. By acting in a reasonable way, liberal and decent 
nonliberal peoples view each other as free and equal in status. They abide by the 
principles of the Society of Peoples and view these principles as acceptable from their 
own conceptions of good. In viewing each other as reasonable, they do not impose 
their values on others. Imposing their own values on others would not only be 
intolerant but also unjust because in that case, they would not respect each other as 
free and equal members in good standing in the Society of Peoples. That is why it is 
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only when stability is secured for the right reasons, that both liberal and decent 
nonliberal peoples would be giving moral principled reasons for toleration. This 
could be achieved by moral learning in the process of the development of stability 
from a modus vivendi towards stability for right reasons. The principle of toleration 
will then be guaranteed as a requirement of justice in a stability achieved for the right 
reasons. 
        Upon all said regarding toleration between liberal and nonliberal decent peoples, 
there seems to be one question raised by the „intolerable‟ in the international realm. 
As we had seen, the societies other than liberal and decent seem to fall outside the 
realm of toleration. If we should not tolerate outlaw states, does that mean we are 
duty-bound to go to war against them or required actively seek to change them in 
other ways? In this manner, we might say that what Rawls means that intolerable 
states are eligible for active intolerance but that what we actually should do will 
depend on circumstances. It would be wrong to think that Rawls subscribes to a 
belligerent attitude concerning outlaw societies and other societies that fall outside 
the realm of toleration.  
        In this chapter, we have analyzed the characteristics of and reasons for toleration 
concerning Law of Peoples. Our goal was to examine the way Rawls considers 
toleration as an international issue. We have seen that in many respects, there are 
parallels between his portraying of toleration as a domestic issue and his 
understanding of international toleration. In Chapters 4 and 5, we will analyze the 
conception of toleration in Jurgen Habermas‟s theory for the purpose of outlining 
how Habermas understands the characteristics of toleration as an international issue. 
 
 
124 
 
Thus, in the subsequent chapters, we will have the chance to see the parallels as well 
as differences between Rawls‟s and Habermas‟s theories of international toleration. 
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CHAPTER 4 
JURGEN HABERMAS AND TOLERATION AS AN INTRA-STATE ISSUE 
        In the previous chapters, we argued that there is a place for toleration in our 
thinking about the international realm and, in line with this claim, we investigated the 
way we could consider toleration as an international issue. Therefore, we have 
analyzed the characteristics of and reasons for toleration in the theory of John Rawls; 
first in relation to domestic democratic societies and second, as an international issue. 
The goal was to outline the main characteristics of and reasons for international 
toleration in Rawls‟s theory. We examined his theory with reference to the conceptual 
map that we developed in Chapter 1. In this way, we tried to demonstrate the different 
dimensions of toleration as an international issue in the theory of Rawls. 
        In this chapter and the next, the theory of Jurgen Habermas will be analyzed 
with the aim of examining the characteristics of and possible reasons for toleration as 
an international issue. To this end, Habermas‟s conception of toleration will be 
investigated with reference to our conceptual map that was developed in Chapter 1.  
In addition to this, we will also try to address the parallels and differences between 
the conceptions of toleration of  Rawls and of Habermas. Thus, it will also be a 
comparative analysis as well as an interpretive one. 
        First, as we did with Rawls, we will start with Habermas‟s conception of 
toleration as an issue of democratic societies (domestic toleration). Understanding 
Habermas‟s conception of toleration as a domestic matter is significant for 
understanding his conception of toleration as an international issue since there are 
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parallels between both conceptions. We will see that toleration is a central and 
significant part of Habermas‟s theory as far as his analysis of contemporary 
democratic societies is concerned. This analysis will be helpful in reflecting on his 
international theory with reference to toleration because it will provide us with the 
fundamental features of his approach concerning toleration in general and toleration 
as an international issue in particular. 
        First of all, we need to consider the centrality of toleration in the political theory 
of Jurgen Habermas.  In Chapter 3.1, we have seen that toleration is a central theme 
in Rawls‟s political theory in the sense that it is a requirement of justice and political 
liberalism. We said that for political liberalism to be possible, toleration as a principle 
comes to the fore as a necessity. As for Habermas, we might argue the same. We 
might say that toleration for him is a requirement of his understanding of political 
liberalism and thus, of justice. 
       One can claim that toleration is embedded in Habermas‟s political theory due to 
his understanding of the justification of the secular constitutional state. He says: 
“political liberalism (which I defend in the specific form of a Kantian republicanism) 
understands itself as a nonreligious and postmetaphysical justification of the 
normative bases of the democratic constitutional state.”138 For him, the constitution of 
a liberal state derives its legitimacy in a self-sufficient manner on the basis of 
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arguments that are independent of religious and metaphysical traditions. We could 
observe the independent legitimacy in the democratic will formation of people which 
gives justification to the law and authority in the political theory of Habermas. In a 
postmetaphysical age, the state does not have to refer to any religious and 
metaphysical worldview to claim its legitimate authority. Instead, the justification of 
political authority rests on a principle of toleration because it does not impose any 
religion or metaphysics on people. 
        In line with the above-mentioned claim, for Habermas, toleration comes to the 
fore as a requirement of justice as well. He says: “the theory of a discourse ethics 
criticizes traditional attempts to base conceptions of justice upon religious 
conceptions or conceptions of the good life.”139 Thus, one might infer that in 
Habermas‟s theory, one needs the concept of toleration to justify the principles of 
justice because justice requires its principles to be derived from an independent 
(autonomous) ground. Indeed it seems this is valid for any conception of justice in 
contemporary societies that claim legitimacy in a post-metaphysical age.  
          The significance and centrality of toleration becomes evident in the theory of 
Habermas especially if we consider that tolerance arises as a question of both 
enacting and applying laws as well as a question of everyday practice.
140
 Since 
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tolerance is a principle embedded in the legitimacy of a constitutional state, no citizen 
should try to impose her own view on others or try to use the state power to apply her 
own ethos on other citizens. In this respect, he says:  
 
“Tolerance means that believers of one faith and another and nonbelievers must 
mutually concede one another the right to those convictions, practices and ways of living 
that they themselves reject. This concession must be supported by a shared basis of 
mutual recognition from which repugnant dissonances can be overcome…The basis of 
recognition is not the esteem for this or that property or achievement, but the awareness 
of the fact that the other is a member of an inclusive community of citizens with equal 
rights, in which each is accountable to everybody else for her political contributions”.141  
 
Thus, we might say that the procedural democratic will formation of citizens 
underlines the significance of the principle of toleration and this principle has to be 
respected by citizens so that they should tolerate each other‟s worldviews in line with 
the independent legitimacy they themselves give to state power. Each citizen, as a 
member of a democratic constitutional society, should recognize each other as free 
and equal and grant the right to be different to each other even though they 
disapprove of each others‟ world-views. Hence, Habermas shares a similar ground 
with Rawls regarding both the meaning of toleration and the central place he gives to 
toleration in his theory. 
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4.1. Characteristics of Toleration in Habermas’s Theory  
4.1.1. Agents and Objects of Toleration 
        We have analyzed characteristics of toleration as conditions of the possibility of 
toleration in previous chapters. For this purpose, we have distinguished agents and 
objects of toleration, diversity coupled with disapproval, power, scope, demands and 
limits of toleration. For observing the characteristics of toleration in Habermas‟s 
theory, we will examine his texts on toleration and also on religion since they are 
texts in which we find direct reference to toleration. His papers delivered in 
conferences, as well as articles that deal with the role of religion in the public 
realm
142
 and with toleration will be addressed to investigate the grounds of toleration 
within the contexts of domestic democratic societies. 
        To begin with, we can identify citizens as the agents of toleration in Habermas‟s 
theory. They are the basic entities that enter into relations of toleration or intolerance 
as far as domestic toleration is concerned. In this respect, we can find a parallel 
between Rawls and Habermas. In Chapter 2, we have seen that also for Rawls, in 
Political Liberalism where he developed his conception of toleration as a domestic 
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issue, citizens come to the fore as agents of toleration. We have observed that for 
Rawls, citizens as subscribing to different reasonable comprehensive doctrines 
tolerate each other‟s viewpoints reciprocally as members of a society as a fair system 
of cooperation. Here, in Habermas‟s view, in a similar vein, citizens, as holders of 
different worldviews -religious and secular - are candidates for tolerating each other‟s 
conduct and beliefs as members of the same political community.  
        As for the objects of toleration, in Chapter 2, we have seen that beliefs, values, 
habits and conduct of citizens as holders of different conceptions of good are possible 
objects of toleration in Rawls‟s theory. It seems we might claim the same for 
Habermas. The beliefs, convictions, habits and conduct of citizens having diverse 
worldviews are the possible objects of toleration in the theory of Habermas.  
         Habermas also seems to make a distinction concerning the status of possible 
objects of toleration in addressing their level of impact on our attitudes and practices. 
Thus, he says:  
“the normative expectation that we be able to live alongside those with different ethical 
life-styles and value orientations is of a different nature than the assumption that we 
must accept the difference between religious truths or between contrary world-views, in 
other words accept statements that contradict our own. In both cases, the competing 
beliefs have an existential trust, that is, an impact on attitudes and practices. However, 
only in the case of competing world-views does toleration mean accepting mutually 
exclusive validity claims. In this narrowly defined sense, toleration- as regards equal 
respect for everybody- means the willingness to neutralize the practical impact of a 
cognitive dissonance that nevertheless in its own domain demands that we resolve it.”143 
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We might infer that for Habermas, religious truths and worldviews, as raising 
mutually exclusive validity claims demand greater tolerance from citizens than life-
styles and different value orientations that do not necessarily contradict each other. In 
saying this, Habermas does not refer to religious truths or mutually exclusive 
worldviews as the only possible objects of toleration but he seems to address the 
status they occupy concerning the ethical life of citizens. In this sense, it could be that 
a greater change in the perspective of citizens is needed if they are to tolerate each 
other‟s different religions and world-views. 
4.1.2. Post-Metaphysical Age as the Condition of Diversity of Toleration 
        In Chapter 1, we have seen that, for toleration to be possible, we need the 
condition of diversity coupled with disapproval. This condition is present in 
Habermas‟s conception of toleration. Habermas, like Rawls, starts with the fact of 
pluralism when he reasons about toleration. He is very much aware of the fact that 
under contemporary conditions, one needs to take diversity and pluralism seriously in 
theorizing about political matters. In a post-secular age in which religion continues to 
have its significance in public life, pluralism has become a more and more pressing 
issue in our thinking about the public political realm.
144
 We will examine in detail 
what Habermas means by Post-secular age in chapter 5. Nevertheless, it is significant 
to note here that for Habermas, like Rawls, contemporary societies are marked by a 
considerable level of diversity containing different worldviews, religions and 
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standpoints. This diversity is likely to exhibit opposition, disagreement and 
disapproval even though we share the same political culture. Hence, the condition of 
diversity coupled with disapproval is a characteristic of toleration in Habermas‟s 
theory. 
        One might refer to the notion of a “post-metaphysical age” to understand the 
meaning of the condition of diversity as a characteristic of toleration in the theory of 
Habermas. The basic features of a “post-metaphysical age” are the lack of a 
substantive consensus on values among citizens as well as the existing diversity 
regarding their ethical lives and choices.
145
 Habermas puts it: “In spite of a lack of a 
substantive consensus on values rooted in a socially accepted worldview, they [the 
members of modern societies] continue to appeal to moral convictions and norms that 
each of them thinks everyone else should accept.”146 This condition makes it 
necessary for toleration to be accepted as a principle in order to facilitate the 
conditions of co-existence in a society marked by pluralism. In this sense, “post-
metaphysical age”, as an age marked by diversity, constitutes the possible conditions 
for toleration.  
        In addition to this, we might say that for Habermas, political liberalism is a 
response to this modern condition; namely “post-metaphysical age”. Thus, he says, 
political liberalism “is primarily concerned with the possibility of achieving a 
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consensus on political essentials which grants equal freedoms to all citizens without 
regard to their cultural heritage, their religious convictions, or their individual life 
styles. The required consensus on issues of political justice can no longer be based on 
a settled traditional ethos that encompasses the whole society.”147 In this way, 
pluralism in ethical views as a feature of a post-metaphysical age requires toleration 
in order to achieve a consensus on principles of justice as well. Here, we see a 
commonality in the Rawlsian and Habermasian standpoints. Nevertheless, this does 
not mean that there is no difference between the theories of Habermas and Rawls. It 
seems both of them refer to diversity (pluralism) as a fact. However, we will also see 
later that Habermas criticizes Rawls‟s notion of „reasonableness as a feature of 
pluralism. 
        In referring to disapproval, Habermas mentions a particular kind of 
disagreement: cognitive disagreement. Toleration does not come onto the scene at all 
if there is no disagreement as far as truth claims are concerned: everyone has their 
own truth claims in the sense that each believes her standpoint is the true one. In 
addition, the disagreement in question must also be the one that is irresolvable in the 
long run.
148
 Therefore, for toleration to occur, we need a persistent irresolvable 
disagreement in which each (moral) standpoint claims that its position is the true one. 
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Therefore, it is not sheer diversity but diversity coupled with cognitive disagreement 
that makes toleration possible in Habermas‟s eyes.  
       As far as the condition of diversity is concerned, one might draw parallels 
between Rawls‟s and Habermas‟s theories. We have seen that Rawls also refers to 
disapproval and disagreement when considering diversity. We will discuss the nature 
of what Habermas means by disagreement specifically when we consider the scope of 
toleration in the following parts of the Chapter. Nevertheless, we can mention for 
now that what Habermas calls „irresolvable disagreement‟ in the long run reminds us 
of what Rawls calls the „burdens of judgment‟. We will consider this under the title of 
„reasons for toleration‟ later on. Here, the claim is not that the two ideas are same but 
that they are similar in taking into account the inevitable nature of „irresolvable 
disagreement‟ among the members of contemporary democratic societies. Both of 
them seem to acknowledge the fact that there will be enduring disagreement among 
citizens all of whom accept the rules of the democratic game and this will have to 
provide some ground to toleration as well. 
4.1.3. Power as a Characteristic of Toleration 
        We have seen that in order for X to tolerate Y, X needs to have the power to act 
according to her objection. We said that this is the condition for tolerant conduct. 
Moreover, for X to have a tolerant attitude or disposition, we said that X does not 
have to have the actual power to tolerate: it is enough for X to be able to say that she 
would tolerate Y even if she had the power not to do so. Upon these considerations, 
we have concluded that one might refer to the dimension of power as a characteristic 
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of toleration in Rawls‟s theory both in Political Liberalism and in Law of Peoples. 
We observed that both citizens of a democratic society at the domestic level; and 
liberal and nonliberal decent peoples at the international level, might be viewed as 
potential bearers of the power to act on their objections. Furthermore, we concluded 
that citizens should also have tolerant dispositions concerning each other‟s 
conceptions of the good in a society as a fair system of cooperation. We added that 
peoples -liberal and nonliberal decent- as being different from states, might exhibit 
tolerant dispositions towards each other‟s conduct. 
       The power condition is also present in Habermas‟s conception of toleration. One 
might contend that citizens of democratic societies -religious and secular- as agents of 
toleration might have the power not to tolerate the object of their toleration. They can 
maintain a tolerant disposition even if they do not possess actual power. This 
condition seems to be valid both for relations between religious and secular citizens 
as well as among religious and secular citizens among themselves. 
4.1.4. Scope, Demands and Limits of Toleration 
        In the previous chapters, we examined the scope, demands and limits of 
toleration with respect to both the concept in general and Rawls‟s conception of 
toleration. Now, we will analyze Habermas‟s conception of toleration concerning 
these characteristics. To recall, scope refers to the nature of the sources of 
disapproval: whether the sources are moral or not. We said that for Rawls, 
disapproval could arise from both moral and nonmoral sources. It seems concerning 
Habermas‟s theory we can say the same thing, however with some qualification. 
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        Habermas says one needs „subjectively good reasons‟ to reject the other‟s 
standpoint. 
149
 He distinguishes these reasons from other grounds for rejection. He 
claims that reasons based on prejudice cannot be legitimate grounds for rejection. In 
this sense for him, we do not reply to the racist or chauvinist with a call for more 
tolerance, but rather with the call that he should overcome his prejudice.
150
 This 
relates to the limits of the concept: we do not enter into any relation of toleration with 
a racist or chauvinist. In addition, for Habermas, we need to distinguish reasons for 
rejection from other circumstances with which they might be confused: “We do not 
need to be tolerant if we are indifferent to other opinions and attitudes anyway or 
even appreciate the value of such „otherness‟‟.151 Therefore, for him, tolerance can 
come to bear only if there are „good reasons‟ for the rejection of competing validity 
claims. 
         What is meant by „subjectively good reasons‟ is vague. Habermas does not 
clarify it by referring to any substantive sources of disagreement. By distinguishing 
„good reasons‟ from „indifference‟ and „prejudice‟, he seems to refer to the 
conceptual limits of toleration. We will focus on limits of toleration in Habermas‟s 
theory later on. For now, in relation to scope, we might infer that „subjectively good‟ 
reasons might be of both moral and nonmoral. In this regard, one might possibly 
argue that from a Habermasian point of view, one can have ‟subjectively good 
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reasons‟ to disagree/dislike a specific action, belief etc. for aesthetic or cultural 
reasons as well as for other sorts of disapproving reason. He says: “We need tolerance 
only vis-à-vis worldviews that we consider wrong and vis-à-vis habits that we do not 
like”.152 It might be claimed that, as long as the disapproval is not based on a 
prejudice and qualifies as subjectively good, then it is within the scope of toleration. 
There is not enough evidence in Habermas‟s theory to claim that disapprovals should 
always be of moral sort.  
         The distinction between ethics and morality seems to be relevant in 
understanding the scope of toleration in the theory of Habermas.
153
  Sources of 
disapproval could stem from ethical judgments which do not have to relate to 
morality. Thus, one might refer to aesthetic dislikes as well as to other sources of 
disapproval which might be generated by ethical considerations that are related to our 
upbringing, habits and traditions. Habermas seems to agree with this argument in 
saying:  
“We can talk of toleration only if the parties involved base their rejection on a cognitive 
conflict between beliefs and attitudes that persist for good reasons. It goes without 
saying that not every rejection can be construed as reasonable: if someone rejects people 
with black skin, we should not call on him to show „toleration towards those of a 
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different appearance‟ because that would be to accept his prejudice as an ethical 
judgment that is similar to the rejection of a different religion.”154  
 
Here it seems that what he means by „cognitive disagreement‟ amounts to „reasonable 
disapproval‟ and the source of this disapproval could be ethical as well as moral.  
Ethical stands for the judgments that are connected to our identity such as traditions, 
religion, life- style etc. Possibly Rawls would label the realm of ethics as the realm of 
morality as well. Thus, some of what Rawls describes as „moral‟ seems to be „ethical‟ 
for Habermas. That is why we say, for Habermas, one might talk of both ethical and 
moral disapproval as far as toleration is concerned. 
        In Chapters 1 and 2, we have referred to the demands of toleration which relate 
to the requirements of action that could be taken with regard to toleration: whether 
toleration entails simply refraining from persecution or whether it requires more than 
that such as fostering and assisting. We observed that, in Rawls‟s theory, one can 
refer to positive requirements such as recognition with respect to his toleration at the 
domestic level. Thus, we said that Rawls‟s theory supports both positive dispositions 
and actions of citizens toward each other concerning toleration as an intra-state 
matter. Here, once again, Habermas shares a similar theoretical position.  
        Perhaps the first demand of toleration in Habermas‟s theory is what we might 
call „social acceptance‟. Acceptance comes onto the scene at the social level, not at 
the cognitive level (Just to recall, we have seen there must be rejection at the 
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cognitive level for toleration to arise).  What basically comes to the fore as a demand 
of toleration is the acceptance of the practical consequences of being in the same 
political environment like all others who have different ethos/worldviews. Habermas 
asserts that one can only realize her ethos within the limits of what everyone is 
accorded.
155
 Acceptance of abiding by the same rules for everyone to exist together is 
a demand of toleration. This acceptance at the social and practical level reminds us of 
Rawls‟s conception of reasonableness. In this manner, as we saw in Chapter 2, 
reasonableness stands for the idea that tolerant citizens accept other citizens who have 
different comprehensive doctrines as free and equal. We will also see later that this 
argument is connected to the notion of respect. 
        As we have mentioned, Habermas claims that, as tolerant citizens, what is 
expected from each of us is to realize our own ethos only within limits and to accept 
the consequences of the ethos of others.
156
 For Habermas, this has asymmetrical 
consequences for believers and nonbelievers in the democratic society.
157
 For secular 
citizens, it is easier to abide by this rule because of their familiarity with the 
embedded heritage of democratic attitude. On the other hand, the believer has a 
different mental set which does not easily allow her to step outside the commands of 
her religious ethos to see the other as equally eligible to the same set of rules. The 
result is that the believer might end up in the enclave of her own ethos without any 
means to see the other‟s point of view. Therefore, for Habermas, considering 
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tolerance only as noninterference could possibly lead to a situation in which 
competing worldviews exist without understanding each other. Therefore, we need a 
more demanding notion of toleration which not only implies noninterference but also 
understanding and recognition.  
         In line with the above-mentioned argument, for Habermas, we might add that 
toleration is also a requirement of the ethics of citizenship.  For this reason, toleration 
should not be viewed as solely noninterference. Put precisely, we should tolerate 
because as citizens who share the same political community, we have a responsibility 
and a duty to tolerate each other‟s viewpoints. Toleration is part of our civic duty to 
each other. That is why as tolerant citizens, we also need to engage in a process of 
dialogue in order to understand each other. 
       In line with the ethics of citizenship that requires toleration as recognition and 
understanding, Habermas also refers to two significant conceptions in terms of the 
relation between secular standpoint and religious one: a “complementary learning 
process” and a “translation requirement”. We will have the chance to observe that 
these notions are also part of the demands of toleration in the theory of Habermas. 
Below I will outline what is meant by these notions and where they fit into 
Habermas‟s normative vocabulary.  
      For Habermas, post-secular society reflects a normative insight which has 
consequences for the political relation between believing and nonbeliving citizens: 
 
 
141 
 
“In Postsecular societies, the insight prevails that the „modernization of public 
consciousness captures religious and secular mentalities in different phases and 
reflexively alters them. If they conceive of secularization of society in common as a 
complementary learning process, both sides can then reciprocally take seriously, for 
cognitive reasons, their contributions to controversial topics in the public sphere”. 158  
 
Here, one might say that a learning process between religious and secular reasons is 
required in the post-secular age because religion is still present with its influence in 
the public and private life of citizens. This claim of Habermas that there needs to be a 
learning process might be regarded as a proposal that would allow each party -secular 
and religious- to open up to the other in a hermeneutical way. Put exactly, a 
“complementary learning process” requires a condition of awareness that is expected 
from secular and religious citizens to open up dialogue and interaction concerning the 
contributions that might come up in public debate. Here one might argue that 
Habermas, in assuming that religious consciousness can be open to dialogue with 
secularism, disregards the dogmatic aspects of religion. However, being aware of this 
risk, he mentions that, politically speaking, this process of self reflection from within 
the religious traditions might work only in favor of those religions that have learned 
to acknowledge democracy, religious pluralism, and the secular authority of 
science.
159
 In this manner, we need a certain level of awareness (a consciousness 
acknowledges pluralism and democracy) in advance on behalf of religious 
standpoints in order to engage in self-reflection which is backed up by learning from 
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the other part. Moreover, for Habermas, a cognitive adaptation is also required from 
the secular citizen in the sense of a “self-reflexive overcoming of a rigid and 
exclusive secularist self-understanding of modernity.”160 
      As mentioned before, the second significant notion Habermas refers to is the 
“requirement of translation”. Reflecting on this notion will give us the opportunity to 
understand better what Habermas requires of the secular and religious parties in terms 
of attitudes that they should take when behaving in a tolerant way. Concerning the 
requirement of translation, Habermas claims that the boundaries between secular and 
religious reasons are fluid and deciding on those disputed boundaries should be seen 
as a cooperative task which requires taking the perspective of the other party.
161
 Thus, 
translation of religious content into a publicly accessible language which would not 
lead religions to be excluded from public sphere is a task to be undertaken by both 
sides. In doing this, “secular reason should insist on the difference between certainties 
of faith and publicly criticizable validity claims but refrain from evaluating the 
rationality or irrationality of religion as such.”162 The move Habermas makes with the 
notions of „complementary leaning process‟ and „translation‟ seems to be significant 
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in thinking of a more positive and demanding toleration.
163
 As Richard Wolin 
observes, by acknowledging religion‟s specific place in public political debate, 
Habermas also made a significant move to theorize a notion of multicultural 
toleration.
164
 In this sense, toleration demands the capacity to take the standpoint of 
the other. 
        Before moving on, here it is significant to note that Habermas‟s „translation 
requirement‟ attracted certain criticisms. We might delineate two main lines of 
argument: one regarding the impossibility of translation and other concerning the 
relevance and status of this requirement within his whole theoretical framework. 
Paolo Flores d‟Arcais, in his Religion and Public Sphere-Eleven Thesis Against 
Habermas claims that a translation of religious demands into secular ones is 
impossible and “such expectation is nothing but wishful thinking”.165 Although it is 
not so clear why he thinks in that manner, it seems for d‟Arcais, the impossibility of 
translation is due to the very nature of the religious demands. Hence he says: “In the 
name of God one can impose norms that no rational argumentation can render 
compatible with the values that Habermas- rightly- considers to be constitutive of a 
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democratic constitutional State (and therefore inalienable).”166 In his reply to 
d‟Arcais, Habermas admits that any translation from a religious to the secular 
language must entail a loss of connotations, yet the core of the semantic content of 
religious language need not be lost.
167
 He also points out the reciprocal learning 
process between religious and secular languages by arguing that there has been an 
absorption from religious content (Judeo- Christian Tradition) since the 
Enlightenment and we cannot know if this process has come to an end or not. 
Following Habermas on this point, I think we have enough reasons to think that there 
is an interaction between the religious and the secular demands, and in a democratic 
polity, religious reasons count in the process of justification with a secular appeal in 
the sense of generally accessible reasons. If we accept the view of d‟Arcais, seeing 
the religious and the secular as two ontologically distinct contents that contain no 
relations with the other, then we would have to accept that the view of religious 
citizens on the question of legitimacy is totally excluded. It seems not plausible to 
end up with such a conclusion if we need to take pluralism seriously in contemporary 
constitutional democracies. 
        Maeve Cooke raised an objection to Habermas concerning the relevance of the 
„translation requirement‟. Her criticism is not about the possibility of translation from 
religious content to the secular content since for her, Habermas‟s political theory 
allows for such translation with its emphasis on the idea of deliberation. She claims 
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that Habermas does not need „translation requirement‟ to argue for the translation 
from religious to the secular language because the very idea of translation is built in 
the process of deliberation among free and equal citizens.
168
 Hence, „translation 
requirement‟ prior to the deliberation makes no sense. Here I share the point of Cooke 
in addressing the capacity of Habermas‟s idea of deliberation to allow for translation. 
Citizens, when arguing in deliberative publics, they already and always have to 
consider if their argument is sound and acceptable by the others. This process itself 
brings into the fore a transformative attitude on the part of citizens, be they religious 
or secular. However, by maintaining a separate „translation requirement‟, Habermas 
aims to secure the ground for the neutrality of laws and political principles. Whether 
this approach is right or wrong is beyond the scope of this research. Nevertheless, it is 
to point out here that Habermas‟s approach is line with his conception of toleration; 
the laws and principles on which the political authority is based should not be 
inspired by a metaphysical or religious doctrine. 
        After addressing certain criticisms of Habermas on the question of translation, I 
aim to compare the viewpoints of Habermas and Rawls on the demands of toleration. 
First of all, we might contend that for Habermas, toleration comes with highly 
positive demands. A hermeneutical self-reflexivity, together with an awareness of the 
possibilities of communication between secular and religious standpoints is 
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needed.
169
 In this way, we might draw certain parallels between his conception of 
toleration and that of Rawls. As we have seen in Chapter 2, Rawls‟s theory demands 
recognition of and respect for the equal status of citizens who maintain reasonable 
conceptions of good and share the principles of political justice in their society. This 
ground of Rawls‟s theory, together with the notion of „reasonableness‟ and the 
requirements of democratic citizenship support a positive conception of the demands 
of toleration. Even though Rawls does not explicitly emphasize the notion of 
„hermeneutical reflection‟ as part of his conception of toleration, it seems his theory 
would allow such a perspective: „reasonableness‟ and the „ethics of citizenship‟ 
would allow room for what Habermas calls the “translation requirement” and the 
„complementary learning process”. Moreover, what he means by „moral learning‟ in 
Law of Peoples might imply a hermeneutical opening up to the other as well. 
Nevertheless, it is still significant to mention that Habermas‟s open and persistent 
emphasis on hermeneutical self-reflectivity and opening up to the other comes to the 
fore with explicitly demanding and positive actions that need to be taken according to 
the principle of toleration. 
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        In Chapter 1, we said that the limits of toleration are concerned with what could 
be tolerated and what could not. We also analyzed the possible conceptual limits 
concerning toleration in general and as an international issue. Then in Chapters 2 and 
3, we focused on the limits of toleration in Rawls‟s Political Liberalism and Law of 
Peoples. Now, we will analyze Habermas‟s thinking on the limits of toleration. 
        As we mentioned before, Habermas reckons that it is not possible to tolerate 
viewpoints that are based on prejudice. To recall, racist and chauvinist people should 
not be labeled as tolerant because race should not be the object of toleration or 
intolerance. Conceptually speaking, we might possibly argue the same for ethnicity 
and nationality. We might say that they are conceptually outside the realm of 
toleration because they do not offer „good enough reasons‟ for toleration. That is 
why; he mentions that we do not reply to the racist or chauvinist with a call for more 
tolerance, but rather with the call that he should overcome his prejudice.
170
  
        It could be argued that Habermas does not refer to any specific determinate 
limits in the substantive sense as far as toleration is concerned. Nevertheless it is 
significant that the substantive limits -what should be tolerated and what should not- 
should be justifiable to all in a democratic constitutional regime. Citizens, by 
accepting that they can only realize their way of life prescribed by a particular 
religion or worldview only under the conditions of equal liberties to everybody, also 
accept that the limits of toleration should be justifiable to all. Hence, he says: “Only 
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with a universally convincing delineation of the borderline – which requires that all 
those involved reciprocally take the perspective of the others- can toleration blunt the 
thorn of intolerance. Everyone who might be affected by the future practice must 
voluntarily agree on the conditions under which they wish to exercise mutual 
toleration.”171  In this manner, for Habermas, the deliberative model of democratic 
will formation supports the claim that we need reasons that all sides can equally 
accept as far as the limits of toleration are concerned.
172
 These should be the limits 
that every citizen can endorse as legitimate in a democratic society. 
        In line with the justifiability of the limits of toleration to all, one might also 
consider the idea of „discourse ethics‟ as drawing the boundaries of what is tolerable 
and what is not. It might be claimed that the procedural presuppositions of discourse 
can be regarded as the criteria for reflection on what one could tolerate and what not. 
Concerning how discourse operates, Habermas says:  
“Discourse ethics rests on the intuition that the application of the principle of 
universalization, properly understood, calls for a joint process of “ideal role taking”. It 
interprets this idea of G.H. Mead in terms of a pragmatic theory of argumentation. Under 
the pragmatic presuppositions of an inclusive and noncoercive rational discourse among 
free and equal participants, everyone is required to take the perspective of everyone else, 
and thus project herself into the understandings of self and the world of others; from this 
interlocking of perspectives there emerges an ideally extended we perspective from 
which all can test in common whether they wish to make a controversial norm the basis 
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of their shared practice; and this should include mutual criticism of the appropriateness 
of the languages in terms of which situations and needs are interpreted.” 173 
 
In this sense, we might infer that citizens in their status as free and equal decide on 
what is tolerable and what is not under a noncoercive and open procedure of 
argumentation. In other words, their open and noncoercive shared discourse defines 
justifiable limits for toleration. 
        In connection with the above, James Bohman points out a commonality between 
Habermas and Rawls. He says, there is a common temptation “to hold certain aspects 
of deliberation as fixed and thus to regard them as the necessary limits of toleration. 
Habermas and Rawls succumb to this temptation in different ways.” 174 If Bohman 
means „certain aspects of deliberation as fixed limits‟ are substantive limits such as 
moral principles that are viewed as prior to deliberation; then it seems he 
misinterprets the issue of limits concerning Rawls and Habermas‟s conceptions of 
toleration. Both for Rawls and Habermas, the limits might be a certain political 
criterion such as „reasonableness‟ in Rawls‟s theory and „social acceptance‟ and 
„discourse ethics‟ in Habermas‟s theory. In this manner, we might call these criteria 
formal procedural measures; but certainly not substantive limits. They come to the 
agenda as formal criteria that enable citizens to view each other as free and equal in 
sharing political power. 
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        Bohman continues to claim that “views that set determinate limits on toleration 
are paradoxical from the point of view of democracy. They either subordinate 
democracy to some moral content of toleration and its attitudes, or they subordinate 
the complex possibilities of justification in democracy to one value or principle that 
they consider “more fundamental”, “basic” or “prior” for any number of reasons.” 175 
Here we might say that there is a sense in which Bohman is right in raising the 
significance of not drawing any substantive limits in advance as prior to democratic 
deliberation. Acting otherwise would also be at odds with the pluralism of 
contemporary societies in which we have to live together having different 
conceptions of good. That is the reason both Rawls and Habermas try to emphasize 
the significance of the justifiability of the limits of toleration to all in a political 
community. 
        Having said that both Habermas and Rawls share the intuition of not setting 
substantive limits to toleration from the outset, it is also significant to take note of one 
major difference between the two theories. This difference is best explained with 
reference to Habermas‟s objection to Rawls‟s idea of „reasonableness‟. Habermas 
says that, in Rawls‟s theory: “Practical reason is robbed of its moral core and is 
deflated to a reasonableness that becomes dependent on moral truths justified 
otherwise. The moral validity of conceptions of justice is now no longer grounded in 
a universally binding practical reason but in the lucky convergence of reasonable 
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worldviews whose moral components overlap to a sufficient degree.” 176 In a sense, 
Habermas in addressing the lack of moral and universal dimensions in 
„reasonableness‟, draws attention to the difference between the presuppositions of 
„discourse ethics‟ and the idea of „reasonableness‟. In „discourse ethics‟, according to 
him, we could find the idea of practical reason as universally binding for all the 
participants who are regarded as free and equal. Here, we might infer that, what 
Habermas means is not that practical reason sets substantive standards for 
deliberation, but it is embedded in the procedure of an open and noncoercive 
pragmatic discourse as a universally binding idea for all. It might be also argued that 
from a Rawlsian standpoint, what Habermas proposes could be viewed as a liberal 
„comprehensive doctrine‟ with its appeal to a universal ideal speech situation. Indeed 
Rawls himself makes this objection in his reply to Habermas‟s „Reconciliation 
through the Public Use of Reason‟.177 
       To sum up, when we reasoned about Rawlsian toleration, we saw that 
„reasonableness‟ is significant in determining the limits of what is tolerable and what 
is not. For Rawls beliefs, opinions etc. which support the idea of reasonableness, in 
the sense of abiding by the fair terms of cooperation and recognizing the burdens of 
judgment are tolerated. Here in Habermas‟s theory, we have a similar idea. However, 
Habermas does not mention „reasonableness‟ as defining the  limits, rather for him, 
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democratic deliberation and will formation itself brings justifiable limits. In this 
sense, the open and democratic discourse of citizens who accept the consequences of 
sharing the same political community with other worldviews, seem to be the defining 
element concerning the limits of toleration. In this manner, the rules and principles of 
democratic discourse puts limits to what is tolerable and what is not. 
4.2. Reasons for Toleration in Habermas’s Theory 
        Above we have outlined the characteristics of toleration in Habermas‟s theory. 
We also addressed certain parallels and differences between his and Rawls‟s theory 
of toleration concerning the characteristics of toleration. In our search for the possible 
dimensions of toleration as an international issue, it is significant to point out the way 
Habermas pictures toleration within the context of democratic societies divided by 
diversity. Now, we will focus on the reasons for toleration in Habermas‟s theory 
which will be helpful for understanding possible reasons for international toleration 
in his theory. 
        To recall, in Chapters 1 and 2, when we considered the reasons for toleration, we 
referred to the justification of toleration. Thus, we observed that a reason for 
toleration is an answer to the question why we should tolerate?  In Habermas‟s 
theory, we encounter specific notions that seem to connect to his justification of 
toleration: respect, civic solidarity and the ethics of citizenship. These notions are 
relevant to the reasons for toleration as well as describing what is expected from a 
tolerant citizen in terms of attitude towards the others. 
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        First of all, we might claim that, in Habermas‟s theory, „respect‟ comes to the 
fore as a reason for toleration. He considers respect (together with the idea of civic 
solidarity) as the basis for justification of toleration in a pluralistic society. It is 
significant that citizens understand themselves to be the citizens of one and the same 
political community. 
178
 “For all their ongoing dissent on questions of worldviews 
and religious doctrines, citizens are meant to respect one another as free and equal 
members of political community.”179 Here, we might say that respect gives us the 
normative principle which we should appeal as citizens of a democratic community 
under the conditions of disagreement. Citizens, by living in the same community 
regardless of their dispute and difference, respect each other‟s status as free and equal 
members. Thus, respect and toleration imply each other and the former comes to the 
scene as a reason to be tolerant of citizens who are not like us at all, with whom we 
disagree but at the same time with whom we have to share the same political 
community. 
      We might argue that civic solidarity is also connected to respect as a reason for 
toleration:  
“In the absence of the uniting bond of a civic solidarity, which cannot be legally 
enforced, citizens do not perceive themselves as free and equal participants in the shared 
practices of democratic opinion and will formation wherein they owe one another 
reasons for their political statements and attitudes. This reciprocity of expectations 
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among citizens is what distinguishes a community integrated by constitutional values 
from a community segmented along the dividing lines of competing worldviews.” 180 
 
Only in the condition of civic solidarity, can citizens of a democratic pluralistic 
society come to see each other as equal and free participants in public deliberation.  
Respecting each other as free and equal members of a community is the starting point 
for achieving that goal. Respect (together with civic solidarity) as a reason for 
toleration is part of the idea of the ethics of citizenship which is significant for the 
democratic and deliberative will formation in a pluralistic society.  
        Here once again we find a parallel between the theories of Habermas and Rawls 
concerning the reasons for toleration. We have seen in Chapters 2 and 3 that for 
Rawls too, „respect for persons‟ constitutes the justification of toleration both 
concerning his domestic and international toleration with the qualification that 
peoples replaces persons in the international realm. As we have observed, citizens of 
a constitutional democratic society, as holders of different conceptions of good, 
respect each other‟s status as free and equal. They do not impose their own 
conception of good on others because they are also reasonable in abiding by the fair 
terms of cooperation and recognizing the „burdens of judgment‟. We have also seen 
that the requirements of the ethics of citizenship demand that citizens show respect 
for each other as free and equal members. Thus, for Habermas too, „respect for 
persons‟ is the reason for toleration. What he calls „civic solidarity‟ and being citizens 
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of the same political community (the ethics of citizenship) requires us to respect the 
free and equal status of each other. 
        Above we have reflected on the characteristics of and reasons for toleration in 
Habermas‟s theory. We were mainly concerned with toleration as an intra state 
matter, as a question within state boundaries. We also touched upon certain parallels 
and differences between the theories of Habermas and Rawls concerning toleration as 
a domestic matter. We have seen how Habermas pictures toleration in democratic 
societies. In the next Chapter, we will examine the different dimensions of toleration 
as an international issue in Habermas‟s theory. 
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CHAPTER 5 
JURGEN HABERMAS AND TOLERATION AS AN INTERNATIONAL 
ISSUE 
        In Chapter 4, we analyzed the theory of Habermas with respect to his conception 
of toleration within the domestic contexts of democratic societies. In so doing, we 
have both outlined the basic characteristics of and reasons for toleration in the theory 
of Habermas. We also made references to John Rawls to observe the parallels and 
differences between the two theories. We saw that both Rawls and Habermas share 
certain aspects of toleration as an answer to the question how we could live together 
as citizens who have different worldviews and beliefs in a constitutional democratic 
regime. 
        As we saw in Chapter 4, toleration is a central theme in the theory of Habermas 
esp. in his later writings. We saw that he explicitly raised the issue of toleration 
within the context of contemporary societies. This was evident in his texts on religion 
and its role in public political life.  We observed that for Habermas, toleration comes 
to the fore as an answer to the question how it is possible to live together as free and 
equal citizens of a democratic community which is divided by various worldviews 
and beliefs.  We also argued that toleration comes onto the scene as a requirement of 
justice in the theory of Habermas and there is a parallel in this sense between the 
conceptions of toleration of Habermas and Rawls. 
        In addition to their commonality in viewing toleration as a requirement of justice 
in the domestic context, we might add that there is also a parallel between the outlook 
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of Habermas and Rawls in viewing toleration as a requirement of international 
justice. In Chapter 3, concerning the international theory of Rawls, we have seen that 
toleration is a principle that has to be endorsed within the context of a just agreement 
on the principles of the Law of Peoples. We said that liberal and decent nonliberal 
peoples would act unjustly as well as intolerantly if they try to impose their values on 
others. Thus, we concluded that international toleration is a requirement of 
international justice in the theory of Rawls. 
       Habermas does not address toleration as an international issue as explicitly as in 
the case of the domestic context. Nevertheless, the necessity and significance of 
toleration is embedded in his writings that aim to deal with the question of religion 
and secularism in the global realm because he still deals with the question of how it is 
possible to live together in peace in a world society divided by various faiths, 
worldviews and beliefs. As he says: “the conflict of cultures take place today in the 
framework of a world society in which the collective actors must, regardless of their 
different cultural traditions, agree for better or worse on norms of coexistence.” 181 
Thus his awareness of diversity in the global realm motivates him to consider the 
possible answers for the question at stake and he considers toleration as a normative 
answer which is consistent with his considerations regarding the domestic toleration.  
         In this manner, for Habermas, international toleration is a requirement of 
justice.  He believes that a multicultural world society which is peaceful and just can 
be possible with the endorsement of the principle of toleration. For him, toleration 
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comes as a cognitive presupposition “which must be satisfied if intercultural 
discourse on principles of political justice for a multicultural world society is to be 
successful.”182 In line with a tolerant disposition, as a requirement of intercultural 
discourse, “all parties, irrespective of their cultural backgrounds, had to consider 
controversial issues simultaneously from their own perspective and from those of the 
various other participants. Moreover they had to learn to restrict themselves to 
arguments that could in principle convince anyone irrespective of their underlying 
metaphysical or religious commitments.”183 Thus, for Habermas, the principle of 
toleration should be reflected in the attitude of the participants of an intercultural 
discourse on principles of a political justice for a multicultural world-society. In this 
way, a Habermasian conception of international toleration might be regarded as a 
requirement of international justice as well.  
         There is then a place in the theory of Habermas to view toleration as a 
requirement of international justice. In this chapter, the aim is to demonstrate that one 
could refer to toleration as international issue in Habermas‟s theory even though it is 
not explicitly spelled out by him. Hence, it is argued that we might develop a 
Habermasian international toleration which would satisfy the conceptual 
characteristics that we mentioned in Chapter 1. For doing this, we will analyze certain 
texts by him with reference to our conceptual scheme regarding the characteristics of 
and reasons for toleration. In addition to this, as we did before, it is also the goal to 
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address the possible parallels and differences between his theory and that of John 
Rawls as far as international toleration is concerned. As mentioned before, 
Habermas‟s conception of toleration as a domestic matter will also help us in making 
inferences with regard to the way he could portray toleration as an international issue.         
5.1. Characteristics of Toleration as an International Issue in the Theory of 
Jurgen Habermas 
5.1.1. Agents and Objects of International Toleration 
        When analyzing the characteristics of toleration in Chapter 1, we had seen that 
the first characteristic that one might refer is the possible agents and objects of 
toleration. Also in Chapter 4, we had observed that citizens as holders of different 
worldviews -religious, secular etc.- are regarded as agents of toleration in the theory 
of Habermas as far as domestic context of modern democratic societies are 
concerned. In addition to this, we also said that the beliefs, habits and conduct of 
citizens constitute the possible objects of toleration. 
           As far as the international realm is concerned, Habermas‟s concept of 
„civilization‟ comes to the fore as bearing an explanatory significance to reflect on the 
possible agents and objects of toleration in his theory. But civilizations as separate 
entities might not be viewed as the only possible agents of toleration per se. The 
category of civilization seems to help in reflecting on different dimensions of 
diversity and disapproval in relation to possible agents and objects of toleration in the 
international realm. Nevertheless, there still seems to be an ambiguity in Habermas‟s 
theory on which the possible agents of international toleration are. My contention is 
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that one might claim that states, powerful individuals, NGOs and communities of 
faith, as bearers of certain cultural and religious world-views, can feature as agents of 
international toleration in the theory of Habermas. Here it is significant to note that 
individuals find a place in the picture as agents of toleration but they are not the only 
agents that Habermas envisions. He gives room for a variety of agents which might 
engage in relations of toleration at the global level. States could also be agents as an 
actual possibility in the international realm, however this is not to say that Habermas 
gives moral significance to the agency of states rather than individuals. Individuals as 
world- citizens could be viewed as ultimate moral units that will engage in relations 
of toleration and intercultural dialogue in the ideal world. Civilizations might have 
significance in shaping the conduct and disposition of these possible agents. In line 
with this, one can also identify various behaviors, beliefs, and values etc. which are 
shaped through the world-view of different civilizations as possible objects of 
international toleration in the theory of Habermas. 
        To understand better what can be inferred from Habermas‟s theory for the agents 
and objects of international toleration, we must consider what he means by 
„civilization‟. It seems Habermas uses the term „civilization‟ as a referential concept 
to present the issue of how we can live together in peace in a world which is divided 
by major different faiths and worldviews as well as different cultures. In his paper “, 
as Self-interpretation of Modernity?”, by subscribing to the theory of Samuel 
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Eisenstadt on modernity, he advocates a plural and dynamic notion of civilizations.
184
  
For him, civilizations as plural social and cultural formations crosscutting the 
boundaries of national territories bring their own understanding of modernity and 
shape the global infrastructure in culturally specific ways.  In this sense, civilizations 
come onto the scene as categories on which we can reflect to understand the features 
of contemporary multicultural world society.
185
 Different agents such as individuals, 
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NGOs and communities, as the bearers of different world- views and beliefs that have 
their source in different civilizations, might be viewed as the agents of toleration at 
the global level. 
         In the previous chapters, we saw that for Rawls, „peoples‟ are the agents of 
toleration. We also argued that he interpreted the category of peoples in a wide 
manner in order to incorporate different civilizations, cultures etc. in the international 
realm. In this regard, there is a commonality between Rawls and Habermas. In 
accepting the wide view of „peoples‟ as potentially incorporating civilizations, we 
could say that the theories of international toleration of Rawls and Habermas both 
focus on the concept of civilization. This does not mean that in Rawls‟s theory, 
different peoples qualify as different civilizations. Rather, civilizations might be 
viewed as world- entities that bring different „people‟ together in virtue of providing a 
shared cultural and traditional basis. Accordingly, Rawls‟s theory does not 
necessarily exclude civilizations. On the other hand, of course Habermas does not 
refer to „peoples‟ as international agents in the way that Rawls does. Habermas‟s 
cosmopolitan stand as compared to Rawls might be a reason for this difference. 
However, in both of the theories; there is a way to address civilizations regardless of 
the differences in the way they do it. Furthermore, in Habermas‟s theory, we might 
envision a room for individuals as agents of toleration but such a view is not in the 
horizon in the theory of Rawls at the international level due to his strict subscription 
to „peoples‟ as agents of toleration. 
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        One might still question if it is necessary to refer to the concept of „civilization‟ 
to understand and make sense of the diversity and pluralism in a multicultural world- 
society. It seems reference to civilization might lead to cultural essentialism in the 
sense that each culture and society might be viewed as part of a specific homogenous 
group subscribing to specific values, traditions and belief sets. This might lead us to 
disregard of the diversity that is inherent inside the societies themselves. It might be 
claimed that this is the risk that Habermas has to take when he envisions a „dialogue 
among civilizations‟ at the global level. Besides, it might be contended that the 
conceptual limits of civilization as a category is not so easy to define on solid basis. 
Civilization is a very broad and inclusive concept so that we cannot talk about it 
without implying that they have highly uniform and unchanging characters.  
5.1.2. Post-secular Age as the Condition of Diversity for Toleration as an 
International Issue         
       In Chapter 1, we have seen that the second characteristic of toleration is the 
condition of diversity coupled with disapproval. For toleration to be possible, it is 
necessary to have the condition of diversity which is the source of disapproval or 
dislike. We had also observed that in Chapters 2 and 3, Rawls‟s theory satisfies this 
condition in its emphasis on the fact of reasonable pluralism in contemporary 
societies. Regarding the domestic context of democratic societies, we also claimed 
that Habermas‟s theory also satisfies the condition of diversity. We said that this is 
especially evident in his emphasis on „post-metaphysical age‟ as a condition of 
contemporary pluralist societies. 
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        In Chapters 2 and 3, we also mentioned that diversity coupled with disapproval 
is a condition for and characteristic of international toleration in the theory of Rawls. 
In this sense, we observed that liberal and nonliberal peoples might 
disapprove/dislike of certain conduct and values of each other. In this way, we said 
that pluralism within the limits of decency constitutes the diversity condition in the 
international theory of Rawls. Below, we will see that pluralism at the global level 
which also contains disapproval/dislike constitutes the diversity condition as a 
characteristic of international toleration in the theory of Habermas. (There is a 
parallel between the theories of Rawls and Habermas in addressing pluralism together 
with conflict concerning toleration in the international realm). 
        To investigate the diversity condition at the global level in the theory of 
Habermas, „post-secular age‟ comes to the fore as a significant notion to describe the 
contemporary situation. We might say that Habermas‟s comprehension of 
contemporary world society which is marked by diversity can be described with 
reference to notion of „post-secular age‟. In this sense, in order to understand the 
diversity condition regarding toleration better, we need to reflect on “post-secular 
society”/ “post-secular age”. This reflection needs an attempt to comprehend the 
connection between secularization and modernization, and the dynamics of this 
relation itself. In the texts in which he mentions those processes, Habermas does not 
explain the nature of the dynamics in detail. However, he gives us the opportunity, at 
least to see what is peculiar to the age of postsecularism.  
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       In the paper delivered in Rome in September 2007, The Resurgence of Religion-
A Challenge for a Secular Self-interpretation of Modernity?, he attempts to answer 
what the resurgence of religion means for a largely secularized society. In this 
manner, he starts with the mention of the infamous secularization thesis which claims 
that “there is a close interrelation between the advancing modernization of society 
and an expanding secularization of the consciousness of the population.”186 For 
Habermas, this conventional reading of secularization made a mistake in considering 
secularization as a zero sum game between productivity of science and technology on 
the one hand and the ongoing powers of church and religion on the other hand.
187
 
Thus, for him, this image is inconsistent with a post-secular society which contends 
that religious communities continue to exist in the ongoing process of secularization. 
In this way, he also points out that: “the awareness of a living secular society is no 
longer bound up with the certainty that the advancing modernization of society and 
culture can occur only at the cost of the public influence and personal relevance of 
religion.”188 Therefore, the basic feature of a post-secular age is the ongoing impact 
of religion on individual and public life. In this sense, we might say that he considers 
secular and religious standpoints as two influential parties among the variety of world 
views under the conditions of intense pluralism. 
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        In line with the features mentioned above regarding post-secular society, he 
makes a significant remark concerning what he means by describing modern societies 
as post-secular. In his paper A post-secular society- What does that mean? delivered 
in Istanbul 2008, he says that post-secular society refers to a change in consciousness 
that he attributes to three phenomena.
189
 First, there is an emerging “awareness of 
living in a secular society is no longer bound up with the certainty that cultural and 
social modernization can advance only at the cost of the public influence and personal 
relevance of religion.”190 For him, the second indicator of a post-secular age is that 
religion is gaining influence not only worldwide but also in national public spheres: 
churches and religious communities are increasingly assuming the role of 
“communities of interpretation”191 in the public realm of secular societies. And 
thirdly, for him, the immigration of „guest-workers and refugees particularly from 
traditional communities is a stimulus for a change in consciousness in modern 
countries regarding religion and its role.
192
 
       In Habermas‟s eyes, post-secular society (pluralistic society) seems to be a global 
condition which marks an intense diversity in the global realm. In this sense, in his 
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view, a post-secular age requires new ways to deal with the problems arising from 
diversity and specifically religion. Toleration here comes to the fore as part of the 
response (if not the whole response) that Habermas gives to the specific problems of 
a post-secular age. Put precisely, we might claim that it is world society, becoming a 
post-secular society that, for Habermas, provides the diversity condition for toleration 
as an international issue. 
5.1.3. Condition of Power for Toleration as an International Issue 
        In Chapter 1, we observed that another characteristic of toleration is the 
dimension of power. To recall, in order for X to tolerate Y, X should have the power 
to make Y act otherwise. We said this is a condition for a tolerant conduct. In 
addition to this, we mentioned that in order to have a tolerant disposition towards Y, 
X does not need to have actual power but it is enough that X would not interfere with 
Y even if she had the power to do so. Moreover, when analyzing Rawls‟s toleration 
with regard to both domestic and international realm, we said that we might refer to 
the dimension of power: citizens of a well-ordered society can have the power to 
influence each other‟s conduct as well as having tolerant dispositions towards 
reasonable beliefs, values etc. Also we claimed that Rawls‟s international theory 
supports the same argument in the sense that liberal and decent nonliberal peoples 
might have the power to influence each other‟s conduct as well as having tolerant 
dispositions. In this manner, we said that liberal and decent nonliberal peoples, by 
adopting a tolerant disposition, do not act on their objection even if they had the 
power to do so. In this sense, we also mentioned that having a tolerant disposition 
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seems to be more significant as a characteristic in Rawls‟s conceptualization of 
international toleration because liberal and decent nonliberal peoples should have 
tolerant disposition to act according to the agreement they made concerning the 
principles of the Law of Peoples. Below, we will see that Habermas‟s theory also 
supports the view that having tolerant dispositions and conduct is a significant 
characteristic of international toleration as far as the power dimension is concerned. 
        As far as the theory of Habermas is concerned, in Chapter 4, we mentioned that 
we might refer both to power regarding tolerant conduct and a tolerant disposition: 
citizens of a democratic community might have the power to act on their objection 
but they refrain from doing so for toleration reasons. Furthermore, we also mentioned 
that citizens might possess tolerant dispositions towards beliefs, values etc. of each 
other even if they do not have the actual power to interfere. Indeed it is an expectation 
of citizens who share the same political community that they should have tolerant 
dispositions.  
         Concerning the international theory of Habermas, we might claim the same. 
States, international organizations, religious communities and powerful individuals 
might be viewed as both bearers of the power to interfere and of tolerant dispositions. 
In this sense, Habermas considers the dimension of power in regard to the conditions 
of contemporary world society. In this manner, for him, with the affect of the 
transformation brought by the forces of globalization, the Westphalian model has 
been under transformation within several dimensions such as political, economic, 
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technological and social.
193
 Thus, he says: “Global powers no longer operate in the 
state of nature envisioned by classical international law, but on the middle level of an 
emerging world politics. This represents a diffuse picture- not the stable picture of a 
multilevel politics within a world organization, but rather the dynamic picture of 
interferences and interactions between political processes that persist at national, 
international and global levels.”194 Therefore, he recognizes that the nation-state 
cannot be seen as the ultimate power and global actor. Rather, a dynamic and 
interdependent world society (if not fully cosmopolitan) has been emerging in which 
each actor can have an effect on the other. Hence, we might say that Habermas‟s 
theory acknowledges the characteristic of power as one of the conditions of 
possibility for international toleration. 
5.1.4. Scope, Demands and Limits of Toleration as an International Issue 
      In addition to the characteristics mentioned so far, in Chapter 1, we also pointed 
out the scope, demands and limits of toleration. We analyzed these characteristics 
regarding international toleration as well. In Chapters 2 and 3, we also focused on 
how these characteristics as conditions of possibility of toleration could be portrayed 
concerning the theory of John Rawls. Here, we will refer to these characteristics in 
relation to the theory of Jurgen Habermas. 
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        To recall, the scope of toleration refers to whether the disapproval of the 
tolerator is moral or not. In Chapter 4, we saw that one could refer to both moral and 
nonmoral (ethical) sources of disapproval/ dislike in Habermas‟s understanding of 
toleration in a domestic democratic context. We also said that, nonmoral stands for 
„ethical‟ in Habermas‟s conceptualization of toleration and its scope. Here, regarding 
toleration as an international issue, it seems we can argue the same. In this way, we 
might claim that one might observe both moral and ethical sources of 
disapproval/dislike concerning the international realm. In Habermas‟s view, in a 
world society as transforming into a post-secular society in which religion still has a 
place publicly and privately, it seems one might expect varied forms of disapproval 
and dislike such as aesthetic, cultural etc. which are part of our ethical life. In other 
words, it seems very likely that there will be disagreement of various sorts given the 
fact that the world is divided by different civilizations, cultures and worldviews. 
Thus, we observe a parallel in scope between Habermas‟s domestic toleration and 
international toleration.  
        Moreover, there is also parallel between Rawls‟s and Habermas‟s theories 
regarding the scope of toleration with one qualification that, what is ethical for 
Habermas might be viewed as moral in Rawls‟s comprehension. In Chapter 3, we 
saw that regarding Rawls‟s theory, one could imagine both moral and nonmoral 
sources of disapproval given the level of diversity among world-views and values at 
the global level. We mentioned that liberal and decent nonliberal peoples might 
disapprove of each other‟s traditions, habits, political values as well as moral stands 
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on certain issues. As addressed above, Habermas‟s theory supports this claim as well. 
Nevertheless, non-moral disapprovals are viewed as ethical disagreements in the 
theory of Habermas so that disapproval could be either moral or ethical. 
          In Chapter 1, we said that demands of toleration refer to the limits of action that 
could be taken with regard to toleration such as refraining from persecution, assisting 
or fostering. We also analyzed possible demands of toleration with regard to 
international realm. Then in Chapter 2, concerning Rawls‟s theory, we observed that 
one might mention both negative and positive demands of toleration such as 
noninterference, recognition and respect concerning his conception of toleration in 
Political Liberalism. We mentioned that the ethics of citizenship, together with the 
idea of reasonableness brings forth positive demands to Rawls‟s theory regarding 
domestic toleration. In this sense, we mentioned that one might talk of both positive 
dispositions and actions that citizens should perform towards each other. On the other 
hand, in Chapter 3, concerning Rawls‟s international toleration, we have mentioned 
that one can refer to positive dispositions rather than positive actions with regard to 
the demands of toleration. We pointed out that Rawls‟s international toleration seems 
to require positive dispositions from liberal and nonliberal decent peoples in 
recognizing and respecting each other as free and equal members of the Society of 
Peoples. But, as tolerant agents, peoples are not required to assist, foster or engage in 
any other action. 
        In Chapter 4, we also saw that Habermas‟s domestic account of toleration makes 
negative as well as positive demands for dispositions and actions. We said that the 
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citizens of a democratic community should not only refrain from imposing their own 
view on others but they should also try to engage in a reflective dialogue and to 
understand each other‟s differences. In this way, we observed that Habermas‟s 
notions of a „complementary learning process‟ and a „requirement of translation‟ as 
expected actions from secular and religious citizens brings forth positive and 
demanding requirements (actions as well as dispositions) from citizens as tolerant 
members of the democratic community. We said that as requirements of the ethics of 
citizenship, these requirements of toleration come to the fore as part of a demanding 
notion of toleration. We also said that possibly Rawls‟s idea of reasonableness and 
ethics of citizenship would allow such a hermeneutical endeavor by citizens; however 
this is not spelled out explicitly in Rawls‟s theory as it is in Habermas‟s. Thus, in the 
theory of Habermas, toleration, both domestic and international makes positive 
demands that require not only positive dispositions from agents but also positive 
actions such as the „translation requirement‟. That is the difference between the 
theories of Rawls and Habermas concerning the demands of toleration. 
        So far as toleration as an international issue is concerned, as mentioned above, 
we claim that within Habermas‟s theory one could also find positive demands as in 
the case of his domestic toleration. In other words, one might appeal to an idea of a 
hermeneutical reflection which goes beyond negative demands of toleration. In this 
manner, „cosmopolitan solidarity‟ might play a role in generating positive demands 
for tolerant agents in international realm. In arguing this, here the basic problem 
might be that it seems difficult to observe a global democratic community analogous 
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to the case of a domestic democratic society in which one could find duties stemming 
from the ethics of citizenship and civic solidarity. In acknowledging this fact, 
Habermas says that: “even a world-wide consensus on human rights could not serve 
as the basis for a strong equivalent to the civic solidarity that emerged in the 
framework of the nation-state. Civic solidarity is rooted in particular collective 
identities; cosmopolitan solidarity has to support itself on the moral universalism of 
human rights alone”195 In this sense, we might claim that the demands of toleration 
stemming from a cosmopolitan solidarity will be limited to those yielded by human 
rights in the theory of Habermas. 
        Nevertheless, one could also claim that in mentioning the difference between 
civic solidarity and cosmopolitan solidarity, Habermas is not being pessimistic about 
the potentials of a cosmopolitan citizenship. This is especially evident in his thoughts 
regarding the EU and the possibility of a political context which would allow the 
flourishing of a cosmopolitan solidarity with certain political and moral ties (if not 
ethical). In this way, he stresses that a communicative understanding of democracy 
cannot rely on a concretist understanding of a „people‟ which is based on pre-political 
kinship ties.
196
 For him, “Only a democratic citizenship that does not close itself off 
in a particularistic fashion can pave the way for a world citizenship, which is already 
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taking shape today in worldwide political communications.”197 Hence, for him, for a 
cosmopolitan citizenship and solidarity to emerge, it is necessary to give up the idea 
of a „people‟ which is based on exclusionary ties such as ethnicity, nation and 
religion within the context of Europe as well as in the global realm. 
         In line with the above-mentioned remark, we might say that for Habermas, a 
politically constituted communicative context is necessary for the idea of 
cosmopolitan solidarity to flourish. In this manner, he says:  
“The initial impetus to integration in the direction of a postnational society is not 
provided by the substrate of a supposed “European People” but by the communicative 
network of a European-wide political public sphere embodied in a shared political 
culture. The latter is founded on a civil society composed of interest groups, 
nongovernmental organizations and citizen initiatives and movements and will be 
occupied by arenas in which the political parties can directly address the decisions of 
European institutions and go beyond more tactical alliance to form a European party 
system.”198  
 
Thus, we might contend that for Habermas, an emerging common political culture 
and civil society across and beyond national borders could foster the development of 
a cosmopolitan solidarity as well. 
        Moreover, concerning the demands of international toleration, we might also 
claim that from Habermas‟s view, one could appeal to an ideal in terms of assuming a 
hermeneutical opening up towards the other and taking the position of the other in the 
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global realm which should direct the action of citizens as well as states and 
international communities of faith. This sort of demand might follow from 
Habermas‟s notions of a „complementary learning process‟ and a „translation 
requirement‟ that he envisioned regarding domestic societies. In other words, as 
tolerant agents in a post-secular age, we could appeal to a sort of cosmopolitan ethics 
of citizenship which might guide our action and which might allow different agents 
of international toleration to engage in dialogue in the sense of intercultural, inter-
civilizational hermeneutical reflection. We might find the sources of such a view esp. 
concerning Habermas‟s hope for a consensus on human rights:  
“A hermeneutical reflection on the starting point of a human rights discourse among 
participants of different cultures draws out attention to normative contents that are 
present in the tacit presuppositions of any discourse whose goal is mutual understanding. 
That is, independently of their cultural backgrounds all the participants intuitively know 
quite well that a consensus based on conviction cannot come about as long as 
symmetrical relations do not exist among them- relations of mutual recognition, mutual 
role taking, a shared willingness to consider one‟s own tradition with the eyes of the 
stranger and to learn from one another, and so forth.”199 
 
 
Here, we might say that demands such as the “complementary learning” and the 
“translation requirement” among different communities of faith as well as secular 
viewpoints in the global realm might be viewed as ideals that one should aspire to 
just as the presuppositions of ideal discourse whose goal is mutual understanding. In 
this manner, they could be considered as positive demands of international toleration 
from a Habermasian point of view. One might not find the strong bonds of ethical 
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responsibility at the international realm from which the demands stem from, however 
the ideal of cosmopolitan solidarity might support these demands as guiding 
principles.  
        In envisioning a hermeneutical conversation between civilizations and cultures 
of the world, we might claim that Habermas is not being unrealistic. He is very much 
aware of the reality of the international realm. Nevertheless, he pictures an ideal 
situation concerning how we should act to tolerate in the international realm. In this 
manner he says:  
“To be sure the West still retains privileged access to the resources of power, wealth and 
knowledge in our world. But is it in our own best interest that the Western project of 
developing a just and peaceful global civilization should not be discredited from the 
outset thus the Judeo-Hellenic-Christian West must reflect on one of its greatest cultural 
achievements, the capacity for decentering one‟s own perspectives, for self-reflection, 
and for self-critical distancing for one‟s own traditions, The West must refrain from 
using any non-discursive means in the hermeneutical conversation between cultures and 
must become just one voice among others.”200 
 
Here Habermas points out the significance of establishing a conversation in which 
each party is equal for the project of a peaceful and just world-civilization. In this 
manner, the principle of toleration demands that each party should view each other as 
equal participants and respect this status of each other. We will see the significance of 
the idea of respect as a reason for toleration in the theory of Habermas in the 
following parts of the Chapter. 
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5. 1.4.1. Limits of Toleration as an International Issue and Human Rights 
        In Chapter 4, regarding the limits of toleration (what could be tolerated and what 
could not), we said that for Habermas, conceptually speaking, one might not refer to 
toleration of something that is based on prejudice such as race. One needs 
„subjectively good reasons‟ for tolerating something that she disapproves/dislikes. 
One might claim the same for international toleration as well. In this sense, we cannot 
say that we tolerate the race or ethnicity of a nation or group of people. In this case, 
we do not ask for the racist to be more tolerant but we do ask her to leave her 
prejudice.  
        We also observed that in terms of what is to be tolerated in the substantive 
sense; Habermas does not refer to any limits from the outset. We said that for him, it 
is significant that the limits concerning what is to be tolerated should be justifiable to 
all in a political community. Democratic deliberation and will formation define the 
justifiable limits of toleration in Habermas‟s theory. We also mentioned both Rawls‟s 
and Habermas‟s theories are similar in not defining any substantive limits for 
toleration in advance. We said they both set procedural limits such as reasonableness 
in Rawls‟s theory and discourse ethics in Habermas‟s theory. We observed that in 
both situations, the deliberative public forum of citizens defines what is tolerable and 
what is not. 
        As far as international aspect of toleration is concerned, the idea of human rights 
plays a significant role in the theory of Habermas. In the first Chapter, we have 
observed that human rights can raise questions of toleration in the international realm 
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in three possible ways: First they can ascribe a right to toleration, i.e. right to religion, 
right to expression. Second, they can set limits to what is tolerable and what is not. 
And thirdly, the universalism of human rights confronts the reality of cultural 
diversity. Now, we will see that Habermas mentions human rights in regard to all 
these three possible ways in which the question of toleration comes to the fore. 
        As mentioned, one of the ways human rights raise questions of toleration is that 
it sets limits to what is tolerable in the international realm. There is a potential in the 
view of Habermas to consider human rights in that manner. Habermas develops an 
account of human rights and we can treat his account as setting limits to international 
toleration even though Habermas himself does not explicitly relate his thinking on 
human rights to toleration in that way. Habermas is aware of the fact that it is difficult 
to speak of a fully developed democratic global public forum, as in the case of 
domestic democratic communities that could be responsible for drawing the limits of 
toleration. By acknowledging the difficulty of setting standards globally in a 
legitimate way, he recognizes human rights as the sole legitimate source of rightful 
conduct in international realm:  
“In the transformation from nation states to a cosmopolitan order, it is hard to say which 
poses the greater danger: the disappearing world of sovereign subjects of international 
law, who lost their innocence long ago, or the ambiguous mish-mash of supranational 
institutions and conferences, which can grant a dubious Legitimation but which depend 
as always on the good will of powerful states and alliances. In this volatile situation, 
human rights provide the sole recognized basis of legitimation for the politics of the 
international community; nearly every state has by now accepted, at least on paper, the 
United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.”201  
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Thus, Habermas attaches a significant role to human rights as legitimate rules that 
have the potential to guide international politics. We might say that human rights are 
potentially legitimate candidates for setting the limits to what is tolerable and what is 
not for Habermas. 
        In recognizing human rights as the sole basis of legitimation, Habermas is aware 
of the reality that under current conditions, acting to implement human rights might 
bring the risk of paternalism. He says: “whoever acts with an awareness of the 
temporary unavoidability of paternalism also knows that the force they exercise does 
not yet possess the character of a legal coercion legitimated by democratic 
cosmopolitan order. Moral norms, which appeal to our better judgment may not be 
enforced like established legal norms.”202 Hence, for him, intolerance on the basis of 
protecting human rights can only be fully justified in a cosmopolitan democratic 
world order. This is because, for Habermas, basic rights as human rights are both 
legal and moral norms. Yet, they will be fully institutionalized only under a 
cosmopolitan world order that is only now beginning to shape. Without the full 
conditions of cosmopolitan framework that will give them legal force, human rights 
as only moral norms would remain too strong for misuse and too weak for protection 
of needy in the absence of law.
203
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        Does that mean abandoning the victims of violations of human rights to 
themselves? Certainly that is not the case. Habermas considers the existing 
regulations of international law as guidelines for intervention. Thus he points out: 
“When there is no other way, democratic neighboring states must be permitted to 
intervene in an emergency in accordance with customary international law. But in 
such cases, the incompleteness of the cosmopolitan condition demands exceptional 
sensitivity. The existing institutions and procedures are the only available controls on 
the fallible judgment of a partisan actor who presumes to act on behalf of all.”204 In 
this manner, we might say that in a world in which cosmopolitan constitutional 
democracy is not achieved, one has to rely on the existing international regulations as 
criteria for the boundaries of toleration and intolerant conduct. One might say that the 
international regulations are viewed as complementary to the idea of human rights in 
building steps towards a cosmopolitan world-order. Accordingly, in the view of 
Habermas, human rights still play a role in defining the boundaries regarding what is 
tolerable as ideal moral guidelines even though we do not yet have a cosmopolitan 
constitutional democracy in the global realm. 
        Furthermore, Habermas also acknowledges human rights as raising another 
question of toleration: universalism of human rights confronting the reality of cultural 
diversity. In this respect, he says that “the general validity, content and ranking of 
human rights are as contested as ever.” 205 Here he refers to the challenge and 
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criticism of non- Western cultures that Western human rights are too 
individualistic.
206
 In referring specifically to the Asian Values debate, he points out 
that the criticism of those countries regarding individualism is based on their belief 
that the cultures of their societies are more communitarian than Western culture.  For 
Habermas, the debate on „Asian Values‟ has taken a false turn in focusing on 
individual and community in hierarchical terms. He says that “individual rights 
provide a kind of protective belt for the individual‟s private conduct of life in two 
ways: rights protect the conscientious pursuit of an ethical life project just as much as 
they secure an orientation toward personal preferences free of moral scrutiny.”207 In 
this sense, individual rights (human rights) secure the basis of any form of life or the 
pursuit of ethical project, be it communitarian or not.  Thus, we might say that 
Habermas recognizes that human rights prescribe a right to toleration in the 
international realm. 
        In addition to the role of human rights and in relation to toleration in the theory 
of Habermas, we might add a further dimension which is related to the way Habermas 
considers the justification of those very rights. For him, human rights are based on 
secular foundations in which the principle of autonomy is prescribed. They do not 
derive their meaning from any metaphysical or religious worldview. In this respect, 
one might point out a parallel between Joshua Cohen‟s approach as a Rawlsian view 
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on human rights and that of Habermas in seeing human rights as independent.
208
  He 
says:  
“The European conception of human rights is open to attack by the spokespersons of 
other cultures not only because the concept of autonomy gives human rights an 
individualistic character but also because autonomy implies a secularized political 
authority uncoupled from religious or cosmological worldviews. In the view of Islamic, 
Christian, or Jewish fundamentalists, their own truth claim is absolute in the sense that it 
deserves to be enforced even by means of political power, if necessary. This outlook has 
consequences for the exclusive character of polity; legitimations based on religions or 
worldviews of this sort are incompatible with the inclusion of equally entitled non-
believers or persons of other persuasions.”209 
 
Here we might claim that the secular nature of human rights in Habermas‟s view 
supports the principle of toleration as embedded in the foundation of the idea of 
human rights. By not having its source in any religious doctrine, the idea of human 
rights acknowledges the principle of toleration. 
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        Before leaving human rights as they relate to toleration, we should note certain 
significant differences concerning the content and role of human rights between the 
theories of Habermas and Rawls. Regarding the content of human rights, In Chapter 
3, we observed that Rawls subscribes to a minimalist conception of human rights. He 
limits the content of human rights to “right to life (to the means of subsistence and 
security; to liberty (to freedom from slavery, serfdom, and forced occupation, and to a 
sufficient measure of liberty of conscious to ensure freedom of religion and thought); 
to property (personal property); and to formal equality as expressed by the rules of 
natural justice (that is, that similar cases be treated similarly)”.210 Habermas‟s list of 
human rights would demand more than that in terms of the content. This seems to be 
clear in his viewing human rights as „freedom of moderns‟ expressed in Kant‟s 
fundamental right to equal individual liberties.
211
 In other words, it seems Habermas 
goes for a much fuller set of basic rights and liberties.  
        Concerning the role of human rights, there is also a difference between the 
outlooks of Habermas and Rawls. We said that for Rawls, the role of human rights is 
limited to setting the limits to what is tolerable in the international realm. In this 
sense, we mentioned that Rawls limits the role of human rights to the international 
realm. For Habermas, unlike Rawls, human rights have both a domestic and an 
international role. Thus, they constitute legitimate claims and secure the basic 
liberties of citizens at both the national and international level. This role of human 
rights is valid regardless of their intervention-justifying role in the theory of 
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Habermas. In line with this, Rawls and Habermas disagree on the limits of HR: Rawls 
does not require the existence of democratic liberal institutions for a fully legitimate 
and stable system of rights neither at the domestic nor at the international level, 
whereas for Habermas liberal democratic institutions are necessary both at the 
domestic and international level for realization of a fully legitimate and stable system 
of rights.
212
 
        Both regarding the content and role of human rights, the difference between 
Rawls and Habermas seems to be based on principle: Rawls subscribes to 
internationalism in recognizing the moral significance of „peoples‟ whereas 
Habermas takes a more cosmopolitan view by mentioning world society as one 
community. At first sight, it might be expected that Habermas would be more 
intervention- supportive at the international level. However, this does not seem to be 
the case. In recognizing the world as it is now, Habermas considers the relevance and 
role of states as significant agents in international realm for thinking of matters of 
intervention and intolerance. This does not mean that he believes in the moral 
relevance and significance of borders. This is to say that even though Rawls and 
Habermas differ in principle, they have similar standpoints concerning practice. 
5.2. Respect as a Reason for Toleration as an International Issue   
         In Chapter 1, we outlined possible reasons for toleration as an international issue 
such as prudential nonmoral, moral consequentialist, moral principled and skepticism. 
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And in Chapter 3, we observed that John Rawls subscribes to „respect for persons‟ as 
a reason for toleration. We said that peoples replace persons at the international level 
in the international theory of Rawls. In this way, we saw that liberal and nonliberal 
decent peoples, by viewing each other as equal and free members of the Society of 
reasonable peoples, grant respect to each other as a basis for toleration. 
        In Habermas‟s theory, respect is a reason for toleration as well.  We might say 
that different cultures, civilizations and communities of faith and persons in viewing 
each other as equal members of a reflective dialogue/discourse; grant respect to each 
other. To recall, in the part on the demands of toleration, we observed that 
hermeneutical conversation might be regarded as a demand of toleration in 
Habermas‟s theory. Here we will claim that the idea of respect as a reason for 
toleration can be considered as embedded in Habermas‟s notion of a „hermeneutical 
self-reflective dialogue‟ in the global realm. In addition to this, we might also say that 
the idea of respect is coupled with the recognition of difference in the outlook of 
Habermas. Below, we will try to explain how respect comes to the fore as a reason 
for toleration in the theory of Habermas. 
        In Chapter 4, we had observed that for toleration to be possible there should be 
the condition of „social acceptance‟. Here concerning Habermas‟s international 
toleration, we could refer to the same condition.”Social acceptance” comes to the fore 
as a condition for toleration and intercultural dialogue. We might say that each 
culture, civilization and community should accept the fact that they have to share the 
same world society even though they disapprove of each other‟s worldviews. In this 
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manner, „social acceptance‟ seems to be a first requirement for respecting and (thus 
tolerating) the equal status of different cultures and civilizations in the international 
realm. “Social acceptance‟ in the international context means accepting that each 
culture and civilization has the equal right to be part of the same world society with 
their distinctiveness and difference. In this sense, no culture or society could have any 
claim to impose its own world-view on others by using either violence or state power 
since each party has to recognize the fact that each culture and civilization are equal 
in status in sharing the same world society.
213
 
        As we mentioned, in Habermas‟s theory, granting respect to each other means 
granting respect to the equal status of each culture and civilization and this is the 
reason why we should tolerate. In this sense, respect and so, toleration requires a 
reflexive consciousness in which each party views the other as equal in status. Here 
he thinks that this is possible on the condition that modern faith becomes reflexive. 
Thus, Habermas says modern faith “can only stabilize itself through self-critical 
awareness of the status it assumes within a universe of discourse restricted by secular 
knowledge and shared with other religions.”214 Becoming aware of the diversity and 
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equal status of all faiths, each culture or community grants respect to each other‟s 
status as equal and does not impose its own faith on others. 
         In this regard, Habermas also points out a parallel between his view and that of 
Rawls: “Furthermore, the reflexive consciousness which has learnt to see itself 
through the eyes of the others is constitutive of what John Rawls calls the 
reasonableness of “reasonable comprehensive doctrines”. This has the important 
political consequence that the community of faithful can know why it must refrain 
from the use of violence, and especially of state- sponsored violence as a means of 
imposing religious truths. “215 Here it might be claimed that what Habermas calls 
“self-reflective consciousnesses‟ is similar to Rawls‟s idea of “reasonableness” 
because both of the ideas refer to a certain type of disposition expected from the 
parties (be it peoples or civilizations) which would allow them to tolerate each other‟s 
worldviews and opinions. 
        Concerning the idea of respect as a reason for toleration, there is a significant 
difference between domestic and international toleration in the theory of Habermas. 
In the case of domestic toleration, respect comes as a requirement of ethics of 
citizenship in a political society in which citizens are viewed as equal and free 
members of that community. They are bound by solidarity towards each other as 
members of the same political community. On the other hand, in the case of 
multicultural world society, it is still not possible to find this solidarity or an ethics of 
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citizenship of the sort that characterizes domestic democratic society. Thus, in the 
international realm, respect seems to come onto the scene as a result of the 
recognition of each other‟s difference and equal status as different communities as 
members of the same multicultural world society. In this manner, respect as a reason 
for international toleration in the theory of Habermas does not presuppose a thick 
ethical idea of citizenship through which one could make demands on citizens. As we 
observed before, cosmopolitan citizenship and solidarity as emerging ideals might 
support the idea of respect as a reason for toleration in its emphasis on viewing each 
other as equal members of the same world society. 
        In Chapter 3, we saw that in Rawls‟s theory, respect and toleration require 
liberal peoples to refrain from offering incentives to nonliberal decent peoples in the 
theory of Rawls. In this respect, we might mention a difference between the outlooks 
of Habermas and Rawls. We might claim that respect, for Habermas, would not 
necessarily exclude the offering of incentives as it does for Rawls. It seems Habermas 
supports certain changes that would help a society to transform in a more democratic 
and liberal direction and does not see incentivizing this process as something contrary 
to the idea of respect. This does not mean to say that Habermas does not tolerate 
nonliberal societies. He too believes that intervention and intolerance needs serious 
justification. However, it seems he does not view political power as Rawls does; in 
totally inclusive terms such as offering incentives means an intervention that would 
violate the principle of respect and toleration. In this sense, in one of his discussions 
on humanitarian intervention, he says: “A prescient politics of peacekeeping must 
 
 
189 
 
take into account the complex social and political causes of war. What is urgently 
needed are strategies designed to influence- where possible, in nonviolent manner- 
the internal order of formally sovereign states whose goal is to foster self-sustaining 
economies and tolerable social conditions, equal democratic participation, the rule of 
law, and a culture of tolerance”.216 Here Habermas does not make a distinction among 
sovereign states according to whether they are decent peoples or not in Rawlsian 
sense. It seems any state which is sovereign and willing to develop in a more 
democratic direction might be regarded as the target of assistance.  
        Above, we outlined the characteristics of and reasons for toleration as an 
international issue as far as the theory of Jurgen Habermas is concerned. In this 
manner, we made reference to our conceptual map that was developed in Chapter 1 as 
well as our analysis of the theory of Rawls in Chapter 3. We observed that, judged by 
our conceptual map on toleration, Habermas‟s theory exhibits an idea of international 
toleration.  We also saw that there were certain significant parallels and differences 
between the theories of Rawls and Habermas concerning the characteristics and 
grounds of international toleration. In the subsequent concluding part of the 
dissertation, we will assemble the discussion we made so far regarding the grounds 
and limits of toleration as an international issue. We also aim to point out certain 
dimensions of the comparison that we made so far between the outlooks of Rawls and 
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Habermas with respect to the characteristics of and reasons for toleration and its 
international aspect. 
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CHAPTER 6 
FURTHER REFLECTIONS ON THE POSSIBLE DIMENSIONS OF A 
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TOLERATION FOR THE 21
ST
 CENTURY 
       The detailed comparison between the theories of Rawls and Habermas on 
international toleration demonstrated that there are many parallels that provide a 
common ground for international toleration between Rawls and Habermas. After an 
analysis of the both outlooks with respect to the grounds and limits of toleration, we 
concluded that both offer an account of international toleration that is based on a 
principled moral justification. Moreover, we demonstrated that their theories provide 
the basis for deriving the characteristics of toleration as an international issue. In this 
way, Rawls and Habermas illustrate how we might think of toleration as an 
international issue. By interpreting their theories, we demonstrated that international 
toleration is possible. They showed us there is and there should be a place for 
toleration at the international level by recognizing pluralism as a global condition and 
providing moral principled reasons for toleration.  
        The comparative analysis we made between the theories of Rawls and Habermas 
has also given us chance to reflect on which dimensions a theory of international 
toleration should address and in which way it should do so. Addressing the strong and 
weak points of both theories in a comparative way proved significance for a further 
reflection on how we can consider the limits and grounds of international toleration 
for a multicultural world society of 21
st
 century. Below, I will focus on each 
dimension of toleration that we analyzed so far for the purpose of exploring the 
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possibility and features of a theory of international toleration for a pluralistic 
multicultural world. 
        First of all, we began our analysis by stating that both Rawls and Habermas 
consider toleration as a requirement of international justice. Both Rawls and 
Habermas ask the question how it is possible to live together in peace and stability as 
people having diverse world-views in a pluralistic world- society. The answer they 
give is toleration. Yet, toleration comes to the fore as a necessary and significant 
component of the justice argument: a just world is possible with the endorsement of 
the principle of toleration.  
        I agree with both Rawls and Habermas on the close connection between 
toleration and justice in the international realm. Toleration, without being part of a 
justice argument, might still retain its significance, but it might not do any more than 
serving for status quo in the international realm. For sure, toleration as a moral idea 
has a significant role in establishing peace and stability, yet this is a minimal and 
necessary role that toleration can play in the international realm. As a requirement of 
justice and a necessity of justice, toleration bears a more significant place in the 
international normative theory. Like both Habermas and Rawls, I contend that we 
need a strong moral role for toleration in our theorizing for a pluralist world in 21
st
 
century. 
        On our way to lay out different dimensions of international toleration, first, we 
began with considering the characteristics (structure) of international toleration.  In 
this vein, we pointed out possible agents of international toleration. We said the 
differences between the two theories stem mainly from Habermas‟s cosmopolitan 
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standpoint as opposed to Rawls‟s internationalism. As we have seen, Habermas‟s 
commitment to a cosmopolitan standpoint leads him to viewing the agents of 
toleration in a broader and more flexible way than Rawls, even though he does not 
clearly state which international agents count as agents of international toleration. It 
seems one might think of a variety of agents such as individuals, cultural groups and 
international organizations in the theory of Habermas whereas in Rawls‟s outlook, 
only people as corporate entities figure as agents. One might contend that Habermas‟s 
position is more compatible with the contemporary global pluralistic condition since 
it can leave room for plural and diverse agents. Treating peoples as the only agents of 
international toleration seems to disregard the highly pluralistic and diverse nature of 
the global realm. However, on the other hand, Habermas seems to overemphasize the 
category of civilization in the international realm. Civilizations are such broad and 
general categories that they may not leave enough room for the diversity inherent in 
each culture and society.  
         My contention is that a theory of international toleration must be clear on which 
of the international agents count as agents of international toleration. Habermas‟s 
theory seems to be vague on this point. On the other hand, Rawls‟s insistence on 
peoples seems to be too narrow as an approach when we consider the highly 
pluralistic world of the 21
st
 century in which a variety of agents can enter into 
relations of toleration. I think we can refer to states, different international 
organizations, NGOs, individuals, various types of collectivities such as communities 
of faith, cultural groups, and organizations of different global social movements as 
possible agents of international toleration. Here it is important to mention that even 
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individuals can count as agent since they also can have some influence on the conduct 
of another agent in the international realm.  
        Secondly, condition of diversity was analyzed as one of the characteristics of 
international toleration. We mentioned that both theories of Rawls and Habermas 
recognize global pluralism and conflict as a fact. We said, in this regard, their theories 
satisfy the condition of diversity coupled with disapproval as a circumstance of 
international toleration.  They prove that their theories are realistic in taking pluralism 
seriously. Here, I share the point that a theory of international toleration for our times 
must definitely start from the fact of pluralism as a global condition. 
        As another strong point in the outlooks of Rawls and Habermas, we stated, both 
of the theories recognize the role of power in issues of toleration as an international 
matter. In this regard, we could say that this is also an important feature of a theory of 
international toleration. In the international realm, different agents might have 
different degrees of power to influence the conduct of each other, yet no actor is 
wholly immune from the power of others and no actor is wholly incapable of exerting 
power on the others. 
        We noted scope, demands and limits of international toleration. We observed 
that both the theories of Rawls and Habermas accept that there might be both moral 
and nonmoral sources of conflict in the international realm. I also share this intuition: 
one might think of various sources and reasons for disapproval in the international 
realm. These sources can be cultural, aesthetic, economic etc. However, we might 
also contend that they are the moral reasons of disapproval which have utmost affect 
on our judgment in reacting in an intolerant way in the international realm. This can 
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be more intelligible if we consider that we are more ready to react to something we 
think is morally wrong than something we just think is aesthetically ugly. 
        In our comparison between the theories of Rawls and Habermas, we focused on 
demands of toleration as an international issue too. We mentioned Rawls and 
Habermas differ on the requirements of international toleration. While Rawls mainly 
gives space to positive dispositions within the realm of international toleration, 
Habermas requires both positive action and disposition from the agents of toleration 
in the international realm. He considers an attitude of hermeneutical self-reflection 
and engaging in dialogue for the purpose of understanding each other as necessary 
dimensions of an international account of toleration. Here the question to ask is 
perhaps, whether these dimensions bring a too demanding and unrealistic notion of 
toleration to the agenda. At first instance things might look that way. Nevertheless, if 
we think of these requirements as guiding normative principles rather than empirical 
possibilities, then we could have a firm understanding of Habermas‟s endeavor in 
terms of international toleration. Habermas‟s ideal of cosmopolitan solidarity and 
democratic peace gives content to his „demanding‟ notion of international toleration. 
Toleration is a requirement of international justice and peace, and in this sense, it is 
part of a moral ideal. 
        Another significant question to ask is which of the options one must adopt for a 
theory of international toleration. Should we go for a Rawlsian approach which looks 
less demanding rather than a Habermasian approach which might seem overly 
demanding? Here, I will be on the side of Habermas in arguing for a more demanding 
notion of international toleration. The requirements such as willing to understand the 
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other, being open to dialogue and hermeneutical self-reflection as positive 
dispositions are quite important. Moreover, Habermas‟s notions of „translation 
requirement‟ and „complementary learning‟ seem to be quite significant as positive 
actions that are required for toleration. They might play a significant role as 
normative guidelines that can inspire our action in our interactions with the other in 
the international realm. In this regard, they are part of a cosmopolitan democratic 
ideal. 
         With respect to the limits of international toleration, we observed that for both 
Rawls and Habermas, human rights play a role. For both of the theories, human rights 
are candidates to draw the line of what is tolerable and what is not in the international 
realm.  In my opinion, they are both right in considering human rights as standards 
for international toleration. It is significant to appeal to limits since toleration is not 
an absolute good; referring to toleration always means referring to its limits at the 
same time. In this respect, human rights, as moral and legal standards, give us chance 
to reflect on the tolerable conduct in the international realm. In this sense, they 
exhibit an intervention-justifying role. Nevertheless, we need to keep in mind that 
they are both legal and moral rights; appealing only to their moral dimension might 
lead to misuse.      
        Beside their common emphasis on human rights as limits of toleration, Rawls 
and Habermas differ on the content and role of human rights and it seems to be a 
difference in principle. As we stated, unlike Rawls, Habermas does not subscribe to a 
minimalism in terms of the content of human rights. Moreover, for him, human rights 
require that for a regime to have full legitimacy, it must have a liberal democratic 
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framework. Only with that condition, can human rights play a legitimate role 
regarding toleration in the international realm. For Rawls, this condition is not 
necessary. Despite this difference of principle, they do not differ much in practice as 
far as toleration is concerned. Habermas‟s cosmopolitanism is not necessarily more 
eager to justify international intervention than is Rawls‟s internationalism.  
        Having said this, we might claim both Rawls and Habermas have weak points in 
their usage of human rights as standards for international toleration. Habermas does 
not explicitly identify which rights are prior in his theory that can serve as standards 
for toleration. Rawls does not provide us with a justification for his minimal set of 
human rights. In my view, a theory of international toleration must address at least 
two points on the question of human rights: first, which rights are considered as 
standards for international toleration (question of content) and second, how these very 
set of rights we use as standards for tolerable conduct are justified (question of 
legitimacy). 
        On the question of content, as we mentioned before, Habermas seems to favor a 
full set of basic rights without appealing to any minimalism. Nevertheless, this leaves 
us with ambiguity on the issue of limits of toleration. Does Habermas support 
intolerance towards the violation of any kind of basic rights? He does not provide the 
answer of this question directly. My contention is that, he would not be so eager to 
support international intervention in any violation of human rights or even if he 
thinks that intervention is necessary, the type of intervention would differ on the basis 
of which rights are violated. 
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        Rawls answers the question of content by appealing to a minimalist set of human 
rights. He lays down a list of human rights which he considers as limits to tolerable 
conduct in the international realm. However, he does not demonstrate how this set of 
rights can be justifiable to all. He does not argue for his particular set of rights over 
the other alternatives: how his minimalist set is superior over other alternatives in 
terms of justification. 
        In my view, although it seems difficult to come up with an easy solution, a 
theory of international toleration cannot do away with dealing with these two crucial 
questions -content and legitimacy- concerning human rights as standards to 
toleration. We have two options as far as the content of human rights is concerned: 
going for a full set of basic rights as human rights or choosing minimalism for 
limiting the content of human rights. If we choose the first option, then we need to 
identify which rights are prior that could serve as standards for toleration. (That is 
what Habermas needs to do too as have noted before). In both options, we have to 
address the question of legitimacy. 
        Minimalism seems to be required (either in the form of identifying which rights 
are prior or coming up with a minimalist set of rights) if human rights can serve as 
legitimate grounds for international toleration. This is because treating human rights 
as standards to toleration means justifying intolerance on the basis of the violation of 
human rights. If intervention has to be seen as justifiable to all parties in the 
international realm, it seems difficult to appeal to a full set of rights, particularly 
because there may not be a global consensus on the significance of all sorts of rights. 
Without demonstrating that they are justifiable from the point of view of different 
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cultures, civilizations and groups in the international realm, human rights would not 
work as legitimate candidates for justifiable intolerance\intervention. 
        In line with the point mentioned above, we might say that any minimal set of 
rights, if it has to bear some legitimacy, has to be seen as the outcome of a global 
overlapping consensus as a way of justification. In this respect, I find Joshua Cohen‟s 
approach quite appealing as a way to ensure the legitimacy of a possible intolerant act 
which is done on the basis of a violation of a human right. As we have seen in 
Chapter 3 when analyzing the limits of toleration in Rawls‟s theory, Cohen goes a 
step further and does what Rawls did not do, in providing us with a procedure of 
justification that addresses human rights as the outcome of a global overlapping 
consensus.
217
 This means, for him, a theory of human rights should be presented as 
independent from any particular philosophical or religious doctrine that might be 
used to explain and justify its content.  
         Cohen‟s approach provides a solid base for the role of human rights as 
standards for toleration. Human rights set the limits of what states can be required to 
tolerate in other states, such that intervention would be morally justified if those 
limits were transgressed and morally unjustified if they were not. Moreover, Cohen‟s 
approach to human rights is tolerant in that it deals with them in a way that 
recognizes that there are many different comprehensive doctrines embraced by 
different societies and that aims not to impose any one doctrine on people who do not 
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share it. It is like Rawls‟s political liberalism in that it does not rest on any 
comprehensive doctrine but is „freestanding‟ and therefore does not impose any 
comprehensive doctrine on any person or society. 
         In line with the considerations on the limits of international toleration, a theory 
of international toleration must also be able to distinguish between various possible 
types of justifiable intolerance. It seems there is a general belief that intolerance 
necessarily means intervention by force, i.e. military intervention. Nevertheless, one 
can think of other types of influence on an intolerable conduct of a state such as 
economic sanctions, public criticism, initiating a campaign against the conduct that is 
disapproved etc. Intolerance is not necessarily restricted to sending troops to the 
territory of another country. Of course, which type of intolerance might be adopted 
would depend on the character of the intolerable conduct. For instance, a conduct 
such as genocide or mass killing that one state undergoes in its territory might 
necessitate intervention by force whereas other intolerant actions such as a war- prone 
and aggressive speech might necessitate public criticism. Here I do not mean to say 
that theory should provide us a detailed map on which actions are tolerable and what 
are the possible reactions that can be initiated.  Yet, it can give us some insight on 
possible types of intolerance when necessary. As we have seen in the former chapters 
of the dissertation, Rawls is clearer than Habermas on which types of actions can be 
considered as forms of intolerance. For instance, offering incentives to another 
people, public criticism made by a government about a specific conduct of another 
people and waging war figure as possible intolerant actions. However, for Rawls, 
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these are actions that should not be appealed by peoples since there is no room for 
justifiable intolerance in the ideal world of the Law of Peoples. 
          Lastly, we said, both Rawls and Habermas subscribe to moral principled 
reasons for international toleration. We observed, „respect for persons‟ approach 
translate to the international realm in their theories- though with certain 
modifications- as a reason for grounding international toleration. In my opinion too, 
we need to justify toleration in terms of principled moral grounds and „respect for 
persons‟ with certain modifications seems to be the best candidate for that aim. We 
need to grant respect to the equal status of different communities, groups, and peoples 
etc. who share the same world-society. This provides us reasons why we should not 
impose our own comprehensive doctrine on others. It gives reasons for why we 
should react to each other‟s differences in a tolerant way. In addition, moral 
consequentialist reasons and skepticism also find a place in my conception of 
international toleration. Skepticism might play an important role in arguing against 
intolerance and moral consequentialist reasons can serve peace and stability in the 
world in different ways. I do not mean to say that moral consequentialist reasons and 
skepticism provide enough and complete reasons for international toleration. 
However, a theory of international toleration must recognize their relevance; at least 
it should not disregard them totally.  
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
        In this dissertation, it has been argued that toleration has a place in our thinking 
on the international realm and that we can address the characteristics of and reasons 
for toleration as an international issue. We referred to the conceptions of toleration of 
Rawls and Habermas as two supportive theories in order to examine the dimensions 
of international toleration. We also addressed the parallels and differences between 
these two theories as far as their outlook on toleration is concerned to identify their 
strong and weak points as theories of toleration. 
         Chapter 1 was devoted to developing a conceptual map with the aim of having a 
theoretical tool to analyze the theories of Rawls and Habermas in the later stages of 
the dissertation.  In the first part of Chapter 1, we laid out the characteristics 
(structure) of toleration and the possible reasons for toleration. We mentioned that the 
characteristics of toleration also stand for the conditions of the possibility of 
toleration. Thus, agents and objects of toleration, the condition of diversity coupled 
with disapproval, dimension of power, the scope, demands and limits of toleration 
were examined as characteristics of toleration. In addition, we analyzed the possible 
reasons (justifications) for toleration such as nonmoral prudential, moral 
consequentialist, skepticism -though controversial- and moral principled reasons. 
         To recall, in the first part of Chapter 1, we observed that the first characteristic 
of toleration to be considered is agents (tolerator) and objects (tolerated) of toleration. 
It was stated that we could talk about a diversity of agents as well as objects 
depending on the context of toleration. In this way, one might think of „individuals‟, 
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„groups‟ (in various forms such as associations), „societies‟, „states‟ and 
„governments‟ as potential agents of toleration. As for the objects, „beliefs‟, „actions‟, 
„identities‟, habits, etc. were mentioned. Moreover, as a second characteristic of 
toleration, we referred to the condition of diversity coupled with disapproval. We 
added that for toleration to be possible we need more than diversity or any diversity; 
it needs to be diversity that is a source of dislike, disapproval or disgust.  
        Thirdly, we cited the condition of power as a characteristic of toleration. We 
made a distinction between tolerant conduct and a tolerant disposition. We saw that 
for tolerant conduct, in order for X to tolerate Y, X needs to have the actual power to 
act otherwise (i.e. not to tolerate). For a tolerant disposition, we mentioned that for X 
to tolerate Y, X does not need to have the actual power but it is necessary that X 
would not act on her objection even if she had the power to do so. 
        Finally, the scope, demands and limits of toleration as characteristics and 
conditions of possibility of toleration were noted. We observed that the scope of 
toleration relates to whether toleration needs to be defined on the basis of a morally 
grounded disapproval or simple dislike/disgust. In this vein, it was mentioned that we 
might imagine both moral and nonmoral sources of disapproval or dislike when 
defining toleration. Furthermore, we observed that the demands of toleration concerns 
whether toleration requires only refraining from persecuting or something more, such 
as assisting, fostering etc.  Demands refer to the limits of the action that could be 
taken with reference to toleration. Lastly, the limits of toleration were considered. By 
limits, we signified what could be tolerated and what could not; what could be the 
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object of toleration and what could not. In addition to the conceptual limits of 
toleration, it was stated that we could refer to the limits in the substantive sense in 
terms of what ought to be tolerated and what ought not. 
        In the first part of Chapter 1 in which a conceptual map for toleration was 
developed, we also pointed out the possible reasons for toleration. By reasons for 
toleration, we meant the justification of toleration. We referred to four possible 
reasons: nonmoral prudential, moral consequentialist, skepticism and moral 
principled. We observed that non-moral prudential reasons are the reasons that are 
solely motivated by the self-interest of the tolerator. On the other hand, it was stated 
that in moral consequentialist reasons, we tolerate for the sake of the consequence 
that we expect to achieve out of the conduct of tolerance but the consequence is not 
calculated on the basis of merely the self-interest of the tolerator. Hence, we observed 
that the moral consequentialist reasons are other- regarding in taking the interests of 
the others into account.  
        Moreover, we mentioned „respect for persons‟ as a moral principled reason.  It 
was pointed out that „respect for persons‟ is founded on the idea which considers 
individuals as self-legislating beings that are capable of pursuing a way of life which 
they think is good for them. We have seen that this way of reasoning gives principled 
moral reasons for toleration because toleration is not treated as a means to achieve an 
end. Lastly, skepticism was mentioned as a controversial candidate for being a reason 
for toleration. It was stated that skepticism does not offer straightforward reasons for 
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toleration but it could erase the ground for intolerance by referring to epistemological 
uncertainty and doubt regarding beliefs. 
        In the second part of Chapter 1, we developed the argument of the dissertation 
that there is a place for toleration in our thinking on the international realm. First, we 
examined the possible reasons for disregarding toleration as an international issue. It 
was mentioned that the Westphalian model and its influence constituted the main 
reason for the neglect of toleration as an international issue. We also argued that this 
model, in viewing states  as lacking either the actual power to intervene in the affairs 
of other states or the right to interfere in the affairs of the other states, considers that 
there is no need and place for toleration in the international realm. Nevertheless, we 
claimed that this model and its assumptions proved to be implausible under the 
contemporary international conditions in which each state might have an actual 
influence on other states and there might also be cases in which certain international 
agents have the right to interfere in the affairs of states in particular situations. We 
observed that toleration might be regarded as a question of rightful conduct in the 
international realm and therefore, there is certainly a place for toleration in the 
international realm. 
        After dealing with the possible reasons for the neglect of toleration as an 
international issue, we turned our attention to demonstrating in which way toleration 
is part of our thinking on the international realm. In order to do this, we pointed out 
certain examples from the actual international discourse such as humanitarian 
intervention, human rights, gender and environmental issues. We claimed that each of 
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these cases raises questions of toleration in the international realm. In addition to this, 
we also referred to the theories of certain political theorists such as Peter Jones and 
Michael Walzer to support our argument that there is a place for toleration in our 
thinking of international realm. Furthermore, we referred to the conceptual map 
developed in the first part of Chapter 1 in terms of the characteristics of and reasons 
for toleration as an international issue. We analyzed each dimension with reference to 
the international aspect of toleration. This conceptual analysis demonstrated that 
toleration has a place in our thinking on the international realm. 
        After developing the argument and stating the parameters of our analysis in 
Chapter 1, we began our discussion of the theories of Rawls and Habermas 
concerning toleration. In Chapter 2, we analyzed Rawls‟s conception of toleration in 
Political Liberalism and, in the third Chapter, we focused on his theory of 
international toleration. Throughout this analysis, we made reference to our 
conceptual map that was developed in chapter 1. We observed that there are certain 
parallels and differences between the conception of toleration in Political Liberalism 
and The Law of Peoples both concerning the characteristics of and reasons for 
toleration. 
        First of all, we observed that in both Political Liberalism and The Law of 
Peoples, toleration comes to the fore as a requirement of justice. We saw that for 
Rawls, toleration is a principle which is necessary for establishing the fundamentals 
of a political conception of justice. By being freestanding and political, justice as 
fairness refrains from basing its principles on any specific comprehensive doctrine 
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and for this reason, it does not impose any comprehensive doctrine on others. Thus, 
toleration is central to the project of political liberalism and justice. 
         As far as The Law of Peoples is concerned, we said that international toleration 
might be regarded as a requirement of justice too. For Rawls, rights and obligations 
of a just arrangement among peoples make toleration necessary. Well-ordered -liberal 
and decent- societies act on the principles that they have worked out and that gives a 
reason to tolerate each other as societies who recognize each other as equal members 
of the society of reasonable peoples.  
         In Chapter 2, first, we focused on the agents and objects of toleration as 
characteristic of toleration. We observed that in Political Liberalism, free and equal 
citizens as holders of various reasonable comprehensive doctrines are considered to 
be the agents of toleration. In The Law of Peoples, we saw that liberal and decent 
non-liberal „peoples‟ came to the fore as agents of toleration.  We said that „peoples‟ 
in The Law of Peoples take the place of persons in Political Liberalism. As for the 
objects of toleration in the theory of Rawls, we mentioned that in Political Liberalism 
different values, habits, traditions, beliefs as well as actions of reasonable citizens 
might be regarded as the objects of toleration. In a parallel vein, we observed that, in 
The Law of Peoples different traditions, belief systems, values as well as conduct of 
decent and liberal peoples are the possible objects of toleration.          
       With respect to diversity coupled with disapproval as one of the characteristics 
and conditions of possibility of toleration, we examined that Rawls‟s theory satisfies 
this condition both regarding his domestic and international account of toleration. We 
observed that in Political Liberalism, reasonable pluralism constitutes the condition 
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of diversity for toleration to be possible. Also, it was pointed out that we might think 
of disapproval/ dislike as a component of reasonable pluralism because it seems 
likely that disapproval/ dislike among citizens regarding one another‟s actions, beliefs 
etc. will be an outcome of their holding different comprehensive doctrines. 
Concerning Rawls‟s conception of toleration as an international issue, it was 
demonstrated similarly that we can identify a condition of diversity coupled with 
disapproval/dislike. We said that we might refer to pluralism between liberal and 
decent nonliberal peoples and it seems likely that this diversity might be the source of 
disapproval/ dislike. We mentioned that various kinds of disagreement and 
disapproval might arise between liberal and nonliberal decent peoples, and amongst 
different liberal peoples and different nonliberal decent peoples.                          
        In outlining the characteristics of toleration in the theory of Rawls, we also noted 
that his theory satisfies the power condition of toleration. It was pointed out that the 
citizens of a well-ordered society might have the actual power to act on their 
objections; however they would refrain from doing so for toleration reasons. In 
addition, we said that citizens might be considered as having tolerant dispositions 
since even if they had the actual power, they would not act on their objection. In this 
sense, good Rawlsian citizens might be regarded as having tolerant dispositions. As 
for The Law of Peoples, we argued that, although we can talk of the condition of 
power concerning tolerant conduct, Rawls‟s concern is mainly about peoples having 
tolerant dispositions in the international realm. 
        Lastly, we referred to the scope, demands and limits of toleration in Rawls‟s 
theory. We said that in both Political Liberalism and The Law of Peoples, one might 
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think of moral and nonmoral sources of disapproval as far as the scope of toleration is 
concerned. It was mentioned that citizens might find certain values and practices of 
other citizens which are informed by their particular comprehensive doctrine, as 
morally wrong or aesthetically ugly or dislikeable for many different reasons. In a 
similar vein, it was noted that in the Society of Peoples, liberal and decent nonliberal 
peoples might have quite varied (moral and nonmoral) reasons for their disapproval 
or dislike of one another‟s societies. 
        As for the demands of toleration, we noted that in Political Liberalism  the ideal 
of citizenship together with the idea of reasonableness requires more than merely 
refraining from persecution. It was pointed out that one might refer to positive 
demands in terms of both action and disposition as far as Rawls‟s domestic toleration 
is concerned. On the other hand, we mentioned that demands require positive 
disposition but not necessarily positive action in Rawls‟s account of international 
toleration. 
        It was noted that the idea of reasonableness defines the limits of what is tolerable 
and what is not in Political Liberalism. It was conceded that Rawls seems to propose 
that comprehensive doctrines that gain the status of reasonableness in public realm 
are tolerated because, by being reasonable, they already demonstrate that they move 
within the boundaries of the appropriate principles of justice. Citizens tolerate each 
other‟s views and actions because they know that disagreement does not give them 
the right to be intolerant given the fact that all other citizens are also reasonable. As 
for The Law of Peoples, we claimed that decency draws the boundaries of what is 
tolerable and what is not. What is identifiable as decent peoples and their conduct to 
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the extent that they comply with the reasonable principles of the Society of Peoples, 
is considered tolerable. In addition, we also saw that respect for human rights, as 
being part of the idea of decency, constitute the limits of tolerable international 
conduct in Rawls‟s theory.     
     In Chapter 2, with respect to the reasons for toleration, we mentioned that in both 
Political Liberalism and The Law of Peoples, we might refer to „respect for persons‟ 
as a justification for toleration. However, in the international realm, „peoples‟ 
replaces „persons‟ as the agents of toleration and he does not treat peoples as 
reducible, morally, to persons. In Political Liberalism, we have seen that persons, in 
virtue of being reasonable, grant respect to each other as citizens who are free and 
equal members of a society as a fair system of cooperation. They also do not impose 
their own conception of good, either alone or by using political power, on others 
since they accept that others are reasonable, and free and equal like themselves. In a 
similar vein, we noted that liberal and decent nonliberal peoples, as equal members of 
the Society of Peoples, grant respect to each other by abiding by the principles of the 
Law of peoples. It was stated that in recognizing the equal standing of decent 
nonliberal peoples in the Society of Peoples, liberal peoples grant respect to the status 
of those peoples as free and equal.    
      After examining the conception of toleration in the theory of Rawls, we focused 
on the theory of Jurgen Habermas with the aim of outlining the characteristics of and 
reasons for toleration as an international issue. In chapter 4, we analyzed Habermas‟s 
conception of toleration as an intra-state matter within the context of democratic 
societies. This analysis provided us with the main parameters of his conception of 
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toleration as an international issue. In examining the theory of Habermas, we tried to 
give attention to differences as well as parallels between his domestic and 
international accounts of toleration. We also made reference to Rawls‟s conception of 
toleration regarding both toleration as an intra-state and inter-state issue with the aim 
of outlining the parallels and differences between the two theories.    
       In Chapter 4, we examined Habermas‟s conception of toleration as an intra-state 
matter with reference to the context of democratic societies.  First of all, we argued 
that toleration is a central theme in Habermas‟s political theory and also a 
requirement of his understanding of political liberalism and justice. It was mentioned 
that, on this point, there is a commonality between his theory and that of Rawls. We 
said that, in a postmetaphysical age, the state must not refer to any religious and 
metaphysical worldview to claim its legitimate authority. In this way, in the theory of 
Habermas, justification of the political authority rests on a principle of toleration 
because it does not impose any religion or metaphysics on people. Moreover, it was 
mentioned that one needs the concept of toleration to justify the principles of justice 
because justice requires its principles to be derived from an independent 
(autonomous) ground in a postmetaphysical age.   
       As for the characteristics of toleration, we noted that in Habermas‟s view, in a 
similar vein with Rawls, citizens, as holders of different worldviews -religious and 
secular-, are viewed as tolerators of each other‟s conduct and beliefs as members of 
the same political community. As for the objects of toleration, we also pointed out a 
parallel between the theories of Rawls and Habermas: the beliefs, convictions, habits 
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and conduct of citizens having diverse worldviews are the possible objects of 
toleration in the theory of Habermas.     
       Regarding the condition of diversity as a characteristic of toleration, we said that 
there is a similarity between the outlooks of Rawls and Habermas with respect to 
their perspective on pluralism. We stated that, like Rawls, Habermas acknowledges 
pluralism as a fact of contemporary times when theorizing about toleration. In line 
with this, it was noted that the „post-metaphysical age‟ as an age of pluralism requires 
the principle of toleration for providing the conditions of coexistence of different 
ethical world-views. We also said that we might refer to the condition of disapproval 
because Habermas‟s individuals are likely to exhibit opposition, disagreement as well 
as disapproval even though they share the same political culture. In addition, we 
pointed out that both Rawls and Habermas seem to acknowledge the fact that there 
might be enduring disagreement among citizens all of whom accept the rules of the 
democratic game, and this will have to provide some ground to toleration as well.  
We mentioned that what Habermas calls „irresolvable disagreement in the long run‟ 
seems to be similar to what Rawls calls reasonable pluralism arising from the 
„burdens of judgment‟. We said Habermas does not qualify clearly what exactly he 
means by „irresolvable disagreement‟, whereas Rawls defines in a detailed way what 
he understands by „burdens of judgment‟.   
       As for the condition of power as a characteristic of toleration,  a parallel is 
pointed out between the theories of Rawls and Habermas. We contended that for 
Habermas too, citizens of democratic societies -religious and secular- as agents of 
toleration would tolerate each other‟s conduct even if they had the actual power not to 
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do so.  They would also act out of a tolerant disposition if they lacked actual power. 
We noted that good Habermasian citizens possess tolerant dispositions towards each 
other as members of the same political community having equal status. We said that 
this condition seems to be valid both for the relations between religious and secular 
citizens and for religious and secular citizens among themselves.    
       Lastly, in Chapter 4, we mentioned the scope, demands and limits of toleration as 
far as Habermas‟s outlook on toleration as an intra-state matter is concerned. With 
respect to the scope of toleration, we said that there is a parallel between the outlooks 
of Rawls and Habermas: for both of them, it seems the sources of disapproval might 
be both moral and non-moral. It was also stated that for Habermas, as long as the 
disapproval is not based on a prejudice and qualifies as „subjectively good‟, then it is 
within the scope of toleration. We also pointed out the significance of the distinction 
between ethics and morality in the theory of Habermas regarding the scope of 
toleration: it could be argued that sources of disapproval might stem from ethical 
judgments which do not have to relate to morality. Thus, it was stated, that for 
Habermas, one might refer to aesthetic dislikes as well as other sources of 
disapproval which might generate out of ethical considerations that are related to our 
upbringing, habits and traditions.     
        Regarding the demands of toleration, it was mentioned that similarly to Rawls‟s 
position in Political Liberalism, Habermas‟s theory supports both positive disposition 
and action of citizens toward each other. We stated that in the theory of Habermas, a 
hermeneutical self-reflectivity, being open to dialogue with the other, and 
understanding the other require positive action and disposition from citizens of a 
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democratic community with regard to demands of toleration. We pointed out that 
Rawls‟s notion of „reasonableness‟ and the ethics of citizenship would probably 
support such a positive disposition from citizens in the sense of hermeneutical self-
reflectivity even though it is not stated explicitly. However, we added, Habermas‟s 
open and persistent emphasis on hermeneutical self-reflexivity brings explicitly 
positive actions to the fore as a requirement of toleration. We also pointed out the 
„translation requirement‟ and „complementary learning process‟ as two positive 
demands of toleration in the theory of Habermas.       
        With respect to the limits of toleration, we argued that Habermas does not refer 
to any specific substantive limits. Nevertheless, we stated, it is significant that the 
substantive limits (what should be tolerated and what should not) should be justifiable 
to all in a democratic constitutional regime. It was pointed out that citizens, in their 
status of being free and equal, shall decide on what is tolerable and what is not under 
a noncoercive and open procedure of argumentation. In other words, it was stated that 
their open and noncoercive shared discourse will define justifiable limits for 
toleration.         
       We also drew attention to a similarity between the positions of Rawls and 
Habermas concerning the limits of toleration. We argued that for both Rawls and 
Habermas, the limits could be assessed by a certain political criterion: 
„reasonableness‟ in Rawls‟s theory and „discourse ethics‟ in Habermas‟s theory.  In 
Rawls‟s outlook on toleration, reasonableness plays a role in drawing the limits, 
while in Habermas‟s outlook  it is deliberative democratic will formation of citizens. 
In this sense, we might call these criteria formal procedural measures rather than 
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substantive limits. They come onto the agenda as formal criteria that enable citizens 
to view each other as free and equal in sharing the political power. Nevertheless, we 
also took note of one major difference between the two theories: Habermas‟s 
discourse ethics relies on a universal idea of practical reason while Rawls‟s 
reasonableness does not presuppose such a moral core in the Habermasian sense of 
the term.      
       Lastly, in Chapter 4, we focused on the reasons for toleration in the theory of 
Habermas. We said, the idea of respect comes onto the scene as a reason for 
toleration in Habermas‟s theory and this is again a parallel between his and Rawls‟s 
outlooks on toleration. It is noted that the idea of civic solidarity as part of the ethics 
of citizenship is also supportive of respect as a reason for toleration. Moreover, for 
Habermas, being citizens of the same political community requires us to respect the 
free and equal status of each other.  
        After focusing on the outlook of Habermas on toleration as an intra-state matter 
(in the context of democratic societies) in Chapter 4, we turned our attention to his 
conception of toleration as an international issue in Chapter 5. We analyzed the 
characteristics of and reasons for international toleration in his theory with reference 
to our conceptual map developed in the first part of Chapter 1. To begin with, we 
argued that in a parallel vein with Rawls, toleration is a central theme and also a 
requirement of justice concerning Habermas‟s international theory. We said the 
question how it is possible to live together in peace in a world society divided by 
various faiths, worldviews and beliefs constitutes Habermas‟s motivation for 
considering international toleration as a central theme in his international theory. In 
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addition, we also said, there is a place in the theory of Habermas for the argument 
that international toleration might be viewed as a requirement of justice. We argued 
that, for Habermas, a multicultural world society which is peaceful and just could be 
possible with the endorsement of the principle of toleration. It was pointed out that 
for Habermas, the principle of toleration should be reflected in the attitude of the 
participants of an intercultural discourse on principles of a political justice for a 
multicultural world-society.      
         In Chapter 5, we stated that there is an ambiguity on which international agents 
count as agents of international toleration in the theory of Habermas. Nevertheless, it 
was contended, states, powerful individuals, NGOs and communities of faith –all of 
whom could be bearers of certain cultural and religious world-views- seem to figure 
as possible tolerators in the theory of Habermas. Individuals might also count as 
agents of toleration at the international level as members of different faiths and 
cultural communities, since Habermas gives much significance to civilizations and 
cultures in his considerations concerning religion in the international realm. The 
category of civilizations might have significance as shaping the conduct and 
disposition of these possible agents. We also added that mention of states as agents 
does not mean states have moral priority rather than individuals in the international 
realm.  
           It was mentioned that one could also identify various conduct, beliefs, and 
values etc. which are shaped through the world-view of different civilizations as 
possible objects of international toleration in the theory of Habermas. Overall, 
regarding the category of civilizations, we pointed out that there is a risk of falling 
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into cultural essentialism when considering the agents and objects of international 
toleration and this risk has to be taken by Habermas.    
          Moreover, we addressed both a parallel and a difference between the outlooks 
of Rawls and Habermas on toleration regarding the agents and objects of toleration. 
We mentioned that Habermas does not refer to peoples in the way that Rawls does in 
his international theory. He seems to incorporate a variety of agents into his theory as 
far as toleration is concerned. We also said that this might be due to the cosmopolitan 
stand of Habermas as compared to Rawls. Nevertheless, we said, peoples in Rawls‟s 
theory do not have to exclude the category of civilizations: civilizations might be 
viewed as world- entities that combine different „peoples‟ in virtue of providing them 
with a shared cultural and traditional basis. Having said this, we also pointed out the 
risk of disregarding other possible agents of international toleration, such as 
individuals if we stick to peoples conceived as corporate entities as the agents of 
toleration at the international level.          
        As for the diversity condition as a characteristic of toleration, we pointed out 
another parallel between the theories of Rawls and Habermas in addressing pluralism 
together with conflict concerning toleration in the international realm. In Habermas‟s 
theory, we specifically referred to the „post-secular age‟ as a global condition marked 
by an intense diversity in the global realm. We said that world society, the tendency 
of world society to become a post-secular society, constitutes the diversity condition 
that enables Habermas to refer toleration as an international issue.                         
        With regard to the condition of power as a characteristic of toleration, we 
mentioned both tolerant conduct and tolerant dispositions on the part of tolerators in 
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the international realm in the theory of Habermas. We said states, international 
organizations, religious communities might be viewed as potential exhibitors of both 
tolerant conduct and tolerant dispositions. Hence, it was stated that like that of Rawls, 
Habermas‟s theory also satisfies the condition of power as a characteristic of 
toleration as an international issue.     
        Regarding the scope of international toleration, we said, in Habermas‟s view, 
one might assume varied forms of disapproval and dislike such as aesthetic, cultural 
etc. which could be seen as part of our ethical life. In other words, it seems very 
likely that there will be disagreement of various sorts given the fact that world is 
divided by different civilizations, cultures and worldviews. Thus, a parallel was 
pointed out between Habermas‟s domestic and international toleration concerning the 
question of the scope. This constitutes another similarity between Rawls‟s and 
Habermas‟s outlook. Nevertheless, we mentioned, what is nonmoral is ethical in the 
eyes of Habermas. Therefore, we said, for Habermas, disapproval is either moral or 
ethical in the international realm.       
            With respect to the demands of toleration as an international issue in 
Habermas‟s theory, we drew attention to the positive demands that require not only a 
positive disposition of agents but also positive action such as the „translation 
requirement‟ and „complementary learning‟. It was also mentioned that this 
constitutes a difference between the international theories of Rawls and Habermas 
because in Rawls‟s international theory, we do not find requirements for positive 
action but rather we do find demands of positive disposition. In line with this, we 
mentioned that, in the view of Habermas, one could appeal to an idea of a 
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hermeneutical reflection which might be supported by an idea of cosmopolitan 
solidarity as the source of positive demands of toleration as an international issue.         
     In Chapter 5, we noted that human rights play a significant role in the theory of 
Habermas concerning the limits of toleration in the international realm. First of all, 
we mentioned that Habermas attaches a significant role to human rights as legitimate 
rules that have the potential to guide international politics. In this respect, we said, 
human rights might be regarded as potentially legitimate candidates for drawing the 
line between what is tolerable and what is not. Secondly, it was pointed out that, for 
Habermas, human rights raise another question of toleration: the universalism of 
human rights confronts the reality of cultural diversity. In this sense, we said, 
according to him, basic individual rights (human rights) secure the basis of any form 
of life or the pursuit of any ethical project, be it communitarian or not. In this regard, 
we noted, Habermas also recognizes that human rights prescribe a right to toleration 
in the international realm.     
       We also addressed certain significant differences between the theories of Rawls 
and Habermas concerning human rights. We said that Rawls subscribes to a minimal 
set of human rights in terms of content. On the contrary, it was claimed that 
Habermas‟s list of human rights would demand more than that. In other words, we 
mentioned, Habermas would go for a full set of basic rights and liberties in a non-
restricted manner. We also said that the role of human rights is limited to setting the 
limits of what is tolerable in the international realm in the theory of Rawls. In this 
regard, it was claimed, unlike Rawls, human rights have both domestic and 
international role in the theory of Habermas. They require a liberal democratic 
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institutional setting for their full realization as a legitimate and stable basis both at the 
domestic and international level. For Rawls, there is no such necessity for human 
rights to have full legitimacy.  In line with this, we mentioned that although Rawls 
and Habermas differ in principle in viewing human rights in the international realm -
Rawls subscribing to internationalism whereas Habermas favors a cosmopolitan 
approach- they do not differ much in practice. Like Rawls, Habermas is cautious in 
his use of human rights as justifying international intervention.     
        As far as reasons for toleration as an international issue is concerned, we also 
pointed out „respect‟ as a justification for toleration in the theory of Habermas.  We 
said different cultures, civilizations and communities of faith and of course 
individuals as members of these communities, in viewing each other as equal 
members of a reflective dialogue/discourse, grant respect to each other. We also 
added that the idea of respect as a reason for international toleration does not base 
itself on a thick ethics of citizenship as it does in the case of the domestic context in 
the theory of Habermas. Thus, it was stated that in the international realm, respect 
seems to come to the fore as a result of the recognition of equal status of each other as 
different communities sharing the same multicultural world society.          
       We also pointed out a significant difference between the outlooks of Rawls and 
Habermas regarding the idea of respect as a reason for international toleration. We 
said that respect, for Habermas, would not necessarily prohibit the offering of 
incentives as it does for Rawls. It seems Habermas would support certain changes 
that would help a society to transform into a more democratic and liberal direction 
and he would not see this matter as something contrary to the idea of respect. It was 
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mentioned that the reason for this difference might be the fact that Habermas does not 
view political power in the way Rawls does. We noted Rawls considers any activity 
of intervention or influence that is practiced by a certain people on the other in the 
Society of Peoples as exercising illegitimate power such as manipulation, bribing etc.  
         Chapter 6, the last chapter, was devoted to further reflections on the comparison 
between the theories of Rawls and Habermas with the aim to address their weak and 
strong points as theories of international toleration. We said both of the theories 
demonstrated the possibility of international toleration by outlining different 
dimensions of toleration as an international issue. They both provided strong cases 
for international toleration by offering principled moral reasons and recognizing 
global pluralism as a fact which gives rise to the question of toleration. 
        We also said that, the differences between the two theories are of principle: 
Habermas subscribes to cosmopolitanism whereas Rawls favors internationalism. In 
this respect, we identified differences concerning the possible agents and demands of 
international toleration as well as differences on the content and role of human rights. 
We contended, regardless of its ambiguity on the possible agents of international 
toleration, Habermas‟s theory seems to offer room for a variety of agents which 
makes his outlook more compatible with the highly pluralistic nature of our 
multicultural world in comparison to Rawls‟s outlook on agents of international 
toleration. In addition, we said, the requirements of international toleration Habermas 
lays out are far from being unrealistic even though they bring a demanding notion of 
international toleration. On the issue of human rights, we gave credit to both theories 
in recognizing human rights as candidates for drawing the limits of tolerable conduct 
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in the international realm. Nevertheless, we mentioned, both theories suffer from 
certain ambiguities on the issues of content and legitimacy: Habermas does not 
specify clearly which rights are prior as far as international toleration is concerned 
and Rawls does not justify his minimalist set of human rights. 
         Lastly, in Chapter 6, we tried to give an account of what features a theory of 
international toleration should exhibit. We said that first of all, a theory of 
international toleration must be able to give room to all possible diverse agents in the 
international realm such as different international organizations, NGOs, states, 
communities of faith, cultural groups, various associations of different sort, 
individuals, organizations of social movements etc. Secondly, a theory of 
international toleration should recognize the highly pluralistic condition of the world 
and start from this fact in its conceptualization of conflict and its place. Thirdly, it 
must also consider the role of power in the sense that no actor is wholly immune from 
the power of the others and no actor is wholly incapable of exerting power on others.  
        Then, we claimed, as far as demands of international toleration are concerned, 
we can appeal to both positive dispositions and actions. We contended, we can see 
Habermas‟s proposals such as hermeneutical self-reflectivity, openness to dialogue 
and understanding the other as necessary positive dispositions as well as „translation 
requirement‟ and „complementary learning‟ as necessary positive actions. Regarding 
the limits of international toleration, we stated that a theory of international toleration 
must recognize that human rights play a significant role as limits to tolerable action in 
the international realm. Nevertheless, a sort of minimalism in terms of content seems 
to be necessary if intervention in the name of human rights should be justifiable 
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morally to others. In addition, it was concluded that seeing human rights as the 
outcome of an overlapping consensus in the international realm might be helpful in 
both justifying intervention and developing a tolerant account of human rights which 
does not impose any particular comprehensive doctrine on the others. 
        We also stated, a theory of international toleration must offer some insight on 
what type of actions are counted as justifiable intolerance when necessary. Thus, it 
was contended that one might refer to diverse actions such as intervention by force, 
economic sanctions, public criticism, initiating a campaign against the intolerable 
conduct etc. 
        As a last consideration, it was mentioned that a theory of international toleration 
must be able to provide principled moral reasons for international toleration. In this 
respect, we said, „respect for persons‟ seems to be the best candidate. Nevertheless, it 
was also stated that recognizing the relevant role of moral consequentialist reasons 
and skepticism is also significant for a theory of international toleration.  
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